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THE
NEGOTIATIONS
OF
COUNT D'AVAUX,

Ambassador from his Most CHRISTIAN
MAJESTY to the STATES GENERAL
of the United Provinces.

CONTAINING

The Steps taken by the Prince of ORANGE to
ascend the Throne of GREAT BRITAIN; and
the Intrigues of the Court of FRANCE to coun-
teract his Measures during that interesting Period.

Translated from the FRENCH.

V O L. II.

L O N D O N:

Printed for A. MILLAR; and D. WILSON and
T. DURHAM, in the Strand.

MDCCCLIV.

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The Count d'Avanx, by the Prince of Orange, is
the Prince of Orange, of Great Britain; and
the Prince of Orange, of the Count of Flanders, is
the Prince of Orange, during that interesting Period.

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T H E
NEGOTIATIONS
O F
COUNT D'AVAUZ.

ON the 23d of December the King repeated what he had before ordered me to say to the magistrates of Amsterdam, and expressly signified to me, that if they could bring the States General not to make new levies, nor to join their troops to those of Spain, in order to attack those of the King, or the countries that belonged to him, he would be satisfied with carrying on the war in the open country, and should not be obliged either to lay siege to, or take possession of, any of the places in the Spanish Netherlands.

This obliged me to go to Amsterdam, to renew the assurances I had already given them on the part of the King; and their deputies being arrived at the Hague, on Tuesday, at eight o'clock at night, they demanded an audience of me, and let me know, that the magistrates of their city felt the extremest gratitude, on account of his Majesty's goodness in resolving to turn his arms aside from the Netherlands, if at the end of the month of January the Spaniards did not accept one of the equivalents.

They at length asked me, if I was not empowered to declare his Majesty's favourable dispositions,

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by a memorial to the States General; to which I answered three things: first, that I was not impowered, and therefore could not do it; in the second place, that his Majesty having done this only to satisfy, even contrary to his own interest (as I had already shewn them) the desires of the magistrates of Amsterdam, they ought not to have made the proposal. And, in short, I desired to know, if they had so well taken their measures as to be certain that the affair would succeed, supposing I did give a memorial. They told me, that they hoped so; but as they foresaw great difficulties in it, they could not answer for it. On which I let them see, that it was not only improper for me to give a memorial, but that my asking his Majesty's permission to present it, would not contribute even to the success of the affair. To this I added all the reasons I had alledged, when they desired me to make this very proposal, in the visits I made the deputies of the cities of Holland; in such a manner that they agreed to it; and only desired the permission to inform the states of Holland, that having conferred with me on the reason they had to be apprehensive about the fate of the Low-Countries, in case the Spaniards should not accept his Majesty's proposals by the end of January, they had found that they might preserve themselves from the apprehensions they might be under of his Majesty's making new conquests in the Netherlands.

The deputies of Amsterdam went the next day, by order of their superiors, to put three very bold questions to the Prince of Orange, two of which were founded on the intelligence I had given them.

1. Who it was that gave orders to Torcy's regiment to leave the countries under the dominion of the States General, and to enter those of Spain.

2. What

2. What number of troops had been sent against the Spaniards; and whether these troops were to act offensively or defensively?

3. By whose order the fleet belonging to the states had sailed to Gottenburg?

The Prince of Orange replied, that the magistrates of Amsterdam had for some time past behaved towards him in a very extraordinary manner, and had sought for opportunities of giving him personal affronts; that this behaviour had obliged him, on his side, to observe a very different conduct with respect to them, and that he had therefore no other answer to make to their demands; but that he was not to give an account of his actions to a single city; and that when the States General should speak to him of it, he would then explain himself.

He went immediately to the states of Holland, complained of the behaviour of the magistrates of Amsterdam, and represented, that he had been absent for some days, because he found the magistrates of Amsterdam would be masters, and pretended to regulate the affairs of the republic, according to their caprice.

He afterwards said, that he should be glad to know what was these gentlemen's design, whether they were desirous of suffering the Spanish Netherlands to be lost, or whether they were for having them defended; that if they were willing to suffer them to be taken, he should freely declare that the other cities of Holland were not of their mind, and that as for himself in particular, he would part with his last penny, and even the last drop of his blood in their defence: that he did not doubt but that these gentlemen would no sooner see two places taken than they would be of the same opinion, and think of nothing but defending the Spaniards; but that then it would be too late.

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He added, that he was extremely surprized at seeing that a single city was desirous of becoming the mistress of all the others; but that he would perish rather than suffer it, and permit the order of the republic to be changed.

He also took occasion to deny what the English envoy had formed out of what the deputies of Amsterdam had reported that he had said to them, with the design to break off all correspondence between the magistrates of Amsterdam and me. He represented the disorder that would proceed from too strict an intercourse between foreign ministers, and the particular members of the state; that these ministers very often advanced things which they would afterwards disavow, whenever the interests of their masters made it expedient, and proposed to forbid all correspondence between foreign ministers and the persons in the government.

The magistrates of Amsterdam would not suffer this affair to be brought into deliberation, and they all at once declared, that they could not submit to any resolution that might be taken on this subject; that they resolved to inform themselves of the sentiments of the Princes with whom it was for their advantage to preserve a good intelligence; and that they were resolved to see whether the Pensionary Fagel, either added or diminished any thing in what he reported in the assembly, on the part of the foreign ministers; that they had been to see me, and would go as often as they had any thing to communicate to, or to learn from me.

It is surprizing that the Prince of Orange should attack so powerful a city as that of Amsterdam, on a few visits I had paid to its deputies, as if they had acted contrary to the laws of the government, or had done what had never before been practised. Yet this was so far from being the case, that I saw
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the magistrates of Amsterdam much seldomer, than the other foreign ministers saw the persons in the government; for not only is it permitted to see them in a ceremonious manner, and all together, as I did, since being sovereigns whenever they are assembled at the Hague, they every day treat about foreign affairs with foreign ministers, but every body knew that they went every day separately to make private visits, to play and eat with them. It is true, that being forbid to see the Prince of Orange, no member of the government had been to see me, during the whole course of my embassy, in a familiar visit, and much less to eat with me: so that it appeared the more strange to the Prince of Orange, that the magistrates of Amsterdam and I should return such frequent visits; and as he at the same time saw they opposed all his designs, and that such a conduct, if still pursued, might at length re-establish the republican party, we ought not to be astonished at his making use of all his endeavours to destroy this correspondence, and break these measures.

Thus he treated the magistrates of Amsterdam so ill, that they put themselves on their guard more than they had hitherto done; and from hence they caused all the gates of the city, except two, to be shut at four in the afternoon, and proposed to raise a thousand men to guard the place.

In the mean time they constantly proposed my making known, by a memorial to the States General, the good intentions of the King to preserve the repose of the republic, in case the Spaniards should let the month of January pass to no purpose; and as I was not impowered to present it, we sought for all possible expedients to let the States General know his Majesty's intentions; and we could find no other, besides that of improving the occasion of a compliment which the deputies of the States Gene-

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ral ought to make me on the birth of the Duke of Anjou. I immediately sent an account in a long letter I wrote to the King, on the ninth of January, of every thing I had concerted with the magistrates of Amsterdam; I wrote an account of the particulars of what had passed between us; the assurances I had demanded in case the King acted according to their wishes, and many other things of the like nature. But the Prince of Orange, who resolved to ruin the magistrates of Amsterdam, and to break off all correspondence between them and me, had set his spies on all sides to get information of my sending a courier; and being informed that one of them had that day taken post-horses, caused him to be followed; and as I had for some time sent my couriers by the way of Liege, having no other means of security besides making them pass through the Spanish territories, the orders he gave to him he dispatched to cause the gates of Boisleduc and other strong places belonging to the States General to be opened to him, enabled him to overtake my courier at Maestricht, and give information to the governor, who detained him a considerable time, without giving him the permission to take post-horses; and while he stopped him, he sent three parties of seven men each, who were to wait for him a quarter of a league from Maestricht. He was seized on the 15th of January, by the first party, who belonged to the regiments of Berlow and Tilly; these men undressed him, and took his letters, without meddling with his money, or taking any thing else besides his boots, and strait coat, and then put him into the hands of his postilion, who brought him back to Maestricht. He returned to the Hague to give me an account of his adventure; and I was informed, by another of my couriers, who arrived the same day from Paris, that a person of whom he had no know-

knowledge, having seen him take a post-chaise at Boisseduc, had accosted him, and told him, that he was thoroughly persuaded that he belonged to me; that he took care of him, and that he had just learnt, that orders had been given to rob my couriers, which in fact obliged him to take another road. I made complaints of this attempt to the States General, not doubting but that the Prince of Orange, finding himself obliged to disown his having any hand in it, would not dare to make use of these letters against the magistrates of Amsterdam. I resolved, nevertheless, not to name the Prince of Orange, without an order from the King, which I besought his Majesty to grant me, at the same time giving an account of the memorial I had already presented on this subject; but it was not thought proper, that I should make stronger and more particular complaints, which would nevertheless, in my opinion, have embarrassed the Prince of Orange: for the States General were too much afraid of offending the King, not to have shewn their resentment against the Prince of Orange, especially on their being incited to it by the magistrates of Amsterdam, and the provinces of Friesland and Groningen. I therefore spoke no more of this affair, till the Prince of Orange had caused my letters to be deciphered, as will be seen in the sequel.

The Prince of Orange went no more to the assembly for near a month, and had given it as his reason, that since the magistrates of Amsterdam were resolved to destroy the republic, he would suffer them to do it; but he did not labour with the less zeal to make them resolve to raise sixteen thousand men; and even attempted, on the 16th of January, by the Pensionary Fagel's means, to engage the states of Holland to come to a conclusion. He had imagined that he should receive great assistance from

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Mr. Heinsius, Pensionary of Delft, who positively assured the states of Holland, that at the time when he was in France, he had discovered that if the States General had raised sixteen thousand men, things were so situated that it would have brought about an accommodation that would have been of much greater advantage to Spain. In reality, this discourse made a very strong impression on their minds, but it had no effect on those of the magistrates of his own city; for the deputies of Delft, and those of Leyden, declared, that they would never consent to its being done, while the magistrates of Amsterdam so strongly opposed it. The deputies of Amsterdam, on their side, represented, the necessity of pressing the Spaniards to come to an accommodation by the end of the month; and in case of their refusal, to take measures with his Majesty for the safety of the Netherlands; they declared, that they had been informed the deputies of the States General having waited upon me, we had talked of many things that appeared to them very advantageous to the republic; and then they desired one of the nobles of Holland, who had been employed in this deputation, on the part of his province, to relate what had passed. This nobleman, however, for fear of displeasing the Prince of Orange, excused himself, from the pretence that I had given him nothing in writing. The deputies of Amsterdam told him, that if he was so scrupulous about explaining himself on an affair so advantageous to the republic, they should not be so. They then made a long enumeration of all the securities that might be taken with the King, in case the Spaniards did not accept any one of the equivalents before the end of January, and pressed with warmth their entering into a deliberation upon it: but the body of the nobles, who first give their votes, and only spoke

spoke by the mouth of the Pensionary Fagel, declared, that they would not enter into a deliberation on any affair, till the raising the sixteen thousand men was first agreed upon; but offered to endeavour to promote an accommodation between his Majesty and Spain, the same day, if the magistrates of Amsterdam would consent to the levy of that number of forces. On which the deputies of Amsterdam said, that no reason, nor any pretence whatsoever, should induce them to consent, either at that time, or any other, to a new levy. They therefore separated without any thing being done.

The deputies of Friesland and Groningen, who came on the deputation with this Dutch nobleman, were not so reserved as he; for they made a report to the States General of what I had said: but the deputies of the other provinces, who were all, as I have already observed, in the Prince of Orange's interest, declared, that they would deliberate in the States General, only on the written memorials of foreign ministers.

Thus the Prince of Orange eluded all the good designs of the magistrates of Amsterdam, by means of his creatures; and these gentlemen traversed his enterprizes, by the strong opposition they made to them.

The King sent, on the sixth of January, to inform me, that he was very well satisfied with the account I had sent on the 30th and 31st of December, of the conferences I had had with the magistrates of Amsterdam, and with my having disabused them with respect to the hopes that his Majesty would not insist on the equivalents; that he had nothing to add to what I had agreed with them, and had nothing left to desire, except their engaging the States General to give him assurances of it.

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And after many alternatives, which his Majesty explained, he let me know, that he should be satisfied (in case I found too much difficulty in making them recal the overplus of eight thousand men) that the States General should engage by treaty, that this overplus should only be employed as garrisons, (without requiring the same, with respect to the eight thousand men they were obliged to grant the Spaniards, by the treaties they had made with them) in which case his Majesty permitted me to give in writing, that he would not enter upon any siege in the Netherlands; and even that he would not seize or take possession, in any manner whatsoever, of any place in the Netherlands, belonging to the Spaniards; so that he should content himself with pressing them by the lodgment of his troops and the exaction of contributions, to consent to one of the equivalents proposed; and for this purpose he sent me the power necessary to enable me to conclude and sign this treaty.

The King also sent me, for the information of the magistrates of Amsterdam, a memorial which explained the extent of the places, and dependencies he demanded in the second equivalent.

These instances of condescension in the King, were adapted to confirm the magistrates of Amsterdam in their good dispositions: but as I had not the permission to represent them in a memorial to the States General, they were of no use in bringing this affair into deliberation. For want of this, they required, that the King of England should give orders to his envoy to testify to the States General, that if the Spaniards would not agree to an accommodation, his Britannic Majesty believed, that the best expedient they could embrace, was to take measures to prevent the war being carried into the Spanish Netherlands; but they were very far from
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having this permission from his Britannic Majesty; for the magistrates of Amsterdam and I having found the means of entertaining the English envoy with discourses of this nature, in some private conversations, the Spanish ambassador at London complained of it to the King of England, who disavowed what his minister had done; and Mr. de Barillon informed me, that he would not give the Spaniards cause to make new complaints.

On the other hand, Citters did not cease writing, that the King of England wished that the States General might be arbitrators jointly with him. This made the States General consider things in a different light from that in which they had been received by the deputies of Amsterdam, and from time to time produced some scruples even in the minds of the magistrates of that city, who almost began to be persuaded by Citters, that I was not informed of the King's secrets, and that Mr. Barillon and the King of England were acquainted with things that were not intrusted to me.

I nevertheless easily removed their mistake, or at least what I imagined to be such; and what pressed them still more than I was able to do, was the time's advancing; for the 17th of January was already arrived: this obliged them to redouble their endeavours to bring the States General to enter into a negotiation with me on the securities that might be taken on both sides, in case the Spaniards should not have come to an accommodation by the end of the month; and they had even one day so well taken their time, that they were on the point of bringing the States General to resolve upon it, when the Pensionary Fagel arrived unexpectedly, which broke these measures.

They however were not discouraged, but did all in their power to oblige the States General to enter

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into a negotiation with me, on the measures that were to be taken after the last of January: but the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel rendered all their endeavours ineffectual. This Prince hoped that the first of February would arrive, without any thing being performed; and that then his Majesty would grant a new delay, which was what he greatly wished, since the Spaniards would on this account become more obstinate; or if the King's troops should perform some enterprize in the Netherlands, this would furnish a favourable opportunity for his pressing the States General to make the levies.

Mean while he warmly pursued the affair he had undertaken, of preventing all correspondence between the members of the government and the foreign ministers: but the deputies of Amsterdam publicly declared, that they would never consent to it, nor ever agree to a resolution which the Prince of Orange might cause to be taken, with respect to this particular, on a plurality of voices, since in causing a change in the form of government, the consent ought to be unanimous.

The Pensionary Fagel, on the contrary, notwithstanding all his endeavours, could not hinder the province of Holland from deliberating on the proposal made by the magistrates of Amsterdam to send word to five admirals to repair to the Hague, and to bring with them a true state of the vessels of the republic; with an exact account of those that were fit for service, and those that were not; of the sums they had received for the improvement of the navy, and how they had imployed those that had been granted for its support. They were resolved by this means to make known the considerable sums the States General were obliged to grant for the maintenance of their commerce, and the establishment of their
naval

naval affairs, and that they ought not so much as to think of entering into superfluous expences, by raising fresh forces, while they were scarcely able to furnish what was necessary for the support of the republic. They at the same time caused the deputy of Friesland to represent to the States General, that his province, on seeing the warlike preparations made by the bishop of Munster, in his bishopric, had thought proper to recal general Alwa with his regiment, which was maintained at the expence of that province, and that the Prince of Orange had sent it into Flanders to succour the Spaniards, together with this general, who commanded the forces of the republic.

The Prince of Orange still endeavoured to gain over the magistrates of Amsterdam by the means he had already put in practice. He assured them, that they should deliberate on my papers, and seriously endeavour to obtain a peace, as soon as the levies should be resolved upon, and caused it to be represented to them, that he only desired this instance of their complaisance to save his honour. But they were so perfectly informed, by all the steps they saw him take, that as soon as they had put it into his power, he would draw them into a war, in spite of all they could do to prevent it, that they constantly refused to make the levies on these conditions, and declared, that no reason, nor no pretence, should ever oblige them to grant them.

In the mean time I was informed, that other affairs might be brought on the carpet, and that the marquis de Grana began to conceive hopes of deciphering my letters, which by the Prince of Orange's means had been taken from my courier; and upon this I gave them some hints, that they might be able to take measures for their defence; but not so as to terrify or discourage them.

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The Prince of Orange always thought of establishing a general negotiation at the Hague, in which he hoped that if the States General were but once entered, there would be no room after that to think of a particular accommodation with Spain. The Prince of Waldeck, who was to have the management of this assembly, arrived at last at the Hague, on the 24th of January 1684: but I had made the magistrates of Amsterdam see so plainly the snare that was laid for them, under the pretence of a general accommodation, that I was not under the least apprehension of their suffering themselves to be surprized into it; they therefore fortunately opposed it, and were so carried away by their heat, as even to lose sight of their own interest, from their aversion to every thing that might occasion a war, or give the least pretence to the Prince of Orange for making the levies; so that, when the Pensionary Fagel, who knew the particular interest of Amsterdam required their having a considerable naval force, resolved to take them by their weak side, and proposed in the assembly of Holland their always having a fleet ready to put to sea, the magistrates of Amsterdam, who at other times had solicited it, and frequently to no purpose, in express terms rejected the proposal, and said that they had no occasion for it, since they placed an entire confidence in his Majesty's word; and that his inclination for peace rendered them intirely easy.

I discovered, that the first thing the Prince of Orange and the Prince of Waldeck designed to make the general assembly perform, was to engage the States General, to desire the King of England, in the name of all the Princes who were entered into the association, to interpose his good offices with the King, to obtain a general armistice, in which they would labour after an accommodation. They
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were afterwards to make some proposals, and in case the King did not agree to them, they had resolved to deliberate among themselves, what measures they could all take for supporting the war against his Majesty.

The Prince of Waldeck, however, would not undertake the direction of this assembly, till he had first conversed with the magistrates of Amsterdam. He went to see them, and after a long conference, in which he founded three or four of the principal persons in the republic, he learned the situation of the affairs of the country, and resolved not to take upon himself the management of the general negotiation, but only to give his sentiments.

The suburbs of Brussels, burnt by M. Boufflers, at the end of January, gave fresh cause for the Prince of Orange's creatures making a very great noise in the assembly of Holland, and drew many reproaches on the magistrates of Amsterdam; but the Prince of Orange had the displeasure to see, that the deputies of Amsterdam, were not in the least moved by them; and that they made no other answer, but that this ought to let them see the necessity of coming to an accommodation with his Majesty. The Prince of Orange resolved, nevertheless, that the Spanish envoy should redouble his instances to the States General; and I was informed, that he was to present a memorial on the fifth of February, by which he was to urge them to enter on a war against France. But I informed the King, that he had nothing to apprehend from it; and that this envoy could not do any thing more injurious to the King his master.

M. de Barillon then wrote me word, that he had communicated to the King of England the resolution I had informed him the magistrates of Amsterdam had taken, to demand a neutrality for the Spanish

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nish Netherlands ; that his Britannic Majesty was very glad of it, and had ordered his Minister at the Hague to conform himself to this opinion.

Mean while the apprehensions the people of Amsterdam were under, of receiving some insult from the Prince of Orange, was considerably increased ; they therefore levied six hundred men more than they had already, for guarding the gates of their city. This guard, which had been doubled, was for some days tripled ; they gave them fire-arms instead of the staves tipped with iron which they had before, and every day regularly employed six hundred men in breaking the ice of the ditch.

The King informed me, by a letter dated the 18th of January, that by the time I received that with which he honoured me, the States General would either have given me an opportunity of entering upon a negotiation with them, or the Prince of Orange's authority would have made them reject all the proposals offered by Amsterdam.

That in the first case, I should have nothing to do but to adhere to my orders, and that as the delay would be expired, I could only promise, that the King would make no assault before the first of February.

That if, on the contrary, the Prince of Orange's credit had made them lose all hope of bringing the States General to take measures with the King for the safety of the Netherlands, in case the Spaniards should not accept of the conditions, I should not cease promising the city of Amsterdam in particular, that his Majesty would undertake no siege before the end of February ; but that I should not explain myself, either in the one case or the other, without being greatly pressed to it.

That if the Ministers of Spain threatened the States General as usual, with exchanging the Netherlands

therlands with the King, if they gave them no assistance, that I should promise the magistrates of Amsterdam, and by their means acquaint the States General, that his Majesty would not accept any offer made by the King of Spain in relation to the Netherlands, except in concert with them.

But it was several times repeated, that I was not to engage that the King should enter upon no siege in Flanders, unless the States General would oblige themselves not to make the levies.

And that if the States General would sign a treaty, by which they would engage to make the Spaniards accept of the conditions the King had proposed, I might sign that treaty.

As I found that we were at the end of the month of January, and the magistrates of Amsterdam had not been able to bring the States General to take any steps towards a peace, I resolved to know, if what they had made me hope that they would do for the King, would satisfy his Majesty for the want of the assurances they were unable to obtain from the States General.

I went to pay them a visit, when I made them reflect on every thing his Majesty had already done from a regard to them, and the necessity of not letting slip, without any effect, the delay he had granted them.

They, on their side, made me a long enumeration of what they had done for a certain time past to oppose the Prince of Orange's designs; and asked, if I did not think it very extraordinary, that the King's laying waste and burning all the open country belonging to Spain, had not made the States General come to any determination; that this could only proceed from the great efforts made by the magistrates of Amsterdam, which had had such an effect, as

to prevent the Prince of Orange's drawing the States General into the war. They asked me if it was true, that we were bombarding Mons, as the Prince of Orange had reported, because they apprehended that it would disturb people's minds, and that things might be carried so far, as to render it impossible to make such of the towns in Holland, who were of their party, persevere in their former sentiments. That the inroad made by the Marshal d'Humieres, after he had passed the canal of Bruges in the latter end of December, would have produced very bad effects, if the King had not had the goodness to inform the magistrates of Amsterdam of it beforehand.

That they had not been able to begin to establish a confidence in him; that the greatest part of the leading men of Amsterdam entirely relied on his Majesty's word, but that, however, there were some amongst them, who were not of this disposition: The person of whom they were speaking was Van Buning.

That the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel had filled the minds of many of the principal persons in their government, with suspicions and distrust of all his Majesty's proceedings, which the Magistrates of Amsterdam could not wholly remove; that in order to destroy them entirely, and to hinder the Prince of Orange from engaging the States General in the war, it was necessary to do two things: The first and principal was, to establish and maintain confidence and veracity: The second, not to throw the Spanish Netherlands into such confusion, as to oblige the States General to have recourse to arms, in spite of what they had done to prevent it.

We entered at last into a discussion of what was to be done by them to render ineffectual the measures taken by the Prince of Orange to engage the
States

States General in the war, and though I knew, that the assurances given by a single city were not of equal value with those his Majesty might be able to receive from the States General, I did not forbear endeavouring to discover what might be hoped for from them, and I demanded :

I. That the city of Amsterdam should assure me that no fresh troops should be raised.

II. That it should engage, that no more troops should be sent by the States General into the service of the Spaniards.

III. That the eight thousand men which had been granted, should only be employed in the defence of the strong places, without being sent into his Majesty's dominions, or to oppose the execution of what his troops might perform in the open countries belonging to Spain.

IV. That the city of Amsterdam should cause those to be recalled which the Prince of Orange had raised above the eight thousand men.

V. That if it was impossible to recall the surplus of the eight thousand men, this surplus should only be employed in the defence of the fortified places.

VI. That as his Majesty's only design, as well as that of the magistrates of Amsterdam, was to deprive the Prince of Orange of all means of kindling the war, those gentlemen should refuse to maintain the recruits that had been made within two years past, which amounted to ten thousand five hundred men.

VII. That the general negotiation that had been entered upon at the Hague being only designed to draw things out to a great length, till the Allies should be in a better condition to make war, and to hinder, under the pretence of a general accommodation, there ever being any such thing; the magi-
strates

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frates of Amsterdam should not concur in any resolution that should authorize this assembly.

VIII. That neither should they suffer it to be demanded, that the States General should be arbitrators; since they were very certain, that the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel would have the management of their deliberations.

IX. That in short, the magistrates of Amsterdam should consent to no proposal, except to the pure and simple acceptance of one of the equivalents, and that at the end of the month of January, and after the last day of January should be expired, his Majesty resolving to carry his arms elsewhere, and only to make his troops exert themselves in the Spanish open countries in Flanders, without attacking any strong place in the Spanish Netherlands, the magistrates of Amsterdam should religiously observe all the assurances they had given.

And on the pressing instances they made to me to give a memorial, as I had received a letter from the King on the 20th of January, which was absolutely against my presenting one, I repeated to them what I had already said on this subject, viz. that tho' the offers I had made on the part of the King were done with no other view besides the welfare of the republic, they themselves knew that what appeared advantageous to the States General, when proposed by one of their members, became suspected and would be rejected when offered by the King: that after his Majesty had consented that I should deliver two Memorials to the States General, to which they had made no answer, it was neither consistent with his dignity, nor with the advantage of his services, that I should give a third; and that the Prince of Orange had the same power to prevent their deliberating on this, as he had to hinder it with respect to the two others.

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That moreover his Majesty always persevered in the same good dispositions, and had ordered me to sign the agreement with the States General in case the magistrates of Amsterdam were able to engage them to take a resolution conformable to the sentiments of that city.

The deputies of Amsterdam said, they desired me once more to reflect on the conduct they had maintained for some time past, and that ought to have a greater weight with his Majesty, in convincing him of the sincerity of their sentiments, and the strength and firmness of their resolutions, than the most solemn promises they could make to me. That what they had done was so considerable in itself, that the Prince of Orange had taken occasion from it to render them odious to most of the members of the state. That they could safely assure me, that they would never suffer their zeal to relax, and that if the King would only change the scene of action with respect to his arms, things would take a turn in the manner he desired.

At last they answered article by article what I had proposed.

They told me in regard to the first, that they had already assured me six times, and could assure me still, that Amsterdam would never consent to the levying of fresh forces; that they could consequently promise, that no more of the troops belonging to the state should be sent into the service of Spain; though the Prince of Orange might, by a new breach of the laws of the State, send them thither, but that they did not believe he would undertake it: that as for their part, they would never consent to it, but would always oppose it.

With regard to the third, fourth, and fifth articles, as I had only proposed them to obtain an opportunity of yielding a little, I was content with their
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giving me their word, that they would do all that was possible to satisfy his Majesty, not being able to speak more particularly to a thing, that depended on a positive order of the States.

They shewed me with respect to the sixth, that they could not decently, and without drawing upon themselves the reproaches of all the other towns, (after their having refused to consent to the raising of sixteen thousand men) cause these recruits to be disbanded, at a time when all their neighbours were in arms, and his Majesty's army was busy in the Netherlands. But on my pressing them not to consent to maintain these troops above three months, they promised, that in case his Majesty within that time carried his arms out of the Spanish Netherlands, they would refuse to pay these recruits after the three months should be expired.

As to the general negotiation, they assured me, that they would not enter into it at all.

That as to receiving the States General, in conjunction with the King of England, for arbitrators, they had already prevented it, on the remonstrances I had made them, and would never hear any thing on this subject.

They added to all this, that the thing of which they would give me the greatest assurance, was the firmness of their conduct, of which I ought not to doubt, since it was their interest to continue it. That the steps they had taken to oppose the Prince of Orange's designs, more particularly since I had assured them of his Majesty's sincere desire of a peace, obliged them at least as much as their own interest, not to go back; and that his majesty ought to place a greater confidence in this, and on the engagements into which they had entered against the Prince of Orange, than on all the assurances they were capable of giving his Majesty. In a word, they assured me,

me, that they were resolved on a peace whatever it cost them, and would never consent to any thing that could directly or indirectly engage them in the war.

That they had been told, that the Spanish envoy would present a memorial on the fifth of February, by which he would summon the States General to come to a rupture with the King; and that if they were so ill advised as to do it, I should see by the resolution of the magistrates of Amsterdam on this proposal, in what manner they would begin to execute what they had promised me, and they did not desire me to stay longer than till that day, to judge of their fidelity to their promises and the vigour of their resolutions.

The Prince of Orange at last found means, thro' the earnest persuasions of Beuverning, to make the city of Leyden, in spite of the opposition of Amsterdam, consent to the raising of six thousand men, which they did on the 30th of January. Beuverning assured them, that this Prince only thought of saving his honour, and that they ought not to destroy the reputation of a Prince who was at the head of the republic, and who promised, that as soon as this resolution should be taken, he would seriously endeavour to promote an accommodation between France and Spain.

This was what the Prince of Orange had caused more than once to be repeated to the magistrates of Amsterdam to no purpose. Their Pensionary, who this day came to speak to me in their name, informed me, that this Prince had offered them still more considerable advances; he had proposed to give them a security, signed by twelve of the principal members of Holland, that so far from making use of the resolution of raising the forces to enter into the war, he would engage to concur with the States General,

as soon as this resolution should be taken, in finding the shortest expedients for immediately terminating, on such conditions as should be regulated by the magistrates of Amsterdam, the differences that subsisted between his Majesty and Spain; but that they had entirely rejected this proposal, as not finding any safety in delivering up the fate of all Europe into his hands.

That the magistrates of Amsterdam, seeing however, with vexation, that notwithstanding their opposition, the Prince of Orange, who had gained Leyden, had resolved to cause the resolution of raising the levies to be passed that very morning by a majority of votes; and that he desired me on the part of his masters to assure the King, that that would only serve to confirm them the more in their first resolution of constantly opposing whatever might contribute to make the States General enter into the war, and engage them to embrace still more warmly than they had hitherto done, the means most proper to procure a peace. That he could assure me, that the resolution of raising the forces, taken contrary to form, would be more prejudicial than advantageous to the Prince of Orange, because the principal towns that had consented to it, would not be long without their perceiving, that they had been imposed upon; that the provinces of Friesland and Groningen were on this occasion of the same sentiments as the magistrates of Amsterdam; and that they promised by the unshaken firmness of their conduct, to render all the Prince of Orange's endeavours to involve the States General in a war fruitless, provided that his majesty would support and second them in whatever they had resolved to undertake.

But as I had done so much, by means of the friends I had amongst the leading men in the government of Amsterdam, and by the strong reasons I had caused
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to be offered to the others by those of the well affected in whom they placed their confidence, I had disposed them to consider the taking of Luxembourg as a means capable of bringing the Spaniards to accept of a peace; provided that his Majesty would give me at the same time a memorial, by which he should declare, that he would be content with that place and its dependencies, as an equivalent for his pretensions; and that, tho' they had not dared to mention it plainly to me the evening before, they had said enough to give me room to write to his Majesty. The Pensionary desired me not to write about it; and declared, that after the change in the city of Leyden, an enterprize of this nature would absolutely oblige them to consent to raise the forces, and submit to the Prince of Orange's pleasure; this I avoided mentioning, till things having a second time changed their face, I sent his Majesty the particulars of this affair, and let him know the sentiments of the magistrates of Amsterdam, on the taking of Luxembourg, as will be seen hereafter.

The Prince of Orange did not fail, on the 31st of January in the morning, as the magistrates of Amsterdam had foreseen, to cause the levies to be agreed to by a majority of voices, in spite of the opposition of Delft, Amsterdam, and Schidam, who continued firm in their resolution. The deputies of Amsterdam were not contented with making strong protestations against this resolution, as against a thing that sapped the foundations of the republic; but challenged the province of Holland to declare, whether it pretended that the city of Amsterdam was obliged to contribute to the expence of this levy. The Pensionary Fagel exerted himself on this subject, and said, that such a demand had never been made since the republic was a republic; but the deputies of Amsterdam

insisted upon it still the more strongly, and challenged the deputies of the other towns to report at their first meeting, the opinion of their superiors on this demand. However, as they knew that, in order to extort the consent of these towns to raise sixteen thousand men, they had been made to believe, that as soon as the resolution was taken, measures would be pursued to bring about an accommodation without loss of time; this gave rise to warm disputes between them and the Pensionary Fagel, who being willing to lay down, as the foundation of this negotiation, a principle he well knew they would not approve, which was, that the King should abate of his pretensions; and that as he was equally informed, that the Spaniards would never consent to give fairly and without reserve one of the equivalents, they could no otherwise think of an accommodation, but by endeavouring to make the Kings of France and Spain agree to a reasonable satisfaction, which might be found in a part of some one of the equivalents. This Pensionary asserted, even with an oath, that the English envoy had informed him, that his Most Christian Majesty began to yield, and that, provided a proposal was made to the King his master, he would oblige the King of France to condescend to it. And it is true, that this Envoy had said to the Pensionary Fagel, that the King of England was persuaded, that France would not firmly insist on the equivalents; but that these were offers on which they might begin to enter upon a negotiation. The deputies of Amsterdam maintained, on the contrary, that the King would not give up the least part of any one of the equivalents; and that if they sincerely resolved to procure a peace, they ought to endeavour to obtain an accommodation on this foot only. In short, after a very bitter dispute on both sides, the Pensionary Fagel made the States

of Holland agree to an expedient, which began to discover to the greatest number of them, that the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel had deceived them; for he made them come to a resolution, to persuade the English envoy to desire me to ask the King for a delay of four months, during which time the States General would endeavour to reconcile the two Kings, and to grant a cessation of all acts of hostility during this delay. It was also concluded, that in case Chudley resolved not to take upon himself this commission, the States General should come and make me the same proposal.

I was informed of this at the breaking up of the assembly, on which I resolved to prevent the English envoy's taking upon himself the task of making me this proposal; I had more than one reason, which I could easily urge, for my not wishing him to engage in such steps as were so contrary to the advancement of the peace, without reckoning the interest I had in speaking directly to the States General, which would give me an opportunity of letting them know his Majesty's intentions.

I had great difficulty in making the English envoy consent to what I desired, though I made him see that the King his master would not approve of his demanding a delay of three or four months, and much less a cessation of acts of hostility, unless the States General would engage at the same time to bring Spain to agree to one of the equivalents; that besides, I had not the power to grant a delay; that his refusal to make this proposal, even though it should be reasonable, could not be attended with any prejudice, since the States General had resolved in that case to make it themselves, and that when the States General should come to talk with me, I should have things to demand of them which I could not require of the English envoy.

He promised at last, that he would not undertake to make me any proposals; but two hours after he came to desire me to excuse his weakness, and to let me know that he had been unable to refuse complying with the solicitations of the States General. I stopt him short, and desired him to tell them, that on his informing me, that he was intrusted with a commission from them, I would not suffer him to explain himself; and that I had told him, that I was very much surpris'd, that notwithstanding my having the honour of being ambassador to the States General, they shou'd apply themselves to the minister of another prince to explain their sentiments to me, on what related to the King my master; and that if they had any thing to say to me, I was entirely ready to enter into a conference with them.

I informed the King, that this affair appeared to me to be of a very delicate and dangerous nature, and that it was to be feared that the Prince of Orange would impose upon the leading men of Amsterdam, by the hope of a negotiation which it was in his power to break off whenever he pleased. That this prince plainly saw, that he should never be able to raise the sixteen thousand men if the magistrates of Amsterdam threw in his way all the obstacles in their power; and that he therefore only sought to prevent their taking such resolutions; that from this design he decoyed them with the hopes of an accommodation, but would take advantage of the calm into which he had cast their minds; that at last, he would meet with so many difficulties on the part of Spain, as would enable him to draw out the negotiation, to a great length under the pretence of receiving answers from Madrid, which it was already said he would be obliged to wait for; that after this, he would cause such proposals to be offered by the Spaniards,

Spaniards, as he knew his Majesty could not accept, and that the negotiation breaking off on his Majesty's refusal, the magistrates of Amsterdam would find themselves almost obliged to enter into the Prince of Orange's sentiments; that to prevent these inconveniencies, no surer method could be taken, than to make the envoy of Spain declare on the pure and simple acceptance of one of the equivalents; and that the States General would gain what they desired from his Majesty, by making Spain accept one of these equivalents; and that afterwards they should demand time to adjust the conditions of the treaty; but that I could inform them, that all these precautions would be useless, if from the hopes of a negotiation, they neglected making use of all the means they had in their hands, to prevent the levies being made.

The King wrote me word, in a letter dated the 27th of January, that if his obtaining what was wished for only depended on his granting a new delay, I might promise that his troops should not attack the Spanish Netherlands before the last day of March; but that he would not engage not to bombard the towns in Flanders. That if the intentions of the leading men of Amsterdam were as good as he had reason to believe, they would not be alarmed at the bombs thrown into the towns in the Spanish Netherlands, but on the contrary, would be very glad of his Majesty's making use of every means to turn to the detriment of the Spaniards the design they had formed, in conjunction with the Prince of Orange, to let the whole winter slide away to no purpose, from the hopes of being more ready against next spring to carry on the war.

I observed, in my answer to the King, dated on the third of February, that the bombs thrown into the towns in Flanders would cause some alteration at the Hague; but that I hoped, in spite of that to

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accomplish what the King required from the States General, if the English envoy was ordered to present a memorial to the States General, in which he should exhort them to press the Spaniards to come to an accommodation with the King; and also declare, that the King his Master thought, that if the Spaniards could not be brought to chuse one of the equivalents, it would be necessary that the States General should labour to establish a neutrality in the Spanish Netherlands; and that I should be permitted, two days after, to present to the States General a memorial to testify, that having been informed of the proposals made by the English envoy, I thought it my duty to let them know, that the King was not averse to the expedient proposed, in case the Spaniards should refuse to come to an agreement. I also wrote to M. de Barillon, and did not doubt but that the English would comply with these proposals, after what M. de Barillon had sent me of the orders that had been sent to the English envoy at the Hague, to conform to the advice of the magistrates of Amsterdam, in relation to the neutrality of the Netherlands: but notwithstanding this, no order came to Chudley, nor was any afterwards sent for him to present such a memorial, which convinced me, that England desired neither a war nor an accommodation.

The deputies of the States General, on the 3d of February, brought me the resolution I had refused to receive from the hands of the English envoy, which contained nothing but assurances of their desire to endeavour after an accommodation between the kings of France and Spain, and the demand of four months delay, or at least of two, with a suspension of all acts of hostility.

I answered the States General, that I was very glad to find they resolved to endeavour to obtain a peace;

peace ; and that as there could be no better means of arriving at it, than by proceeding with the Spaniards on the foot of the memorial I had presented on the 5th of November, I had room to believe they had deliberated upon it, and had brought me an answer ; that if they had taken this first step, and had obtained the consent of the Spaniards to one of the equivalents, I was sufficiently authorized to take upon myself the power of granting a new delay.

As the deputies of the States General let me know that they had not been able to bring Spain to accept of any of the equivalents, and yet pressed me to give a new delay : I told them, that tho' they had been unable to obtain any thing of the Spaniards, if they had at least taken some resolution with respect to the means I had insinuated to the deputies of the States General, to procure the Safety of the Netherlands, and avert the war, which they could not doubt but that Spain was desirous of carrying on, after the declaration made by the Marquis de Borgomainero to the Emperor ; that the Spaniards would never have resolved to declare war, if they had not hoped to engage England and the States General to assist them ; in this case I might still take upon me to grant them a delay.

And on their informing me, that they could not answer me on this subject, since this affair had never been yet brought into deliberation in the assembly of the States General ; I declared, that from my desire to satisfy them as much as was in my power, if they would sincerely promise me, to remain in the state they were in at present, without performing any act, or taking any step either at home or abroad that might render the Spaniards more obstinate, from the hopes of a new and more powerful assistance, I would take upon myself to grant a delay, sufficient to give the States General time to exert themselves

more efficaciously in bringing the Spaniards to consent to the conditions proposed by his Majesty.

But as the deputies of the States General had no instruction to make a reply to this expedient, and as besides I had confessed, that it was to be feared that the King, on seeing the last delay expired, without having had any answer to his proposals, might have given orders to his troops to attack some place in the Spanish Netherlands, I told them, that all I could do in this conjuncture was to write to the King to prevent this inconvenience, and to give my word to the States General, in his Majesty's name, that during the time that should pass before I received an answer, his arms should take no place in the Spanish Netherlands; and that I would, at the same time, desire his majesty to give me new orders, to enable me at the end of this term, which would expire on the 15th or 16th of February, to satisfy the States General, in case they should be in a condition during this time, to return such an answer as his majesty ought to expect from the strong inclination they discovered for the re-establishment of so necessary a peace.

I communicated my answer to the magistrates of Amsterdam, at the breaking up of this conference, who approved it extremely, and told me, that nothing could have been more adapted to second their good designs. I even caused it to be wrote down, not only to render it public, but also to give the magistrates of Amsterdam the means of bringing it into deliberation in the assembly of the States General.

I sent his Majesty an account of it, and wrote him word, that I had not found that the steps taken by the States General, deserved that I should explain the power I had to grant them a delay; but being afraid on the other hand, of drawing the rest of the republic on the magistrates of Amsterdam, I had thought
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of these expedients, which did no injury to the King, and yet gave the magistrates of Amsterdam room to endeavour in an effectual manner to obtain a peace, and that with the greater ease, as I had made them hope that I might receive orders to grant them what they wished for, if during the time that should pass till my receiving them, the States General should take a resolution conformable to one of the three proposals I had made them.

I observed further, in another letter dated the 10th of February, that I had imagined I could not have done any thing more agreeable to his Majesty's intention, nor that would less expose his authority, than my giving this writing; that if I had demanded a conference, in which I had proposed an expedient to procure the safety of the Netherlands, and had at last given a memorial: though this proceeding had in some manner softened the demand, yet it would still have been proposed by his Majesty, and this would have been neither agreeable to his interest, nor to his dignity. That it was not the same on this occasion, since it was the States General who sent to solicit me, and I had only declared by way of answer, the conditions on which I might consent to what they desired. That this writing would serve greatly to strengthen the magistrates of Amsterdam, and let the republic see, that if the States General had sincerely resolved to strive to bring about an accommodation, they might easily obtain it by following their true interest, which was to avoid engaging in any measures that would draw them into the war.

As the orders, which the deputies of Amsterdam were to carry to the assembly of Holland on the different expedients I had proposed, were an intimation of what I expected from them, I omitted nothing that I thought capable of confirming them in

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their good intentions. This obliged me to write them a letter, which contained in substance, that those who wished for a peace might see by the offers I had made to the deputies of the States General, with how much ease the States might obtain the delay they required, and at length confirm the peace. That I was not contented with returning these answers to the deputies of the States General, but had put them in writing, to give the magistrates of Amsterdam the means of bringing them into deliberation before the States General, but that I was obliged to tell them, that all these steps would be very useless, and even prejudicial to the King's interest, if it was true, that they had already begun to put in execution the resolution of the province of Holland in relation to the levies; that all the new regiments were disposed of, and even the captains commissions, as if the resolution upon it, had been validly taken; that if the affair was pushed in this manner, the magistrates of Amsterdam's refusal to consent to this levy, would only produce a domestic quarrel, without having the least effect with respect to foreign princes, for it was of little moment to them, if the levy was once made, whether it was done according to, or against the laws of the republic; that in both cases it would be attended with the same prejudice, and the Spaniards would derive the same advantage from it; and that they might be firmly persuaded, and with some sort of reason too, that the same power that had resolved on the levy, in spite of the most powerful city in that State, and contrary to the fundamental laws of the republic, might still, in opposition to the same laws, and in spite of the same city, send them fresh succours, and whenever they pleased, make offensive alliances, and declare war. Therefore they ought to be convinced, that the fate of Europe depended on the opposition they should make to raising

raising the levies; and that they ought to consider it as certain, that if they acted with the vigour that might be expected from them, and prevented the levies being made, they would enjoy a perfect repose, without any thing being able to give them the least disturbance.

That I was informed a report was propagated, that the King of England had interposed to obtain a cessation of all acts of hostility; but that I could positively assure them, his Britannic Majesty was so well persuaded that the most efficacious means to bring the Spaniards to an accommodation, was to press them by way of arms, that they had not endeavoured to prevent the King's making use of this means; and that I even knew, that if the King of England should interfere, it would be to no purpose; that this had led me absolutely to refuse the deputies of the States General to write to his Majesty about it, and had obliged me, on the contrary, to let them know, that the Spaniards would be still closer pressed, without, however, taking any place before the return of my courier. I finished my letter, with giving them assurances, that I was persuaded things would be regulated in France according to the vigorous or weak measures taken by the magistrates and deputies of Amsterdam.

The Prince of Orange continued however, to put all methods in practice to engage the other provinces to agree to the levy of sixteen thousand men, in order to form, if possible, a resolution of the States General, and in the mean time, he regulated the State of the new levies, and appointed the officers, which obliged me to redouble my care by instances to the deputies of Amsterdam. I represented, that it was not enough for them to protest strongly against the resolution taken to make the levies; but that it was necessary for them to declare, that after this they

could neither contribute to the ordinary state of the war, nor furnish any subsidies. They did not disapprove of this proposal, but offered, as will presently be seen, protests nearly to the same effect, which they did not do without anxiety, because, notwithstanding the precautions they had every day taken to break the ice in their ditches, the cold was so sharp, that they were froze almost to the bottom; from which they apprehended, that the Prince of Orange, who had just put five thousand men into Narden, would make use of them to render himself master of their city, and they would have been glad to have deferred their coming to an explanation, till a more favourable time.

I then discovered, that the Prince of Orange began again to put in practice an artifice he had already made use of, and such a one as had a very plausible appearance; this was to spread a report, by means of his creatures, that his majesty acted in concert with the King of England, and that he had engaged not to attack, or take any place in the Spanish Netherlands; and that they ought not therefore to be under any uneasiness, nor give themselves any trouble about making advances to prevent a danger which they had no reason to fear. To this it was added, that the King of England would procure a delay, and a cessation of acts of hostility. I was very far from being able to make use of the English envoy, in order to discredit these false reports: This person behaved so ill, and the magistrates of Amsterdam were so dissatisfied with him, that they desired me, if possible, to get him recall'd, and urged this request two or three times.

It is surprising to see to what a degree the King of England was either blinded or negligent with respect to his own interest; he did not act with the least vigour on this occasion: however, I took care to have him informed

formed of the Prince of Orange's secret practices, and I then let him know, that I had discovered by a channel I could perfectly depend upon, that this Prince had for some time maintained a perfect understanding with the presbyterians in England. He, indeed, had always some of them attached to him, but the greatest number had kept at a very great distance, nor did they make him any advances till they were dissatisfied with the Duke of Monmouth. They then formed a strict connection with the Prince of Orange, whom they considered as their protector. I also caused Van Buning to be informed of it, in such a manner that it did not seem to come from me, and he was greatly astonished, because he had always imagined, that by an alliance between the States General and England, the whigs, who did not love the Prince of Orange, would have supported the interest of the States General in opposition to him.

At length the conferences were begun, which were to produce, as the Prince of Orange had pretended, a general accommodation. Cramprick, the emperor's resident, who acted also in the quality of plenipotentiary of the elector of Bavaria; Fuenmajor, envoy of Spain; Guldenstop, envoy of Sweden; Wittendorf, for the house of Lunenburg, and the Baron de Goes for the circle of Franconia, assembled with the deputies of the States General. In the first conference, they communicated and examined their powers, and in the second, spoke of the means of keeping what passed among them secret; and on this account, desired the States General to give them commissaries that should not be changed, and who should take an oath to keep inviolably secret whatever they should treat of in their assemblies, in such a manner as not even to give an account of what passed to their superiors. The deputies

puties of Friesland and Groningen refused to submit to this oath, and declared, that they would never engage to be deficient in the duty they owed their masters. The Pensionary Fagel, who had caused this proposal to be made by the allies, that he might have a pretence for excluding the deputies of these two provinces, did not fail to make the deputies of the five others resolve, that those of Friesland and Groningen should be excluded from the conferences that should be held with the ministers of the allies. The provinces of Friesland and Groningen were very sensible of the affront that was offered them, and the States of Friesland wrote to the States General, that they could not help shewing them their dissatisfaction, as they could not see for what reason they were excluded from an affair which related to peace or war, and on which they could come to no conclusion without the unanimous consent of the seven United Provinces, at least if the States General did not determine that what was concluded by the five others, should be followed by the concurrence of the provinces of Friesland and Groningen; that for their part, they were so far from submitting to this, that they declared, that if they continued to hold conferences, without admitting their deputies, they would also excuse themselves from the payment of the taxes that were imposed on them by the majority, for the service of the common cause, since it was not just, that while they were deprived of the rights and advantages of the Union, they should support the expences of it. That they should wait for a satisfactory answer on this subject from the States General, in order that they might not be reduced to the necessity of taking resolutions that could not, in the present conjuncture, be of advantage to the state; though from the conduct which had been observed with respect to them, they should be

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be sufficiently justified in doing every thing capable of contributing to the maintenance of their rights, and the respect due to their province and its deputies.

The King informed me by a letter dated the third of February, that he ought not to doubt that the assembly which the allies of the house of Austria were about to hold at the Hague, was not principally designed to prevent a peace; and that they would only endeavour to gain time, as I had observed, till the Emperor should have entered into an accommodation with the Turks, or till the city of Amsterdam had consented to the raising of fresh forces; and as nothing was more adapted to favour this design, than entering into the proposal of submitting to the arbitration of the King of England and the States General, at a time that would be scarcely sufficient for the acceptance of his Majesty's offers, he had no room to hope for a peace with the Spaniards without obliging them to chuse one of the equivalents; and all they could desire from his Majesty was, that in case the Emperor accepted a truce for twenty years, his Majesty would also grant a truce of the like duration to Spain, and that to this he had already consented, for the general good of all christendom. That I ought not only to reject the proposal of an arbitration; but also make known to the deputies of Amsterdam, and to others who were well affected, that since his Majesty would suspend, by a truce of twenty years, all the differences between him and Spain, as well as those that subsisted between him and the empire, they could not find a more ready, nor a more reasonable method of establishing the tranquillity of Europe.

On the 14th of February, I caused the magistrates of Amsterdam to be acquainted with these new condescensions made by his majesty to obtain a peace. They were extremely glad of this intelligence, but
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at the same time informed me, that it was sufficient they knew of them; but that it was of some importance, that the States General should not be acquainted with them, till they had taken some steps towards procuring a peace.

This, however, greatly encouraged the magistrates of Amsterdam, who gave their protest in writing against the resolution that had been taken in the province of Holland, to raise, in spite of their endeavours to the contrary, sixteen thousand men*. In which they declared, that after the new ways the King of France had opened, by the memorial I had presented on the 5th of November, to obtain a peace between France and Spain, they could not have any foundation to assert, that the new levies could contribute to it; but on the contrary, they were very prejudicial to the design of procuring an accommodation, since they would strengthen the Spaniards in the resolution they had taken to continue the war in the Netherlands, not with a view to the advantage of the Netherlands, but for that of the whole Spanish monarchy, and the house of Austria in general, and there to involve England and the States General in a war; and this, they had been informed, was their design. That they had formed a conclusion on a plurality of voices, in contempt of their opposition, and consequently in opposition to the fundamental laws of the government, according to which, and in conformity to the ancient customs and maxims practised even in the times of the counts of Holland, and maintained with the utmost firmness against all those who endeavoured to infringe them, they could not take the resolution of im-

* This protest of the magistrates of Amsterdam against the resolution of the province of Holland, taken by a majority of voices, was sent to court on the 18th of February 1684.

ing new burthens on the State, without the unanimous consent of all the voices; this the predecessors of the magistrates of Amsterdam had always judged of such importance, that they would never suffer it to be done even in times when the republic was in the greatest danger, from whence they had never been led to yield, whatever intreaties were used, to submit to the judgment of any man; having, on the contrary, declared, that they would no longer come to take their seat in the States of Holland, if they were deprived of the entire liberty they ought to possess of giving their opinions. That the whole proceeding on this occasion, visibly tended to the change and destruction of the fundamental laws of the government; and that this was of the greater consequence, as they might in affairs of the same nature, that ought not to be concluded on a plurality of voices, form a resolution on this precedent. That in short, the burgomasters and council of the city of Amsterdam could never regard the resolution of the States of Holland, as taken according to law, but would consider it as a thing agreed to by the nobles and fifteen towns, and as a thing of no consequence, positively declaring, that they would not contribute in any manner whatsoever to the expence of the forces to be raised.

The magistrates of Amsterdam, did not confine themselves to this; but at the same time addressed the States General, and pressed them warmly to deliberate on the answer I had given on the third of February, and set down in writing the reasons they had to demand this deliberation, which they distributed amongst the towns in Holland.

The deputies of Amsterdam informed me themselves of what they had the same day caused me to be told; that it would be of no service to acquaint the States General, that his Majesty gave them time to
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accept his offers; that this delay would only serve to quiet the minds of the deputies of those towns that were apprehensive of the prince of Orange's drawing them into the war; and that it was sufficient, that the magistrates of Amsterdam were informed, that the King would undertake no siege, while the deliberations were carrying on at the Hague; because they would be enabled by this means to improve the fear the others would be under. This plainly discovered, that the magistrates of Amsterdam, who must have been well acquainted with the motives most capable of influencing the States General, and who had so great an interest in maintaining the peace, were persuaded that the only means they could make use of to obtain it, was to inspire them with fear, and that nothing but the fear of a war, could make the States General seriously endeavour to obtain a peace.

I had advice from Friesland, that it was hoped that province and that of Groningen would conform themselves to the opinion of Amsterdam.

The King informed me, by a letter, dated February 10, that he was very well satisfied with the answer I had made the States General on the third of the same month, and with the different expedients I had proposed. His Majesty also sent me a memorial, conformable to them, and ordered me to declare to the States General, that he was always ready to accept of any one of the equivalents he had proposed; and that if they could not agree to it so speedily as was desired, he would consent to a truce with Spain for twenty years, on the same conditions on which he had made the same proposal to the emperor.

That in case any obstacle should retard the acceptance of his offers, his Majesty would readily consent to put a stop to all acts of hostility against the

the States, under the dominion of the King of Spain, provided the States General would engage by a treaty, supported by the guaranty of the King of England, and all the Princes who were disposed to enter into it, to make Spain agree, within two or three months, to one of the equivalents that had been proposed, or to the truce of twenty years, on condition nevertheless, that by the same treaty it was stipulated, that in case the Spaniards should suffer the time of two or three months to pass, without accepting one of the aforesaid equivalents, or the truce of twenty years, the said States should prevent their troops being employed otherwise, than for the defence of the places there in the possession of the Catholic King; that they should not lend him any new succours in any place whatsoever, either against his Majesty, or his allies; and his Majesty would also oblige himself not to besiege, or take possession, of any place in the Low Countries, on any pretence whatsoever; and moreover, not to make war in the open countries, if the Spaniards would on their side desist from it. His Majesty, however, reserving to himself the power of carrying his arms into any other place besides the said Netherlands, till such time as his Catholic Majesty should have re-established the peace he had broken.

That if the States General would not enter into the engagement, and that contenting themselves with employing their good offices at the court of Madrid, in order to procure an amicable accommodation, they were desirous of taking necessary measures with his Majesty, to prevent any change in the Low Countries, his Majesty would still consent to a suspension of arms in Flanders, as long as the present war should continue, and not to undertake any siege, nor take, in any manner whatsoever, any of the places belonging to the King of Spain in the Low

Low Countries, provided that the States General would in like manner engage, by a treaty signed by me at the Hague, and guarantied by the King of England, and also by all the Princes who would afterwards enter into the same obligation, not only to hinder the troops the States had then in Flanders from being employed otherwise, than for the defence of the places there, in the possession of the King of Spain, but also not to give any assistance to that crown in any other country whatsoever, nor to act directly against his Majesty or his allies.

His Majesty would also readily oblige himself not to perform any other act of hostility in the Low Countries, provided that the Spaniards would in like manner desist from them; and in case that the war should be continued there, he would sincerely promise to act only in the open country, in such a manner, as that the barrier should not receive any change.

That if, after so many concessions on the part of his Majesty, the house of Austria and its allies would not take advantage of them, to them alone ought to be imputed, all the miseries and desolations of a war, which they might have prevented by ways that were in their power; and that he would make use of the means God had put into his hands, to vindicate his rights, and support the justice of his pretensions.

On the 17th of February, I communicated my orders to the deputies of Amsterdam, who were well satisfied with them; and I at length delivered a memorial to the States General, which contained all that I have just specified.

As the Sieur de Cramprick, the Emperor's resident at the Hague, resolved to render himself master of the general conferences that were to be held in relation to the means of procuring a peace; and not
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only pretended to preside there, to summon the assembly, and to propose the subjects of debate, but also to act in the name of the empire, and as the Pensionary Fagel acted in the same manner in the assembly of Holland; the deputies of Amsterdam shewed, that they were greatly surprized that the Emperor's resident spoke in the name of the empire, and much more that the Pensionary Fagel made use of the same expressions when he spoke in the states of Holland; and that he thus endeavoured to impose upon them, by representing things as if France was at war with the whole empire; they therefore demanded that Cramprick should first of all deliver his commission, and shew his powers. This in some measure put a stop to the enterprizes of the Emperor's envoy, but did not break up the assembly of the Allies, who still continued their debates, though but faintly.

On the 27th of February, 1684, the Prince of Orange went at eleven in the morning to the States of Holland, when he caused the doors to be shut, and gave orders that no body should be suffered to go in or out. He then required an oath, particularly from the members of the assembly, that they should preserve inviolably secret whatever should there be treated of; and even made the door-keepers, who were placed on the outside, swear, that they would not mention their being forbid to open the doors to any one. At length he declared to the States of Holland, that he was come in quality of their governor (which he had not done since he had been intrusted with that office, he always appearing in the States of Holland as the first nobleman) and that he had things to communicate to them of very great importance; but that he first demanded, that before he explained himself, those whom he suspected should retire. To this they consented;
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on which he named Mr. Hooft, echevin of Amsterdam, and Mr. Hop, Pensionary of the same city, who passed into an adjoining room. The Prince at length shewed, that these gentlemen had carried on a criminal correspondence with me; and after having greatly exaggerated what he had to say against their conduct, caused my letters to be read, of which by his order my courier had been robbed five weeks before (which were now almost all decyphered); and the Pensionary Fagel, according to his custom, made comments on every article. After they were read, the Prince of Orange brought the affair under deliberation, and there were already seven of the towns who were for sending the two deputies of Amsterdam to prison, and for carrying on a prosecution against them, when these deputies, who were not free from uneasiness, hearing their names mentioned by somebody who spoke a little too loud; and as they imagined, that they had heard something read in French, they did not doubt but that it was my letters. This obliged them abruptly to leave the room where they were, and to go through a passage about four feet high, into the great hall, in the midst of which the deputies were sitting. The Prince of Orange was astonished at their boldness; but as they were members of the State, and had taken their places, he could not hinder their asking the subject of the debate. The other deputies of Amsterdam informed them of it; when these gentlemen confessed that they had waited on me; that they were ready to give an account of all our conferences, and desired the other deputies to declare whether they had come to me by their own authority, or by order of their city. The deputies of Amsterdam, who were at first sufficiently intimidated, resumed their courage, and said, that these two gentlemen had only acted according to the orders

ders of the magistrates of Amsterdam. The Prince of Orange did not however, on this account, desist from his accusation; but still demanded that they should take their trial for the illegal correspondence they had carried on with me. However, the deputies of Amsterdam, vigorously defended themselves, and had even the courage to reproach the Prince of Orange with sending, without their consent, the fleet of the States General to Gottenburg, with sending their troops into the dominions of Spain; and more particularly with his correspondence with the marquis de Grana, to which they attributed the obstinacy of the Spaniards, and the declaration of war which that crown had published against France. In short, the Prince of Orange still insisting that these two gentlemen should be sent to prison; and on proceeding also against the two other deputies of Amsterdam, demanded that the seal should be put on the papers in their house at the Hague, positively asserting, that they should there find a perfect discovery of their correspondence with me. This gave rise to many debates between the deputies of the other cities, which lasted till seven at night. At length Messrs. Hooft and Hop offering to appear the next day to justify what they had done; and the other deputies not thinking they had a right to send two members of the state to prison, who had only acted according to the orders of their superiors, without giving them first a hearing; it was resolved, that they should assemble early the next morning, and that the secretary of the province of Holland should go with the deputies of Delft and Schidam, to put the seal on the house of the deputies of Amsterdam.

In order perfectly to explain the consequence of this seal, without reckoning the injury done to a sovereign city, of such importance as Amsterdam,

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it is necessary to observe, that the eighteen cities of Holland, which compose the states of that province, have houses at the Hague, where their deputies live, during the assembly of the States, which regularly meet four times a year, without mentioning the extraordinary assemblies: but in these extraordinary assemblies, they do not treat so often on affairs of state, as on the private affairs relating to the interior concerns of the republic; being almost always busied about the disputes that arise between the cities, from each seeking its own advantage, either in relation to the ordinary or extraordinary impositions, in the manner of raising the taxes, in the warlike preparations by sea and land, and other things of a like nature. On the days when they assemble, the deputies take an account in writing of what passes, which they send to their superiors in their several towns, and write a duplicate in the registers, which are kept at the Hague; they also register their most secret orders, and the answers of their superiors. And as all their registers, from the establishment of the republic to the present time, are kept in these houses, we may form a judgment what a violation of the public faith, and what an injury it must have been to the magistrates of Amsterdam, to have these examined, not by their fellow countrymen only, but by interested persons, and such as were even in relation to these affairs, adverse parties, and to give them an opportunity of seeing whatever they had said and thought in opposition to them, in the most secret manner.

We may add to this, that it is contrary to all the rules of equity to advance the supposition, that a city is criminal, without bringing any proof of it; and to resolve, that its most secret papers shall be examined, on an assertion that proofs will there be found of its disloyalty.

It

It is easy to judge that the Prince of Orange losing all hope, from the vigorous opposition of the deputies of Amsterdam, of being able to execute the resolution he had caused to be taken, in relation to the raising of the sixteen thousand men, was unable longer to curb his resentment, and that this led him to make use of violent measures, of which there had been no example since the establishment of the republic. It is, however, certain, that he committed a great fault in the manner in which he proceeded; for there were two methods which he might have taken, each of which would equally have secured his success: the one was, to send privately for the deputies of Amsterdam, to let them know that he had my letters, to point out the most offensive passages, and to tell them, that he had the means in his power of ruining them; but that he would not make use of it, if they would consent to the forces being raised. Had he acted thus, it is beyond all doubt, that from their apprehensions of being inevitably ruined, they would have granted the Prince of Orange whatever he wished. The other expedient was, that in case he was absolutely resolved on their destruction, he should have caused the deputies to be arrested by his own authority, and have appointed them commissaries, by whom they were to be tried, as was the case of Barnevelt, or have put them into the power of a court of justice, by which means they would have lost their heads within the space of twenty-four hours. People after this execution would not have penetrated into the affair; they would have imagined that the deputies had been guilty of treason, and would not have been able to oppose any thing the Prince of Orange had resolved to perform. But, instead of this, the use he made of my letters, only produced, as will soon be seen, an almost irreconcilable hatred

tred between him and the deputies of Amsterdam, who found friends, and entire provinces, who strongly seconded them; and gave the magistrates of Amsterdam an opportunity of writing many things, which made known the intention of the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel, to involve the States General in the war.

The deputies of Amsterdam finding that the seal was put on their papers, that they should be obliged the next day to appear before the states of Holland, and that the public faith could not secure them from the measures taken by the Prince of Orange, went at midnight out of a back-door which opened into some gardens, near which they had caused two post-chaise to wait for them; which having mounted, they spent the rest of the night in going to Amsterdam, leaving only at the Hague a burgomaster and a secretary belonging to their city, to guard their papers.

As soon as they were arrived, which was about five in the morning, they caused the council of the city to be assembled, the members of which were filled with equal surprise and indignation, at hearing the manner in which the deputies of so considerable a city had been treated. They resolved first to write to the other cities to vindicate themselves from the pretended accusation of the Prince of Orange; to make the strongest complaints of the treatment of their deputies, and more particularly on the seal which had been put on their papers at the Hague, and earnestly to demand reparation, and at the same time a sufficient security for the deputies they should send to the States of Holland.

As I had been informed in the night that succeeded the day in which the States sat, of all that had passed, I immediately wrote to the magistrates of Amsterdam,

dam, and offered to take on myself whatever might be injurious to them in this affair. On which, by their order, their pensionary wrote me an answer, in which he returned me their thanks, and let me know that they should be very glad of my doing what lay in my power for their justification; and on this assurance, inserted in their circulary letter, certain things in their own defence, which I had intimated that I would say. I did not fail faithfully to perform what I had promised them, and to assist them to the utmost of my power. And as nobody could know the particulars of what had passed between them and me, there was no difficulty in giving such a turn to things as to make them appear least disadvantageous to them; and to furnish them by this method with the means of speaking with greater boldness; so much the more, as (excepting some passages which expressed too intimate a connection between them and me, and to which I could give a very good turn) the rest of my letter only turned, on their desire, to make the States General enter into a deliberation on the means of preserving the peace of the Netherlands. This did not in reality render them criminal, for they had never concealed their sentiments on this subject; and they were here only in fault from their acting in a manner inconsistent with the form of the government, which did not permit a single city to treat, by its own authority, on affairs of state with an Ambassador.

I then presented a memorial to the States General, in which, after having demanded the restitution of my letters, I declared, that I thought myself obliged, in honour and conscience, to let them know, that he who had deciphered them, was either an ignorant person or an impostor, if he had put any thing into them that could concern Amsterdam or any other city in Holland; since in the whole it

could not be found that I had named any person belonging to the state.

That it was true, I had observed in one letter, that the magistrates of Amsterdam had informed me, that they could not deliberate in the States General, if I did not give a memorial; but that the Pensionary Fagel had also said it, and the States General too had given me the same information. That the rest of the letter only turned on the expedients I thought proper to take, and which I had already taken, to engage them to deliberate on an affair of such importance, without my presenting a memorial. That on this account I had wrote to the King what I thought proper, and what had a relation to his Majesty's intentions, which left me at liberty in this case, to give such a turn to things as I imagined they ought to take. That I knew the form of the government of the States General well enough to be able to represent to the King my master the method I ought to take at the Hague, in order to bring an affair under deliberation: that if I thought it necessary to add other circumstances to give weight to what I said, they could not impute it to a third person, since I was capable of inserting it to strengthen what I advanced, without their entering into a consultation with me, in relation to such particulars, and that as I was only responsible to the King my master for whatever I wrote to him, I had only in view, on these occasions, what appeared to relate to his Majesty's interest, as it was easy to judge from other circumstances which were not cyphered in my letter.

But that what astonished me most, was my hearing of the engagements and particular promises of the deputies of Amsterdam, since I never imagined that a city could enter into private engagements with an ambassador; and the King was very far

from

from being willing to accept of such: that therefore I had never taken the pains to ask any such thing of the deputies of Amsterdam, and was farther still from writing on this subject to his Majesty. I therefore in one word declared; that it was absolutely false to say that I had wrote that the deputies of Amsterdam had entered into any engagement with me, or that they had made any promise, and that if there was any such thing in what was deciphered, it was invented, and gave room to believe that the rest of the letter was deciphered with the same disregard to truth.

This justification was necessary; for it is impossible to imagine the falsehoods and calumnies which the emissaries of the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel caused to be spread amongst the populace, in order to excite an insurrection. A report was spread that the magistrates of Amsterdam had sold the country to the King, that I had paid them money, and that the Prince of Orange had discovered the treason. Upon this, men who were hired for the purpose, cried out in the market-place, that the deputies of Amsterdam were traitors, that they ought to take their trials, or to be treated like de Witt; and that the French ambassador deserved to be thrown into a canal. These discourses were held in the market-places and public-squares at the Hague: I was obliged to undeceive those who were not gained by the Prince of Orange, for fear, that if I was two or three days without making my appearance, that should give them room to believe that there was some truth in what was reported by the Prince of Orange's creatures. However, I saw nothing extraordinary in the streets, and except my being stared at a little more than usual, none of the populace were disposed to say any thing to me, or to any of my men.

The people of Amsterdam talked in very different language; they easily discovered the falshood of the calumnies cast on their magistrates, which were so much the more gross as they perfectly knew that that city had always exerted itself for the maintenance of the peace, for the preservation of liberty, and for the ease of the people, and that it had never acted inconsistent with its own interest, nor strove to promote its own ruin.

But the Prince of Orange himself, without design, justified the magistrates of Amsterdam, and was the cause of these clamours being stopped within the space of twenty-four hours. He, by a fresh violation of the law of nations, had my letters printed in French, German and Dutch, by the printer to the States. Every body read them with the utmost avidity, and each individual sought to find in them the treaty which the magistrates of Amsterdam had entered into with the King, the places that were to be delivered up to him, the money they had received, and other things of the like nature: but when they found nothing in them but conferences, all of which tended to produce a peace; that what was most criminal in the magistrates of Amsterdam, was only the discussion they had entered into with me on the expedients I ought to make use of to engage the States General to deliberate on the means of procuring a peace with the Spaniards, and of maintaining a state of tranquillity in their neighbourhood, in spite of the Prince of Orange, who was resolved on a war; that I, on my side, wrote that the Dutch were sincere in their intentions, that we ought to behave towards them with an entire freedom, and without deceit; the common people, who it was imagined would have rose against the magistrates of Amsterdam and me, seeing the good intentions of these gentlemen, and that

that nothing could be imputed to them but some faults against the form of the government, began to be appeased, and spoke with less heat. All honest men soon discovered the truth, and continued more convinced than they had ever been, that the Prince of Orange was capable of making use of all means, both lawful and unlawful, to accomplish his designs.

In the mean time, as there were some passages in my letter that were maliciously deciphered, and which by the addition of certain words, by the omission of negatives, or prepositions, were put in a sense contrary to that in which I wrote them, I presented a memorial, in which I cleared up all these corrupted passages, and shewed the dishonesty of the decipherers, who endeavoured by these alterations to represent things in such a manner, as that criminal consequences might be drawn against the deputies of Amsterdam, and other persons in the state; while by giving on the contrary the true sense of my letters, people would clearly see, that the only subject of these dispatches, was to make known to the King my master the desires of the magistrates of that city to preserve the republic in peace, and the methods they thought necessary to be taken to engage the States General to deliberate on his Majesty's offers, whose good intentions they were disposed to second and support.

I took particular care in this memorial not to complain of the violation of the law of nations, in publicly selling a secret letter I had wrote to the King my master, of which my courier had been robbed; because I found the affair of too great importance to be treated of by halves; and I durst not express myself in such terms as it deserved, without an order from his Majesty; more especially as it was plainly enough seen, that the Prince of Orange only sought to raise the King's resentment against the re-

public, the better and more judicious part of which differed from him in their sentiments; so that I was so far from taking such steps, as might have engaged his Majesty in this affair, that I took the liberty to inform him, that all honest men hoped he would consider that none but the Prince of Orange and some few of his creatures had any concern in it; and that if his Majesty resolved to shew his resentment against the whole republic, it would soon be overturned, and the Prince of Orange would become more powerful than ever.

The magistrates of Amsterdam were as well satisfied with this explication, as the Prince of Orange had reason to be displeased at it. He was sorry that I had justified them so far, as even to take many things upon myself, and that this incident, which he imagined must have disunited us, had on the contrary bound us more closely together.

One of the things for which the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel had uttered the warmest reproaches against the magistrates of Amsterdam, was, that their conduct was the cause of the King of France's declaring, that he would listen to no other condition of peace, besides the acceptance of one of the equivalents proposed by my memorial of the fifth of November, 1683. They asserted, that they knew very well, that before that time his Majesty would have desisted from his pretensions; and that by this means, they should have laboured in a useful manner in procuring an accommodation between France and Spain; that through the fault of the magistrates of Amsterdam, affairs were not only no longer in the same situation, but that to them also ought to be attributed all the misfortunes with which the state was threatened, from their having opposed a levy, that was alone capable of changing the face of affairs, and procuring the re-
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establishment of the peace on more equitable conditions.

The magistrates of Amsterdam finding themselves attacked on all sides by the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel, caused to be printed a relation of every thing that had passed between them and me, and not only by this means vindicated themselves, but also made known to the members of the republic, and to all its allies, their sentiments on an accommodation of the differences between the Kings of France and Spain, which was of no small advantage to those who wished for the repose of Christendom.

They also dispersed a letter, in which they made it appear, that the aversion of the Spaniards to the means of an accommodation, was occasioned by the hopes they had received from the States General, of a speedy and powerful assistance, and explained what I had written on that subject; that the court of Spain had resolved to consent to the King's proposal, when a courier from the marquis de Grana, who had been dispatched after a conference between this marquis and the Prince of Orange, arrived at Madrid, and made the council of Spain change their resolution. These gentlemen afterwards published many other papers against the Prince of Orange and others, and exposed them to such a degree, that they would have continued till this time at variance, had it not been for the various incidents which happened after the truce, that obliged the magistrates of Amsterdam, and with them the whole republic of Holland, to place themselves under such an entire dependance on the Prince of Orange, that they were unable to oppose his designs, but found themselves, notwithstanding all their endeavours to prevent it, engaged in a war, from which they were unable to extricate themselves,

even though they had desired to do it with the greatest ardour.

While all things were in confusion in Holland, Zealand was not in much greater tranquillity. The Prince of Orange had engaged Mr. d'Odyck to make use of all his endeavours to oblige that province to consent to the raising of sixteen thousand men, and the three principal cities having refused their consent, Mr. d'Odick, as he had the votes of the nobles and of the three other small towns, resolved to oblige the Pensionary to conclude this affair by a majority of voices: but the Pensionary of Zealand replying, that he could not do this by his own authority, Mr. d'Odick resolved, let it cost what it would, to carry his point, and imagined, that he might intimidate them by the news of the arrival of the Prince of Orange: he therefore declared to the burgomasters of Middleburg, where the assembly of the States was held, that they ought to put the burghers under arms, and that the Prince of Orange was to arrive within two days. He said the same to the colonels who were in their quarters; but both the one and the other replied, that they durst not give these orders to the burghers, because they should not be able to command them; and that the populace were so much to be feared, when people seemed resolved on a war in spite of them, that they desired that the Prince of Orange would not come to Zealand, while affairs were in this situation, since he would certainly obtain no satisfaction.

But to return: by a letter from the King, dated the 14th of February, I was informed, that if the States General represented to me, that being obliged by their treaty with Spain to succour that crown, wheresoever it should be attacked, they could not engage not to grant it their assistance in

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Catalonia, Italy, or Navarre; his Majesty permitted me still in this case, to leave them at liberty, when I should think it necessary, to enter into the treaty he had impowered me to conclude.

I answered his Majesty, that there was scarcely any room to hope, that after the disorder into which the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel had thrown the republic, the States General should be brought to embrace the means they might easily employ to secure their own tranquillity, and give peace to Spain; but that, on the other hand, the magistrates of Amsterdam were so far from being intimidated, as it was imagined they would have been, that they were exasperated; and while the States General continued in their present confusion, their Allies had no room to expect much assistance, and that they now scarcely thought about raising the new levies.

Mean while the magistrates of Amsterdam did not send their deputies to the assembly of Holland; but only two secretaries of their city, by whom they demanded reparation for the insult offered their deputies, and their giving security for those they should send thither. The Prince of Orange on his side, continued his solicitations to examine their papers, and to oblige the deputies to take their trial. This occasioned great divisions in the States of Holland; for the body of the nobles, and the city of Harlem sided with the Prince of Orange.

The magistrates of Amsterdam then informed me, that it was extremely necessary that the King of England should explain himself in express terms, and with the utmost firmness, in relation to what concerned the Netherlands; and demanded, with more earnestness than they had yet done, that his Britannic Majesty should declare to their ambassador, and to the States General, by his minister at

the Hague, that since the Spaniards would not listen to an accommodation, and seemed to renounce their own interest, he should not on that account abandon his, nor suffer the war to be carried into the Netherlands. That if the King of France attacked them, he would endeavour to defend them; but that if the King did not attack them, and the Spaniards would make use of the troops they had there, in entering the dominions of France, and the States gave them assistance, in that case his Britannic Majesty would declare against Spain, and against the States themselves, if they acted in this manner.

When persons who perfectly understand the interior constitution of the republic, and who apprehend a war as much as the magistrates of Amsterdam, demand nevertheless to be spoke to in this manner; they must certainly be firmly persuaded, that fear alone could make the States General oppose the Prince of Orange; and this perfectly justifies the principle on which I have always proceeded, conformably to the advice of those who were well disposed.

The Prince of Orange, who, it was then thought, repented of the enterprise he had engaged in against the deputies of Amsterdam, because he had derived no advantage from it, and found them neither less firm, nor filled with less zeal for the welfare of the republic, attempted to regain them by the mildest measures; and to this purpose nominated four commissaries to go to Amsterdam, on the part of the States of Holland, to accommodate this affair: but the magistrates of Amsterdam refused to receive them. He then sent Beverning alone, who went thither as a private person, and yet staid there eight hours, without being able to obtain any thing, notwithstanding

withstanding his having friends and relations in the government of that city.

The Prince of Orange then found himself greatly embarrassed; for every thing remained in suspense, and the state of the war, which ought to have been regulated before the end of the month of December, 1683, was not yet done, though it was now the beginning of March, 1684. This obliged him to cause the Pensionary Fagel to propose to the States of Holland, two days together, to regulate the state of the war for the year 1684, as a thing absolutely necessary. He also caused a proposal to be made for his granting commissions for raising the verponding *, and the other ordinary impositions for the year 1684, which ought to have been regulated in the month of January; but the two secretaries which the magistrates of Amsterdam had sent to the Hague on the part of their city, to be present at the assembly of Holland, declared that they had received no orders on this subject, and that they were only commissioned to desire that the seal might be taken

* The States of the province of Holland made, some time after the establishment of the republic, a survey of all the real estates throughout that province, and a list of the names of those by whom they were possessed. They at length levied a tax, which they called verponding, which was properly the two hundredth real penny. This tax is regularly paid every year to the treasurers of the towns, to which every one is obliged to carry the sum at which he is rated, according to the ancient assessment, on a note's being every year delivered to him, in which is exactly set down his person, quality, abode, and the number of the page where his estate is registered. The villages have each a collector, who takes care to carry the money he receives to the treasurer of the town on which his village depends.

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taken off, and their papers restored; since without this was done, no affair could be terminated, nor the ordinary impositions regulated, as that city alone paid more than all the rest of the province.

The Prince of Orange not being able to succeed on this side, pressed the solicitors to advance the money for the levies. These solicitors are private persons who have the care of demanding the pay due to the colonels, captains, and other officers; and as the provinces, after having delivered their orders, which they never refuse, are a long time before they pay them, these solicitors advance the money to the officers, at a large interest. By this means they make considerable profits, so that many burgo-masters place their money in their hands, for which they receive even seven or eight per cent. though the usual interest is no more than three and a half, or four at most; and for this reason these burgo-masters frequently defer the payment of the troops, in order to draw out to a longer time the interest they receive for their money: but, on this occasion, those who had intrusted their cash in the hands of the solicitors, were so far from thinking of improving it, that they drew it out, plainly perceiving, that they could have no security in lending it, after

When the State levies a two hundredth real penny, the proprietors of real estates may abate, on the payment of the two hundredth penny, the sum they have that year paid for the verponding: but it is not the same when the state raises a two hundredth personal penny; for in that case no deductions are made of what has been paid for the verponding.

Real estates are fallen so low in Holland, that they are not a fourth part so valuable as they were when this tax was imposed, the principal reason of which is, the proprietors always being obliged to pay the verponding, according to its ancient valuation.

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the protestations of the magistrates of Amsterdam. The Prince of Orange also strove to borrow the money of the famous Suasso, a Jew of Anvers, who had lately settled at the Hague; but Suasso refused him.

In the mean time my negotiations had succeeded in Friesland; and I had informed the King in many of my letters, that the States of Friesland would never go back, and that I had intelligence of the resolutions they were on the point of taking; for the Prince of Nassau caused me to be informed every post of what passed in that province; and some persons of the States of Friesland let me know, that they had sent one of their body to Amsterdam to concert with that city, the resolution it was proper the province of Friesland should take in that important conjuncture. They even sent to me, in order to know whether the province of Friesland and the city of Amsterdam might depend on the King of France's particular protection; and on the assurance I gave them of it, they took the resolution I received on the 28th of February, which contained four very important heads. The first of which was, not to consent, on any account whatsoever, to make the new levies. The second, to preserve the peace, and more particularly the King's friendship. The third, to enter into a negotiation with me, in order to terminate the differences between the Kings of France and Spain: and the fourth, to cause all the troops in Flanders, belonging to the States General, that were above eight thousand men, to be recalled.

This resolution was taken very opportunely; for the Prince of Orange durst not, after such a declaration, go into Zealand, as he had resolved to do, to press that province to consent to the forces being raised; and when he assembled the deputies on secret affairs, and strove to oblige them to take a resolution, by which they would authorize him to send

as many troops as he thought proper for the defence of the Spanish Netherlands, there was not one of the seven deputies that durst give his consent, tho' four of them were entirely dependant on him: but all of them told him, that they could do no more than write about it to their provinces.

The Prince of Orange being unable to obtain this permission of the States General, proposed to chuse a deputation of three or four from amongst them, to go and exhort those of Friesland to change their sentiments. I was informed of it, and sent to acquaint his Majesty, that he need not be in any fear of their meeting with success: that, on the contrary, the province of Friesland was going to be strengthened by that of Groningen, and that I was informed, that within the space of four days, I should receive the resolutions of the province of Groningen, which would be conformable to that of Friesland. However, the Prince of Orange was absolutely resolved that the States General should send four deputies into Friesland; but though he met with great difficulties, he nevertheless, after urging and soliciting them for eight days successively, made them resolve upon it. As soon as the States General had taken this resolution, they imparted it to the States of Friesland, and desired them to remain assembled, till their deputies, who were immediately to set out, should arrive in Friesland, where they were to convince them of the necessity of causing the troops to be raised. The States of Friesland, on their receiving this letter, immediately dispatched a courier to the States General, to desire them not to give themselves the trouble of going into Friesland, informing them, that they were already separated, and that, though they should be re-assembled, they should not change their opinion, since they had founded their resolution on good and solid reasons, and by an unanimous consent of the whole province:

vince: but, notwithstanding this, the Prince of Orange made the deputies depart.

The English envoy had at last orders to declare, that the King his master believed, that there was no other means of terminating the differences between the Kings of France and Spain, than that of making the Spaniards accept of one of the equivalents proposed by his Majesty, or the truce of twenty years; but as he was at the same time forbid to give a memorial on this subject, and was enjoined only to make this known by word of mouth to the President of the week of the States General, this declaration produced no effect, for the President refused to take charge of it, since it was not given in writing; and, notwithstanding my solicitations in England, that he might have the permission to deliver a memorial, I could never obtain it.

And indeed the Prince of Orange must have given himself but little pain about the King of England, or else he must have imagined that his Britannic Majesty did not really wish that they should grant the King all he demanded, and that he would be satisfied, provided the peace was concluded, on any conditions whatsoever; for on the sixth of March, he sent a proposal to the King of England from the Allies, which was so extravagant and unreasonable, that he durst not communicate it to the province of Holland, till eight days after it was sent; and he did this not only because he was afraid that they would not have agreed to it, but to conceal the knowlege of it from me. Nevertheless, I was informed of it that very moment, and sent to acquaint the King my master, that I could never have believed that the Prince of Orange and the ministers of the Allies at the Hague could have carried their extravagancies to such a length. That I had discovered his having given orders to the ambassador of the States General, to declare to the King of England,

England, on the part of all the Allies, that they would accept the general truce, the duration to which should be regulated for as long a time as it should be thought proper; but that the Allies required, before they consented to this truce, that the King should restore to the empire, either Strasbourg, and all that he has taken into his possession since the treaty of Nimeguen; or if the King chose rather to keep Strasbourg and all he had possessed since the peace of Nimeguen, that he should restore Friburgh, Brisack, and the fort of Kell, and, in a word, all he possessed beyond the Rhine.

And with regard to Spain, the Pensionary Fagel had made use of a map, in which he had marked a line of separation, and the ambassador had orders only to tell the King of England, that the States General hoped to make Spain agree to it; but that in this case, that crown would stipulate, before it accepted the truce, that the French King should consent to this line of separation. They also demanded a cessation of all acts of hostility during three months, that they might have time to come to an agreement on these conditions.

The King by a letter, dated the 13th of March, informed me, that if these proposals were brought to me, I should reply, without waiting for fresh orders, that they were so extravagant, that though people had hitherto been in doubt whether the house of Austria's design was to continue the war, proposals so unreasonable, would have left every body no room to question it: that the peace could only be granted on the foot of one of the equivalents his Majesty had proposed, or the truce of twenty years; and with respect to this last choice they were sufficiently certain, that it would not admit of any conditions, and that whoever mentioned a suspension or a truce ought to consent that every thing should remain on both sides in the state they were in, with-

without any increase or diminution of power. That with regard to the suspension of all acts of hostility for three months, as it would require at least as much time to agree to the conditions, as to the truce of twenty years, they ought not to expect that his Majesty would agree to a proposal so opposite to his interest and the general welfare of all Europe. That therefore they ought not to hope for any other explication or concession on his part, and that after having consumed all the time allowed, and slighted all the condescensions they could reasonably desire for confirming the public tranquillity; they must impute all the mischief that should happen, in consequence of it, to those who would still disturb the public repose, by a longer refusal of his offers.

The advice I had with such diligence sent to the King on the proposals made by the allies was not useless, for he had time to be before hand with the King of England, who had received this project from the allies by the States General's ambassador, and who was desired to communicate it to M. de Barillon.

I did not content myself with writing about it to his Majesty: but I imagined that his interest required that I should let the deputies of Amsterdam, and some other persons in the state, know the malignity of these proposals. I therefore made them observe, that the allies formed two of these; one which concerned the empire, and which was so extremely unreasonable, that it would not be accepted, even after the loss of four battles; while the other, which related to Spain, was less opposite to the conditions on which his Majesty had consented to a peace; but for fear lest this proposal, unreasonable as it was, should be accepted, they had joined it inseparably to that of the Empire; and in case the interested parties should think proper to separate them, they took another precaution, that they might
still

still have it in their power to make peace or war; this was their offering nothing in regard to Spain, but to make use of their endeavours to engage the Spaniards to agree to the proposal made by the allies: though there was not the least room to doubt, that the Marquis de Grana, and consequently the Prince of Orange, were perfectly informed of the intentions of the court of Madrid, yet they offered absolutely the conditions which related to the empire, though Mr. Cramprick, and the other ministers at the Hague, were neither informed of the sentiments of the states of the empire, nor authorized by them in any manner whatsoever.

The ministers of the Allies were not stopped in their secret conferences by forming these projects for a peace: their consultations turned on the war, and they had regulated the armies their masters were to bring into the field, in case the King did not accept of their proposals, but should attack them. This second project appeared a very fine one, when set down on paper, but it was extremely chimerical. Spain engaged to have thirty vessels at sea, and had promised to make the utmost efforts by land, and to set on foot as many troops as possible. Sweden engaged to send twelve thousand men into Germany, and to furnish thirty men of war, or twenty at least. The five deputies of the States General (for those of Friesland and Groningen were not admitted to these conferences) promised, that their masters should raise the sixteen thousand men, and that they would fit out thirty vessels, and the allies reciprocally promised, that their succours should be ready by the fifteenth of April; but the house of Lunenburg, the Emperor, the Elector of Bavaria, and the circle of Franconia, did not mention the succours they were to bring.

The Prince of Orange, therefore, would not mention the particulars of the forces which the allies were

were to furnish, when he communicated to the States of Holland, the proposals the allies had resolved to make to the King of England for a general truce. He was satisfied with placing, in the number of the princes, whose ministers had consented to these proposals, and who were ready, in case of refusal, to send all their forces, the Emperor, the King of Spain, the King of Sweden, the Elector of Bavaria, a Prince of the empire, for whose name there was left a blank, who had considerable forces, the circle of Franconia, and the Duke of Sax Lunenburg.

I wrote to inform the King, my master, that the Prince who had considerable forces, and for whom a blank was left, could be no other than the Duke of Hanover, of whom the Prince of Orange was so certain, that he did not desire his minister to sign the treaty of association, though he assisted, and consequently consented to all the deliberations of the associates, and that I was persuaded, that this Prince would not declare himself till the States General had caused the levies to be made, and that the Swedes would not be sent into Germany. That I had learnt from good hands, that the Duke of Hanover was united by interest with the Prince of Orange, and that all the fair speeches made by the house of Lunenburg, were only to gain time till the Prince of Orange had taken his measures. In reality, I discovered, three days after, that the Duke of Hanover had entered above two months before into a treaty with Spain, by which that Prince engaged to appear at Luxemburg with twelve thousand men, by the 15th of April, and that the Spaniards ought to have given him five hundred thousand livres in the month of February; but as this sum was not paid in the month of February, which was already passed, and as it was not sent from Spain till the end

of

of June, after the taking of Luxemburg, the Hanoverian troops did not leave their quarters.

The King received this letter on the 9th of March, and at the same time wrote to inform me, that as the Princes of the house of Lunenburg had protested to him, that they would concur in establishing the peace, he was very glad that I continued to inform him of the conduct observed by their ministers at the Hague.

The secretaries of the cities of Amsterdam, in all the meetings of the States of Holland, only repeated their arguments, to have their papers delivered up to them; while the Pensionary Fagel, on the contrary, constantly demanded, that the seal should be broken, and the papers examined, and talked with great heat against the deputies of Amsterdam: but, notwithstanding all his endeavours, after having brought this affair under deliberation, there were twelve cities who refused to suffer the papers of the magistrates of Amsterdam to be examined.

This refusal, which vexed the Prince of Orange, did not seem to me sufficient to secure the magistrates of Amsterdam from the insults of this Prince, especially if any steps were taken by France, that would furnish him with the means. This obliged me to write to the King, that there were two things that might be of extraordinary service to the Prince of Orange in promoting his designs to crush the magistrates of Amsterdam, and destroy the liberties of the republic: The one was his Majesty's giving up some of the conditions offered to the Empire or to Spain; and the other, his Majesty's attacking any considerable places in Flanders or Brabant; so as that the Prince of Orange might make it appear, that the magistrates of Amsterdam were deceived, and that the King intended only to amuse them, in order to enable him, with the greater ease, to make a conquest of the Spanish Netherlands.

And

And certainly it was then impossible to act with too much prudence; for the Prince of Orange thought only of taking advantage of the absence of the deputies of Amsterdam, and of the disorder into which he had thrown the province of Holland, to engage the States General in the war. He then took his measures in the best manner possible with the principal cities in Holland, in order to obtain the permission, which he had been unable to procure from the States General, to cause as many troops to march into the King of Spain's dominions as he thought proper; but this was refused him by the States of Holland, as it had been three weeks before by the States General: nor was he more successful in Zealand; for though he sent three times successively to procure the consent of the city of Middleburg to his making the levies, he could never obtain it.

All this opposition, however, did not discourage him; for though the provinces of Zealand, Friesland, and Groningen refused the levies, and in that of Holland, the city of Amsterdam would not grant their consent, yet he acted as if he had obtained a formal resolution of the States General. I therefore wrote, that this Prince must certainly be either persuaded that he should at last obtain what he wanted of these provinces (which I could not however believe) or that he was absolutely resolved to cause the levies to be made, whatsoever it cost; since I was very credibly informed, that he privately delivered out commissions, and that he had given regiments to those who were capable of doing him service, and even to the Prince of Oost Frieze, on condition that he raised his regiment in his own estate. But I assured the King, that while the city of Amsterdam, and the provinces of Friesland and Groningen remained firm and unshaken (as I knew they infallibly would) all the endeavours of the Prince

Prince of Orange would be ineffectual, and that he would not be able to obtain as much money from the other provinces as would be sufficient either to raise the forces or to maintain them. The Prince, therefore, who knew better than I these difficulties, not to say impossibilities, prevented the troops being paid that were already on foot, though he was in arrears to some of them fifteen or twenty months; he kept all the money given by the cities for this purpose, and laid it up, with a view to make use of it in making the new levies. And though he perceived, that the fresh troops raised by this money could not long subsist, and that the old troops, who fingered none of it, would be drove to great straits, he nevertheless warmly pursued his enterprize, being persuaded, that these exterior demonstrations of his zeal were sufficient to oblige Spain to continue the war; that he should by this means engage the King of Sweden, to enter into it: and tho' he should deceive the Kings of Spain and Sweden by giving them hopes of great assistance, he did not give himself much concern, provided he hindered the first from entering on a negotiation about a peace till the war was entirely kindled; and he did not doubt, but it would, if he could (by shewing a resolution of the States General, such as it was, to cause the sixteen thousand men to be raised) oblige his Majesty to carry his arms into the Spanish Netherlands. He then hoped, that the Magistrates of Amsterdam and the King of England would be forced to enter into the war, whether they would or no. Upon this he hazarded every thing, and endeavoured in the mean time, by vain proposals, to gain two or three months time.

It was doubtless with this view, that no longer hoping to obtain the consent of the province of Holland, in a manner agreeable to the laws of the government, which authorized his giving a more

powerful assistance to the Spaniards, that he kept no measures; but, taking advantage of his power, made them resolve by a plurality of voices, to send a fresh supply to the Spaniards of twelve regiments of infantry, and fifteen hundred horse, notwithstanding the opposition of Amsterdam, and two or three other cities, which protested against this resolution, as being taken against the fundamental laws of the republic. That he might the more easily obtain the consent of those who agreed to this proceeding, he caused to be put into the resolution, that these troops should be only employed for the defence of those Spanish towns that were most exposed, in which they were to be put as garrisons; and he consented that that province should put into the same act, that it did not design by this step to break with his Majesty.

The next day, which was the 17th of March, he caused this resolution to be passed by the States General, notwithstanding the opposition of the provinces of Friesland and Groningen; that is, as irregularly as it was done in the States of Holland, and the same day gave orders that the troops should march immediately. Among these were two battalions of his regiment of guards, his regiment of horse guards, and his company of body guards, which consisted of an hundred and eighty troopers. He at the same time set out for Zealand, not doubting but that he should now accomplish his designs, and that his presence would oblige the city of Middleburg to consent to the levies being made.

Though I had already, more than once, taken the liberty to represent to the King my master, that all the Prince of Orange's steps only tended, to bring the war into the Low Countries, I could not forbear writing to him once more on this occasion; that I was persuaded, and that upon good grounds, that the Prince of Orange exerted all his endeavours to obtain the permission to send troops into Flan-

ders, only from the apprehension, lest his Majesty should employ his arms elsewhere; that he would endeavour, if possible, to stop them in the Low Countries, and there to give such powerful assistance to the Spaniards, as to kindle a war in Flanders, that would interest and engage the King of England and the States General.

The envoy of Brandenburg then resolved, according to the orders he had received from his master, to endeavour to dispose the Prince of Orange to think of an accommodation: but that Prince declared, that from the manner in which things were conducted in France, he could find no medium with respect to himself, and that he must either blindly submit to the King's pleasure, or be at war against him.

It would be tiresome to repeat all that the Pensionary Fagel did to oblige the province of Holland to consent to have the papers of the magistrates of Amsterdam examined; it is sufficient to observe, that I have already given repeated accounts of his attempts, which he still continued; but all were to no purpose.

The King informed me, that the marshal d'Humieres was marching to bombard one of the towns belonging to the Spaniards in Flanders; that I was to cause the deputies of Amsterdam to be informed of it, and to assure them at the same time, that as soon as this expedition should be finished, the marshal d'Humieres should retire into his Majesty's dominions. I was very sorry at my being obliged to tell them this news, and so much the more, as I was unable to assure them of the safety of any one of the towns: besides I was sensible that many of these gentlemen would be greatly concerned at it; I was however so happy as to bring them to consent to a bombardment, without knowing any thing more.

His

His Majesty also wrote to inform me, that Mr. Fucks, the Duke of Brandenburg's Minister was coming with very good orders and intentions to the Hague; and that he was assured that his endeavours and remonstrances might contribute to turn the States General from the precipice into which they were resolved to cast themselves.

In the mean time it appeared, that Fucks was one of the Prince of Orange's creatures; and he shewed that it was not his fault if things did not turn out according to the Prince of Orange's wishes: however he found me scrupulously attached to my orders, without being willing to enter into any expedient, and the magistrates of Amsterdam too steady, or more properly too far engaged, to be able to go back.

I therefore, on the 17th of March, wrote to the King, that this minister, after having been at Amsterdam, came to the Hague; that I was greatly astonished, that instead of exerting himself, as I had expected, in endeavouring to bring the States General to agree to the articles of accommodation proposed by the King, he strove to persuade me, that the proposals made by the Allies to the King of England were reasonable, and that he approved them, at least that which related to Spain. That I had shewn him that his Majesty could not abate of his proposals; in the first place, because his doing it at a time when the Prince of Orange had obtained a resolution for making the levies, and when he had sent fresh succours to Spain, would raise his credit more than ever with the republic, and ruin, without resource, the magistrates of Amsterdam. That by the proposals made by the Prince of Orange, nothing was ceded to the King in the chatellany or lordship of Courtray, but what he had already in his possession, and that what they would take from him in Luxemburg, greatly exceeded that

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lordship; but that without mentioning these particulars, into which it was not my business to enter, I desired him to examine very seriously, with what spirit these proposals were made, and if the Prince of Orange was sincerely desirous of an accommodation: if the demand of a cessation of hostilities during three months, (without any promises to the King, in case the Spaniards came to no resolution at the end of these three months) was not a captious demand. I added to this, that every thing that had passed at the Hague, plainly discovered the Prince of Orange's intentions and designs. And as I perceived, by some words that escaped Mr. Fucks, that the Prince had persuaded him, that it was not for the interest of the electoral Prince of Brandenburg, that the lands which the Prince of Orange had about the city of Luxemburg should remain under the dominion of the King of France, I asked him, if the Elector of Brandenburg was not convinced of his Majesty's affection, and if he did not believe, he should receive as good treatment from him at least, as from the King of Spain. Mr. Fucks perfectly understood what I meant, and was obliged to confess, that all the efforts made use of at the Hague to obtain the country about Luxemburg, proceeded from the Prince of Orange's having all his estates there. I therefore told him, that if it was true that the Prince of Orange had no other views besides those of putting Luxemburg in a condition to procure subsistence during the truce, and if that objection was removed, he should be sincerely desirous of a peace, he would have proposed expedients agreeable to it: for example, that the King should consent that the Spaniards should draw at pleasure, and in the manner practised between neighbouring states and friends, the accommodations necessary for the subsistence of the garrison and inhabitants; that ammunition and provisions should be suffered to pass,

pass, after permission being desired of his Majesty's officers, and other conditions of the like nature. That if the Prince of Orange had made any such proposals, there would have been no room to doubt of the King of England's joining with him to obtain them, or of their being readily granted by his Majesty.

This minister, after having been two days at the Hague, returned to Amsterdam, where he employed himself solely in endeavouring to promote a reconciliation between the magistrates of that city and the Prince of Orange, in which he did not succeed: and so far was he from thinking of making his Majesty's proposals accepted, that he promised the Pensionary Fagel to make use of all his endeavours to bring the Elector, his master, to persuade the King of France to accept those of the allies, which he declared, he thought extremely reasonable.

The Pensionary Fagel mentioned this to the States General, who at the same time sent orders to their envoy at the court of Brandenburg, to strive to improve, to the utmost of his power, the good offices Mr. Fucks had already done them with that Elector.

The deputies of the Elector of Cologne, who arrived at the Hague on the 20th of March, told me that they had met Mr. Fucks on the road to Amsterdam, and that he turned back and went with them; but that he had not been able to prevent some expressions escaping him in the conversations they had together, that discovered his not being disposed to favour his Majesty's interests; and that he could not dissemble the vexation he felt, at the commission that had been given him to the States General.

The Prince of Orange's and the Pensionary Fagel's quarrel with the magistrates of Amsterdam, was at this time carried to such a height, that on

the 22d of March I wrote to inform the King, that I believed they were not to be reconciled; and that nothing but the necessity of a common defence could unite them, or give the Prince of Orange the advantage over them, which made me once more take the liberty to represent to his Majesty, that if he would consent to be satisfied with putting a check upon the Spaniards, by his own troops, and those of his allies, without attacking them in Flanders, he might carry his arms into Catalonia and Italy, in what manner he pleased, without enabling the Prince of Orange to make the States General declare war against him: but that if his Majesty had reasons which obliged him to lay siege to the barrier towns, it was much to be feared, that the Prince of Orange would prevail so far as to oppress the magistrates of Amsterdam, and engage the States General in the war, at least if his Majesty did not turn all his forces against the Low Countries, and did not, at the same time, enter the territories of the States General; and if his Majesty, in this case, thought proper to declare, that he would preserve the liberty of the republic, and the religion of the country; and that he only demanded the re-establishment of the ancient government, I plainly saw that things were never better disposed than they were at that time, to make on the one hand the love of liberty, and on the other, the resentment felt against the Prince of Orange, lead the Dutch to shake off a yoke, which they could not from thence forward support, without being entirely oppressed. That it was not for me to enter into his Majesty's great designs, and that I was sensible I should be too rash in pretending to answer for the event of such an enterprize; but I knew at least, that if it was to be attended with success, it would only proceed from its being undertaken in this manner; and
that,

that, on the contrary, nothing could be of greater service to the Prince of Orange than the King's dividing his forces, and making them act at the same time, on the side of Italy or Spain, and in that of Flanders; for it appeared to me, from the situation of affairs, and the disposition of mind the people were then in, that he should either not attack the Low Countries at all, or not do it by halves.

I at this time received a letter wrote by one of the Prince of Nassau's confidants, to a person whom he, in conjunction with the States of Friesland, had sent to Amsterdam, to consult with the magistrates of that city, on what was to be done in the present conjuncture. This letter observed, that there was so strict an union in the province of Friesland, that there was not the least change to be feared; that the deputies of the States General were arrived, and that they had called an extraordinary general assembly on the subject of the deputation of the States General; but that this would only occasion the discovery of the great unanimity of sentiments on the present affairs.

That one of the principal officers in the army, who was devoted to the Prince of Orange, had been sent to the Prince of Nassau, and promised him, amongst other things, on the part of that Prince, to make him in a short time major-general, and vice-governor of the five provinces, of which the Prince of Orange was governor, with the assurance of all kind of support and encouragement in the provinces of Friesland and Groningen, in regard to the posts he possessed there, provided he would enter into the Prince of Orange's sentiments, who on his refusal would take very different measures, and contrive at least, the means of forcing, not only the city of Amsterdam, but also those two provinces, to return to their duty; assuring him, that the troops of Lunenburg and others should soon be made use of for this purpose.

That the Prince of Orange would gladly do all in his power to live with the Prince of Nassau as with his brother ; but that if he would not accept of his friendship, he would spill even the last drop of his blood, rather than not execute what he had undertaken.

The person who was sent to Amsterdam on the part of the Prince of Nassau and the States of Friesland, at the same time that he sent me this letter, wrote me word, that the magistrates of Amsterdam had news from their friends at the Hague, which informed them, that people were there endeavouring to find out the means of attacking Amsterdam, of throwing bombs into it, of spreading fire and devastation on all sides, and raising the populace ; and that if the power of the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel did not fail them, they would do a great deal of mischief in that city.

This person, who also managed my affairs with the magistrates of Amsterdam, informed me, that they were filled with gratitude for what he had told them, by my orders ; and that in return, they had desired him to let me know it.

That the troops sent into the Spanish Netherlands would only serve for the defence of the barrier ; and that they depended on the King of France's undertaking nothing, either against the States General, or the Spanish Netherlands.

That they hoped the request made to the allies by the five provinces, to cause their troops to draw near to the Low Countries, would produce no effect, since the provinces of Friesland and Groningen, and other considerable parts of the republic, had not consented to it.

That if the King wished for a peace, this was the time most proper for continuing his political views in favour of those who were well-disposed.

That

That the deputation of the States General would be unsuccessful in Friesland, and that they were resolved to declare in the extraordinary assembly held there, that the States of that province would always persist in their present sentiments.

That he had orders positively to assure me, of the constant resolution of the provinces of Friesland and Groningen, to procure a peace; and that he desired me to return an answer to all these articles.

I wrote to inform him, that I was very glad to find that the Prince of Nassau maintained such good sentiments; that he really inherited the love his predecessors had felt for the republic, and that he would have the honour of being its support; that I could assure him, that the King would second him, and that his Majesty's sole intention was to maintain the United Provinces in a flourishing state; and to restore them, whenever it was in his power, to their ancient liberty; that in order to this, it was necessary that the Prince of Nassau should discover his firmness and intrepidity on this occasion. I then answered each article.

That the troops of the States General being sent into the Netherlands was very surprizing, and would greatly change the face of affairs; that I nevertheless did not doubt of the King's constantly maintaining the measures he had already taken, and that he would do nothing that would give the Prince of Orange an opportunity to injure the magistrates of Amsterdam, and destroy the liberties of the republic; and that to confirm his Majesty in these sentiments, I had sent him the copy of the resolution of the States General, by which they had decreed, that their troops should only be employed in preserving the barrier.

That I ought however to inform him, of what I had already communicated to the magistrates of

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Amsterdam, that the French were going to throw bombs into some of the towns in Flanders, in order to oblige the Spaniards to agree to a peace, after which his Majesty's troops would retire; so that those who wished for a peace would have nothing to apprehend.

That they ought to expect, both from the King's prudence, and his affection to them, that he would continue, on this occasion, to give them the marks of that goodness he had already shewn them on so many occasions; and especially in the manner in which he had behaved, in regard to my couriers being robbed of my letters, on which occasion he had been unwilling to shew his resentment against those who were the authors of such a violation of the law of nations, since this could not be done without involving the whole republic in their punishment.

That I was very glad to learn, that the deputation which the States General had sent into Friesland, would be without effect; and that the magistrates of Amsterdam remained steadily fixed in their good dispositions: that this was so much the more necessary, as the King was informed of it; that he was not ignorant of the invitation the States General had sent to their Allies, to make their troops advance to the Spanish Netherlands; and that I had need of such assurances, to prevent the ill intentions of their enemies; and that they ought to believe that the States would have been for a long time involved in the war, if his Majesty had not been informed of the manner in which things were conducted within the republic, since they could not but confess, that had the King only seen what was done abroad, and what appeared to be done in the name of the States General, he must have expected nothing less than their publishing a declaration of war.

That

That I had learned from other channels, the projects of bombs and other military executions formed in the Prince of Orange's closet against the city of Amsterdam, and against all those who opposed the unmeasurable ambition of that Prince, who could not suffer any obstacle should be put to it. That an unshaken firmness was the best expedient they could oppose against it, especially when that conduct was seconded abroad, as I could assure them it would be, since the King would only make his troops act with a view to favour the designs of the magistrates of Amsterdam, and the provinces of Friesland and Groningen.

The King informed me, by a letter dated the 16th of March, that he had imagined, that the Prince of Orange's continual ill treatment of the city of Amsterdam would have reduced it to the necessity of doing whatever he pleased; and that the principal cities in the provinces were so greatly interested in the preservation of the liberties of that city, that there was not the least appearance of their always seconding the intentions of the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel; indeed it must appear surprizing to those who read this work, that the city of Amsterdam should always remain alone, and that it should be deserted by all the others, when it only exerted itself for the preservation of the peace, and to maintain the liberties of the republic: but it ought to be observed, that since the death of Messirs. Oost and Valkenir, the two famous burgomasters of Amsterdam, who had obliged the Prince of Orange to consent to the peace of Nimeguen, the government of that city had fallen into such weak hands, that whenever the other cities united with Amsterdam, to support any affair against the Prince of Orange, they had been abandoned; the magistrates of that city wanting the power long to resist

the will of the Prince; from hence it was that the burgomasters of the other cities durst not now confide in them, from the fear lest they should not behave with greater firmness than they had hitherto done, and the dread of their being left exposed to the Prince of Orange's resentment, those of Amsterdam having always found it much more easy to obtain a reconciliation, from the great need the prince was under of such a powerful city.

His Majesty in this letter added, that the orders he had given the marshal d'Humieres to bombard one of the towns in Flanders had not been executed on account of the bad weather, but that they would be immediately put in execution; after which those troops would retire into their quarters.

I answered his Majesty, that there was no probability that the city of Amsterdam, which, as things were then situated, found its certain ruin connected with the continuance of the war, would embrace the sentiments of the Prince of Orange; that the only question now was, whether that Prince, notwithstanding the opposition of Friesland and Groningen, would bring the other provinces to take such measures as would engage them entirely in the war, or at least, would oblige his Majesty to enter into a war with them.

That I had communicated to the magistrates of Amsterdam what I had learned from his Majesty, in relation to his bombarding a place in Flanders; and that so far from being terrified at it, I had found the means of bringing them to make use of it as a subject of reproach against the States General, for sending their troops into the Spanish Netherlands, and to invite them to do what his Majesty expected from them; that they had declared, by their secretary in the States of Holland, that they did not doubt but his Majesty would cause his troops to act
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in Flanders; and the steps the States General had just taken, ought to oblige him to it, even though he had not designed it: they therefore demanded, that since the States would neither accept of the peace on the conditions offered them by his Majesty, nor of the truce of twenty years, they would at least hold a secret conference with some of the deputies of the province of Holland, to consult on the means of securing the Spanish Netherlands from being the seat of the war, and from being totally ruined; but the Pensionary Egel would not take the advice of the States of Holland in relation to this proposal, the consequence of which he plainly perceived.

The envoys of Cologne had their first audience of the States General, on the 23d of March, and the baron Youl the same day presented his letters of credence from the King of Denmark, in which that Prince being willing to avoid having an ambassador at the Hague, gave him no other title besides that of his counsellor: for the Baron, who had all the false pride of the Danes, had made some difficulty of taking the title of envoy: but the States General refusing to acknowledge him, at least till he was invested with some public character, he took that of ambassador.

At the same time letters came from Zealand, which brought the news that the Prince of Orange being arrived at Middleburg, some captains of the burghers had resolved to put their companies under arms, in order to do him honour, but that they had been able to assemble only twenty five persons; and so much were the burghers exasperated against him who resolved to engage them in the war, that he had caused the council of the city to be assembled three days successively; and though he employed the rest of his time in soliciting, and laying his plots, he

he had always fourteen voices against nine for the refusal of the levies, even though he had threatened the principal persons who opposed his will; and that Mr. d'Hodick, before this Prince's arrival, had caused the council of that city to be assembled two and twenty times on the same account.

We were informed, three days after, that the Prince of Orange finding that he could gain no advantage over the magistrates of Middleburg, took the resolution to behave in the same manner in Zealand as he had done in Holland, and resolved to have a resolution of that province of some kind or other: he assembled them for this purpose, and as of the seven voices of which the States were composed, he had that of one of the small towns, and of two others over which he had great authority; and also the voice of the nobles, he ordered the Pensionary of Zealand to form a conclusion on a majority; but this Pensionary having refused to do what was contrary to his oath, the Prince of Orange said, that he would do it himself: he then took the pen and drew up the resolution; on which the towns which had voted for the levies being made, declared, that they had no orders to consent to a resolution taken on a plurality of voices, and tho' Tergoes strongly protested against it, the Prince of Orange went on, and carried away the resolution he had prepared himself. This was all the satisfaction he obtained in Zealand, from whence he immediately returned to the Hague.

The deputies of the States General, sent into Friesland, met with even still worse treatment: for they were so far from obtaining any thing in favour of the levies, that a resolution was unanimously taken in their presence, which confirmed the first, of absolutely refusing to have them raised, and to press the States General to endeavour, without loss
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of time, to obtain an accommodation of the differences subsisting between France and Spain. But this was not all; the States of this province, some days after, came to a resolution to recal all their troops, as well those that were in the places belonging to the republic, as those that had marched into the Spanish Netherlands; and on this account sent orders to their deputy, who was with the States General, to make this demand to the Prince of Orange; and in case he should refuse to consent to it, which they did not doubt but he would, to declare to the States General, that the States of Friesland had resolved to order all the officers of their repartition to return immediately with their troops into the province of Friesland.

All these obstacles did not stop the Prince of Orange, who continued to take all the measures in his power, to engage the States General in the war; his regiments of horse and foot-guards were to set out as soon as possible, and by his orders a camp was marked out at Willebrouck, and also his quarters at Vilvorden, as if he was to follow the auxiliary troops. I informed the King that this Prince acted in so hot and passionate a manner, that all honest men believed, that he would hazard a battle with the few troops he had under his command, as not caring whether he lost it or not, provided he did but rekindle the war. The republicans, on the contrary, only employed themselves in depriving him of the means of doing it. The commissioners of the admiralty of Amsterdam put a stop to the workmen, who laboured in repairing their vessels, chusing rather to leave the fleet of the States General in the deplorable state it was then in, however necessary these vessels were for the safety of their commerce, than by improving their

their fleet, to give the Prince of Orange an opportunity of making an ill use of it.

The States of Holland being re-assembled on the 30th of March, the Pensionary Fagel had a new struggle to make them examine the papers of the magistrates of Amsterdam; but not being able to effect it, and seeing, on the contrary, that a majority of the voices were for having them restored, he would not bring this affair to a conclusion; but made three other proposals, on which he desired them to deliberate.

The first was, what measures they ought to take on the advice given them by Mr. de Staremburg *, who wrote that the King was to set out on the seventh of April, to form a siege in Flanders, and sent a list of the general officers that were to serve under his Majesty.

The second, if they did not believe that the States General might take the resolution of raising the sixteen thousand men with the consent only of the five provinces.

The third proposal was to fit out fifty men of war.

As the deputies would not explain themselves on these articles, they were sent to their respective towns, to know the sentiments of their superiors; but at their return, the Pensionary Fagel durst not demand their answer; for he had been informed, a little before he entered the assembly, that many deputies had received orders that were very opposite to the Prince of Orange's intentions. This Prince and the Pensionary Fagel were astonished at finding that the principal cities in Holland began to place a confidence in the magistrates of Amsterdam, and

* I was greatly surprized at my learning this news only from the letters the ambassador of the States in France wrote to his masters.

that they conformed themselves to their sentiments. So true it is, that since the connections I had formed between the Prince of Nassau, the provinces of Friesland and Groningen, and the ruling persons in Amsterdam, that these last had resumed their courage, at finding themselves in a much better situation than they had hitherto been.

It was necessary that I should make the King my master observe a change that was of such advantage to the republicans, and inform him of the present disposition of the provinces. I represented, that when it was observed, that the Prince of Orange undertook to make the States General resolve to raise sixteen thousand men, contrary to the fundamental laws of the government, and sent, by his own private authority, new succours to the Spaniards, there was some reason for believing that he would either by fair or foul means, engage the States General to come into his views; but that when we examined in what manner things were conducted in the heart of the republic, it was easy to judge that this Prince could not long support such enterprizes, and that he would infallibly sink under them, if nothing happened in the Spanish Netherlands that would justify the steps he had taken.

That in Holland, the city of Amsterdam, which formed the most considerable part, was not only averse to the raising of sixteen thousand men, but had declared, that it would not contribute to any of the expence that was necessary to their being raised. I represented to his Majesty, how things were carried in Zealand, in relation to this subject; that the province of Friesland, which is one of the most considerable, had taken resolutions, which left no room to fear its receding from them; that Groningen would doubtless follow this example, and that Gelderland, Utrecht and Overysse, which had been con-

constrained to give their consent, were not in a condition to support the expence.

I thought it necessary three days after, to add to these reflections, a particular account of the state of all the provinces, to the end that his Majesty himself might judge of what might be at last expected in regard to peace or war, and the consequences which the Prince of Orange's engaging them to take these steps, would naturally produce.

I informed him, that the province of Gelderland, though dependant on this prince, had sent deputies extraordinary to the States General, to disavow the consent its ordinary deputies had given to the sending of fresh forces into Flanders, declaring that that province had not the least knowledge of it; and that, so far from consenting to it, its inhabitants wanted troops for their own defence, as they saw the danger to which they were exposed, from their not having a single soldier in the whole province.

That Overysfel was not under less fear and uneasiness (but that this did not appear so openly, having only the relations of Benting in the government) and that the inhabitants were reduced to so bad a state, that having sought for money to pay their quota of the expence for raising the sixteen thousand men, the magistrates had been unable to raise it, though they had offered, in the name of the province, eight per cent. interest. And yet these were the two only provinces, whose deputies had given a pure and simple consent to the forces being raised.

With respect to that of Utrecht, the towns which compose the principal voices had absolutely refused to give their consent to the levies; and the common people in that province were so ill satisfied, that there was reason to fear, they would rise if it was continued; that the clergy and nobles who formed the

the two other, but who paid very little of the expence, had only consented on certain conditions, which they were unable to perform.

That the King knew in what manner the consent of Zealand had been extorted; that the three most powerful towns, Middleburg, Tergoes, and Ziriczee had protested against the resolution the Prince of Orange had himself drawn up; that therefore he had only Tertolin, which was no more than a village, besides Flushing and Terveer, over which he had great authority, and the body of the nobles, which always sided with him; yet these three last towns had declared, that though they gave their consent to the raising the sixteen thousand men, they could not furnish their quota of the expence.

That the province of Friesland had not only refused to consent to these forces being raised, but would not leave the troops belonging to that repartition at the Prince of Orange's disposal; and that I was assured, the province of Groningen would follow their example.

As to that of Holland, the city of Amsterdam not only persisted in refusing to consent to the levies being made; but the burghers and inhabitants of all the other towns began to be so perfectly convinced of the good intentions of the magistrates of Amsterdam, and of the formal design of the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel, to engage them in the war, that notwithstanding the orders dispersed throughout the whole province, that information should be given against those who said that the Prince of Orange wished for a war, nothing else was talked of, in the streets, squares, and public boats; and this was done with all imaginable freedom. That the deputies of the seven towns of North Holland, had unanimously declared, in the assembly of the States of Holland, that their superiors had no need

need of sending deputies thither, since they were only amused with things of small consequence, and the States of the province did not seriously busy themselves about affairs that concerned the welfare of the republic: that after this declaration, they had retired to their respective towns, leaving only at the Hague two persons amongst them all, to inform the towns in North Holland of what passed in the States of Holland. That at length the discontent which was generally spread throughout the whole province of Holland, on account of the Prince of Orange's conduct, was carried to such a length, that the two battalions of guards were eight days at Delft, which they had been unable to leave, because they could find no boats to carry them, though the Prince of Orange had given orders fifteen days before for the cities of Dort, Rotterdam, and other places, to send as many boats as they were able to that city: that a considerable number had been already there; but that when the watermen were informed that they were to transport the troops into Flanders, they had the boldness to refuse their assistance, alledging that they had not been paid for the voyages of this kind they had made in the last war: they therefore retired in the night to Zealand, and to other places; and as they returned, informed those of their comrades whom they met, of the reason for which they were to go to Delft, and made them sail back with them.

That his Majesty might plainly see from every thing I had the honour to write to him, that the resolution the Prince of Orange had obtained from the five deputies to the States General, to send a new reinforcement to the Spaniards, was not properly a resolution of the State, but an enterprize of this Prince, which would enable him to obtain his end, if he could by this means oblige his Majesty to involve the States General in the war; but which would

would infallibly be his ruin, if his Majesty attacked none of the places of the barrier, and suffered the troops of the United Provinces to continue unemployed in the Netherlands. That I had given him a perfect knowledge of the succours the States General were in a condition to send to the Spaniards; that he knew the expedients the Prince of Orange might make use of for supporting the new levies, while they were only granted by five deputies of the States General. That he saw in what manner the Prince of Orange's designs were traversed; and I assured him that they would meet with still stronger opposition from the greatest and most powerful part of the State, when it was found that he attempted things which only tended to the ruin of the country.

That it was not my place to say more to his Majesty; but that my duty demanded, as I had the honour to be employed as ambassador to the States General, I should take the liberty to assure him, that whatever success his arms might meet with in Italy and Spain, the States General would not on that account enter into a war with his Majesty; that there were even many who believed, that the Prince of Orange, however desirous of entering into a war, durst not, in this case, engage in any enterprize in Flanders, as he had only obtained from his creatures their consent to send troops thither to stay in the strong places, under the pretence of his having learnt that his Majesty was going to attack one of them.

That if, notwithstanding all this, the Prince of Orange permitted the marquis de Grana to make use of the troops of the States General in such a manner as to engage them in a war in the Netherlands, in that case, if his Majesty, knowing the weakness of the Spaniards, and the small assistance they could obtain from the States General, would
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remain on that side on the defensive, and by this conduct compleatly revive the republican party, and effectually ruin the Prince of Orange; or if he did not think that it was consistent with his advantage or dignity to act only defensively in the Netherlands, while the States General performed acts of hostility; in this case, he would have the advantage of not beginning the war, and whatever he undertook could only be imputed to the Prince of Orange; and that I could safely promise, that the States, so far from enabling the Prince of Orange to support the war, would, on the contrary, be more than ever disposed to oblige the Spaniards to consent to an accommodation with his Majesty.

That if the King obtained such great conquests in the Netherlands as at last to oblige the States to unite for the defence of the places in their neighbourhood, these two reflections might be made: the first, that this re-union being formed only at the last extremity, and with reluctance, might take place when it was too late to save what was left in the Spanish Netherlands; and the second, which I thought very important, was, that though this progress should oblige the States General to enter into the war, the King would however have preserved their entire confidence, and they would remain firmly persuaded, that his Majesty had no design to attack the Netherlands, and that this he had been constrained to undertake; so that they would seize the first opportunity of making a peace with his Majesty, and of attaching themselves more strongly than ever to his interest.

I added to this, that it was not for me to penetrate into his Majesty's designs; I was however sensible that the Prince of Orange had given him but too just cause for his making use of his troops in the Netherlands, if he thought proper to do it, without

out his waiting for any thing more; and this the most sensible men could not deny: but the common people were not of the same opinion, and what is of considerable weight in Holland, the magistrates of Amsterdam might conceive some distrust, and think themselves entirely abandoned; and I humbly entreated him to consider, that supposing a war with the States General to be inevitable, if there would not be some advantage in its being undertaken in such a manner, as would not destroy the confidence which all honest men had, and a great part of the common people began to have, in his Majesty. That if this was done, there was no room to doubt, but that they would no sooner be involved in the war, than they would wish to get out of it, and that they would embrace the first opportunity that should present itself, to obtain a peace that might perfectly re-establish this confidence; but if they could certainly conclude from the manner in which the war against them was begun, that it ought entirely to destroy this confidence, the Prince of Orange would not only raise almost insurmountable difficulties to the conclusion of the peace; but it would not be difficult for him, even after the peace, to prevent the minds of the people becoming reconciled to his Majesty: for he would be sufficiently sensible, that his interest required his keeping up, after the peace between his Majesty and the States General, that distrust on which he found, that the support of his authority absolutely depended.

Mean while the battalions of guards still remained at Delft, for want of boats to transport them; and this obliged the Prince of Orange, on the sixth of April, to send soldiers to bring the boats thither. They forced some watermen to prepare to sail for Delft; but when they went the next day to make them set out for that city, they found that the watermen

termen had fled in the night, and left their boats behind them; so that the Prince of Orange found himself constrained, on the 10th of the same month, to send soldiers in search of them, with orders to bring them by force; but they only found the watermen's boys, the masters chusing rather to run the risk of losing them, than to be obliged to be themselves instrumental in transporting the troops.

On the sixth of March I wrote to inform the King, that I could not penetrate into the reason the Prince of Orange had to hope, that the elector of Brandenburg would change his sentiments, as he had for some days flattered himself; and I intreated his Majesty to observe, that the Prince of Orange and his creatures exaggerated every thing, and that if the elector of Brandenburg did not oppose them, it was enough to make them immediately spread the report that he was in their interest; but that they had never mentioned any of the sentiments of the Elector of Brandenburg to their advantage, that had the least foundation in truth.

The Pensionary Fagel had on the 10th of March published a pamphlet that contained above an hundred and twenty pages, and that was a kind of verbal process of what was treated of in the assembly of Holland on the 16th of February, in relation to the deputies of Amsterdam: and on the sixth of April he caused a volume to be published of the thickness of one's finger, under a fictitious name, against the magistrates of Amsterdam, pretending, upon false and malicious consequences drawn from my letter, to prove them guilty of the crime of high treason: and this last piece had a postscript against the memorial I had drawn up for their justification.

This book no sooner made its appearance, than Fagel found himself attacked on all sides, by books printed against him; one of which was wrote by the
magistrates

magistrates of Amsterdam, and signed by the secretary of that city, to shew that they did not desire to conceal themselves. They treated the author of this book as a man who deserved to be sent to a madhouse, and whose folly seemed accompanied with such malice, that they referred to another time the consideration of the punishment due to one, who by such falsities, and such black calumnies, endeavoured to throw the State into disorder and confusion; and taking occasion from what had just passed in Friesland, they drew a parallel between the Pensionary of that province and the Pensionary Fagel, and said, that there was a necessity for bringing that of Zealand to his trial, for having scrupled to violate his oath, and to act contrary to the fundamental laws of the State, instead of imitating the conduct of the Pensionary Fagel.

It was also resolved in the council of the city of Amsterdam, to cause the Pensionary Fagel's libel to be burnt by the hand of the common executioner: but Van Buning, who had always his views fixed on a reconciliation between the city of Amsterdam and the Prince of Orange, as soon as these affairs should be terminated, prevented its being put in execution.

On the sixth of April the province of Groningen sent the States General a resolution on the subject of the levies, conformable to that of Friesland; which declared, that the power of the French King was arisen to such a height, that though the States General should augment their forces with the addition of sixteen thousand men, and the allies should join to these all their troops, they would not, even then, be equal to those of his Majesty; that also perceiving, that if the States General brought Spain to accept of the King of France's offers, they should avoid the war, and preserve the barrier, which was of such importance to them; and that if they raised these forces, and

consequently gave the King of Spain room to conceive the hopes of a more powerful assistance, they should fortify him in the resolution of doing nothing towards obtaining a peace; that the war would be infallibly kindled, and the barrier lost, even before the resolution of raising these forces could be put in execution; they therefore expressly opposed the raising them; and declared, at the same time, that it was very necessary to press Spain to accept one of the proposals offered by the King of France; and that if Spain would not consent to it, they ought to take particular care not to break with his Majesty by succouring the Spaniards.

The person I had privately sent into Friesland and Groningen informed me, that these two provinces had imagined, that in order to strengthen themselves against the power of the Prince of Orange, they ought to unite together; and that on this account they had nominated commissaries, who were actually assembled in one and the same place, to take, in concert, the resolution of demanding of the States General the troops belonging to their provinces. Three days after, that is on the seventh of April, some of them sent me notice, that they had resolved to send six deputies to the States General to demand of the Prince of Orange, in the name of the provinces of Friesland and Groningen, that he would send them the troops that were in their repartition. I wrote word, that this demand would greatly embarrass the Prince of Orange, because he could not comply with it without abandoning his designs; and that if he refused to consent to it, I knew from good hands, that these two provinces would recall their troops, and break the officers who would not obey them.

The Prince of Orange finding that he could not obtain from the States General the succours he had hoped for, applied for them to strangers, and sent the

the count de Waldeck into Germany to raise as many troops amongst the allies as was possible. In the mean time he made use of all his endeavours to bring about an accommodation with the magistrates of Amsterdam, and sent more than once to that city a very honest man, who had been particularly attached to Pensionary de Witt, to endeavour to reconcile a considerable number of friends he had there, to the Prince of Orange, who had given him orders to ask, what they desired: if they wished to obtain their papers, they should have them; and if they desired to come to the assembly of Holland, they should be well received: but the persons in the government of Amsterdam let him see that his application to them on this subject, would not be attended with the least success, because they would not consent to agree to an accommodation, while the Pensionary Fagel remained in the sentiments he had entertained with respect to affairs abroad. That he ought to begin with accepting one of the King of France's proposals, that when the peace should be concluded between his Majesty and the King of Spain, their domestic quarrels would soon be terminated, and that without this condition, nothing was to be done. This gentleman was surprized at his receiving such an answer, and at the unanimity he found in the council of the city; the Prince of Orange was equally amazed, and remained extremely mortified.

What happened to the magistrates of Leyden gave him fresh cause for vexation. They sent to borrow money at Amsterdam in the name of several of the richest merchants in their city; but those of Amsterdam imagining that it was not for these private persons, but for the city of Leyden, who were to make use of it in making the new levies, refused to lend it them, even at a great interest. We may

from this instance judge of the firmness of the magistrates of Amsterdam, and of the good dispositions of all the individuals of that city, as well as of the small assistance to be found in the others, since Leyden, which is one of the most powerful, was unable to pay its quota without the assistance of Amsterdam.

The King informed me, by a letter dated the sixth of April, that he was resolved to begin his journey (of which, as I have already said, he had given me no intimation) and that he should set out on the 22d of April, for Valenciennes, where he should stay as long as was sufficient for putting his troops in motion; that mean while I should observe the motions of those of the States General, and send him an exact account of them, as well as of the resolutions that might be taken with respect to peace or war.

On the 13th of April, the deputies of the States General having demanded an audience, gave me a resolution, which declared, that they had seen with great uneasiness differences arise between his Majesty the King of France on the one hand, and the Empire and his Catholic Majesty on the other; and that the differences between these crowns were arisen to such a height, as to be capable, to appearance, of inflaming all Europe, if it was not terminated by a speedy accommodation. That they had just learnt from their embassador at London, that his most christian Majesty was disposed to put an end to them by a general accommodation; that they declared, for their parts, and in the name of their allies (except Spain) that they were equally disposed to enter into a general truce of seven or eight years, in which the public repose should not be disturbed under any pretence whatsoever, either on account of re-union, the payment of contributions, &c. but as they had considered, that it was impossible to

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re-establish tranquillity by this truce, on account of the disputes which had arisen on the subject of the possessions to which each made pretensions, they had addressed themselves to the Emperor, and the principal members of the empire, to regulate what they should still possess in the Empire; that the Emperor, and the other Princes their allies, proposed that his most christian Majesty should keep the city of Strasburg, on condition that he restored Brisack, Friburg, and that the fort of Kehl should be demolished, and the fortifications razed; or that the cities of Strasburg, Friburg and Brisack should be put into the hands of a third person. That their allies had founded their proposal on a declaration frequently repeated by his most christian Majesty, that he was willing to preserve the natural bounds which the Rhine had set to that part of his dominions that was bounded by that river.

That the States General, who were better able to form a judgment of the constitution of the Netherlands, than of the state of affairs in Germany, since they had some concern in the former, on account of the barrier which his Majesty had granted them in the year 1678, had carefully examined what might still be separated from that barrier, without entirely destroying it; and they had imagined, that they could not take a better method than that which had been regulated by his Majesty; to wit, from the sea to the Maese, and from that river to the Moselle; and that therefore, to prevent all disputes on appendants and dependances, and every thing of this kind, they had thought, that there could not be a better expedient, than that of marking a line, as they had done, on a map, extending from the sea to the Maese, and from thence to the Moselle; that they had placed this line so advantageously for France, as to leave his Majesty what he had formerly declared, and what he still declared, that

he was willing to retain, to wit, Beaumont, Chismay, the villages which then made part of the chatellany of Ath, and which had formerly made part of Tournay, and also Virton, Chiney, and the towns of Courtray and Dixmude, besides many other places, which being situated on the side of the line next France, should remain in his Majesty's possession during the said truce; that they had not made this line with a view to its being executed, but only as a foundation to proceed upon; and that they and their Allies would endeavour to make the King of Spain agree to the truce on this footing.

That the King of England having frequently testified, that he only desired their furnishing him with some expedient to propose to his Most Christian Majesty, they had caused these proposals to be offered him; but that his Britannic Majesty not being willing to take upon himself the charge of making them known to his most Christian Majesty, they and their allies had thought proper to present them to him; that they had sent them to their ambassador in France, and desired me to support them with my good offices; that as it was necessary to enter upon a negotiation on the regulation of this line, and to adjust the other conditions, as well with the Empire as with Spain, and as some time was necessary to enable them, in conjunction with their allies, to come to an agreement with his Catholic Majesty, they most humbly desired his Majesty the King of France, to appoint a commodious place for treating of them, and to grant them the term of two or three months, and in the mean time a cessation of hostilities.

I was far from accepting the conditions of which I had before informed the King, when the States General proposed them to the King of England; but before I returned them the answer his Majesty had

had ordered me to give them, I thought proper to say,

That was I in an assembly met to consider of the means of procuring a peace, and such proposals were given me, I should take particular care to reject them; but having the honour to be ambassador to the States General, the respect I had for them, prevented my giving them back their resolution; that I only desired them to consent to my not taking charge of it. That they ought to judge from his Britannic Majesty's refusal to communicate their proposals to the King, how widely distant he had found them from what ought to be expected from those who said, that they sincerely wished for the re-establishment of the peace.

That I desired them however to tell me, whether the States General were empowered by the Emperor, or whether the ministers of the Allies at the Hague, were authorized to make such proposals. The deputies of the States General replied, that they were not empowered, and that they made no proposal in the name of the Empire; but as the King of France had testified his desire of a general accommodation, they had pointed out, what the Emperor, the Elector of Bavaria, and some other of the principal powers of the Empire had judged reasonable. I then shewed them that it was very extraordinary, that two or three envoys at the Hague should there decide the fate of the Empire, without having either the power, or orders to do it; that the Electoral College, who knew better than those persons could be supposed to do, the true interest of the Empire, had already, on the 24th of the preceding month, concluded, that the truce proposed by his Majesty ought to be accepted; and when proposals were made at the Hague contrary to this declaration, it could only be done with a view to pre-

vent a peace. That the Electoral College had complained of this proceeding; that the Emperor had disowned it; and that after this, I was astonished that the States General should support an enterprize formed by two or three ministers at the Hague, against the rights and interest of the Empire.

That if it was true the States General had only mentioned the affairs of the Empire, because they wished for a general accommodation, it was very easy for them speedily to obtain an entire satisfaction; that if they were willing that very day to accept of one of the alternatives which regarded Spain, or the truce of twenty years, I had the power to sign the treaty; and if Mr. de Crecy had the same power with respect to the Empire, the general accommodation would be soon concluded. That in a word, if they really would not interfere in the affairs of the Empire, as they had assured me, they ought to leave all they had put in relation to it out of their resolution, and speak only of the affairs of Spain. I made them observe, in relation to this, a false supposition on which they founded their proposal, which was, that they had imagined they could not take a better method, than that, according to which his Majesty had regulated the barrier, that is, from the sea to the Maese, and from the Maese to the Moselle. I convinced them, that no mention was made, either in the treaty, or the negotiations of Nimeguen, of any other line besides that from the sea to the Maese, but never of one from the Maese to the Moselle; and that they could not have introduced a thing of this nature, had it not been in order to draw this consequence from it; that since, to facilitate the accommodation, a new line was made from the sea to the Maese, they ought also to make one from the Maese to the Moselle, a supposition which would insinuate that the city of Luxemburg was in the barrier, tho'

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it never was comprehended in it ; so that the principle upon which these reasonings were founded being false, all the consequences flowing from it were destroyed.

After having made these and some other objections to the deputies of the States General, on the form of the writing, to which they had nothing to reply, I explained myself conformably to what the King had ordered, and shewed them, that their proposals were so exorbitant, that though any one had hitherto doubted of the house of Austria's design to continue the war, proposals so unreasonable would convince the whole world.

That the peace might still be concluded, either by the acceptance of one of the equivalents I had proposed, or by the acceptance of the truce of twenty years ; that with regard to this last, they well knew that it could not admit of any conditions, and that with respect to the said suspension or the truce, it ought to be agreed that all things should remain on both sides, in the state they were in, without any increase or diminution of rights. That therefore they ought not to expect any other explication, nor any other concession on the part of his Majesty, and that after having slighted all the means they could reasonably desire from him, of restoring the public repose, people ought to impute the calamities that might follow from it, to those alone who would disturb the tranquillity of Europe by a longer refusal of his offers.

In regard to the suspension of acts of hostility for three months, I shewed them, that as it would require as much time to agree to these conditions as to the truce of twenty years, they ought not to expect that his Majesty would consent to a proposal, that would be of much less advantage to the general welfare of all Europe, and which was besides so con-

rary to his Majesty's interest, especially after their having taken, and their still every day taking, in the name of the States General, such steps as were opposite to the advancement of the peace, and which were carried far beyond what was allowed by treaties.

And as I had just received the King's letter, by which his Majesty informed me, that he was going immediately to Valenciennes to put himself at the head of his troops, I imagined that it was proper to improve this opportunity of declaring, that I doubted much whether his Majesty on seeing all that was done at the Hague, as well as elsewhere, by the partisans of the house of Austria, to create him enemies, and to kindle the war, would long leave me the same power; that therefore, prompted by my desire to preserve the peace, and by the zeal with which I was attached to their interests, I took the liberty to intreat them, not to let the time slide away to no purpose, in which I was in a condition to conclude a good and advantageous accommodation, and to consider, whether for a few villages more or less, with respect to Spain, or more properly for the mere obstinacy of the Spaniards, they ought to suffer that crown to involve all Europe in a destructive war. I put my answer into writing, at the breaking up of this conference, and printed it, in order to render it public.

I was the same day informed, that the deputies of the States General, having given Fagel an account of this conference; that Pensionary talked to them with much heat, and said, that receding from the proposals they had made both on their part, and on that of the allies, would be the utmost meanness; and that he had rather lose the last drop of his blood, than make others: but notwithstanding all his endeavours, he convinced them, that he was unable to invalidate the reasons I had advanced.

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The envoy of Hanover came to see me the next day, and made use of much art to engage me in some negotiation on the same proposals: but I replied in such a manner as made him lose all hope; the allies therefore assembled to take other measures.

In the mean time the Pensionary Fagel, in conjunction with the Prince of Orange, had laboured for a fortnight together to make them take resolutions on many points, among which there were two which he had proposed on the 30th of March, and on which, as I have already observed, he had not dared to ask the opinions of the deputies at their return from their towns.

That is, whether the States of Holland should give the deputies which their province sent to the States General, the power to conclude there on raising the 16,000 men, with the consent of five provinces only, and of sending money to the admiralty to put their fleet in order.

The proposals the Pensionary Fagel added to these were, to know how they ought to raise the extraordinary impositions, in order to provide the means of raising the sixteen thousand men.

That since the States of Holland were obliged to make good to the Republic the quota levied on their province, it ought to be agreed, how they should proceed with respect to Amsterdam and the other cities, which had not consented to the levies being made, and whether they ought not to borrow the money in their name, and constrain them to pay it by rigorous methods.

That he had private notice, that the King of Denmark was preparing to disturb the navigation of the subjects of the States General; and therefore he demanded, whether it was not necessary to publish a proclamation, forbidding all masters of ships, and

all merchants, subject to the States, to load or send any vessels to the North, and to all sailors not to enter on board any other vessels till the fleet of the States General was manned.

And in short, that they should visit the papers of the magistrates of Amsterdam; and in order the more easily to obtain this last article, he proposed, that it should not be done in a judiciary manner, but only by commissioners chosen from amongst the deputies of the towns of Holland.

But notwithstanding the intrigues of the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel, this affair took a different turn in the assembly of Holland, from what they had imagined. The magistrates of Amsterdam, who had rightly judged that the proposal for prohibiting the sailing of any vessel to the North, was only done with a design to interrupt the commerce of the Baltic, which is the principal trade of their city, caused it to be rejected; and with respect to the other articles, the Pensionary Fagel found the majority of the voices against him. He therefore sent the deputies to their several towns, to endeavour once more to obtain fresh orders from their superiors: but these deputies returned with the same instructions. The magistrates of the towns saw so clearly the fault they had committed, in permitting the province of Holland to agree to the levies being made by the consent of a majority of the towns, that they constantly refused to permit the deputy of their province to agree in the States General to these levies being made on a majority of the provinces.

Mean while, the four deputies of Friesland, and the two of Groningen arrived at the Hague, and took their seats in the States General; where they demanded, to have the troops that were paid by their provinces. The two deputies of Groningen added, that their province desired to have them precisely

cisely in eight days; that they found the French King's proposals just and reasonable; that they ought absolutely to accept of them: and that if the Spaniards refused their consent, and that refusal was followed by a war, their province would not pretend to enter into a war for the interest of the Spaniards; and that though the six others should be unanimous in entering into a war with France, that of Groningen would continue in peace, and refuse to join with them. They all delivered their demands to the States General in writing, and I sent a copy of them the same day to the King my master; who took the measures he judged most agreeable to his own interest, on the informations he received four or five times a week of the state of the interior concerns of the Republic.

The deputies of these two provinces went, at their leaving the States General, to make the same request to the Prince of Orange, to whom they made the same declarations; but this Prince, as well as the States General, having refused them, they returned to their provinces, to give an account of it to their superiors. I informed the King, that I had spoke to one of them before their departure, and that I could assure him these two provinces were going to put in execution the resolution they had taken to order all the officers belonging to their repartition, to repair to Friesland and Groningen; and that they would break those who would not obey them. We shall soon see, that these two provinces executed what they had threatened, with great vigour.

I wrote the next day to inform the King, that the Prince of Orange was under a very great embarrassment, and that the news of his Majesty's departure had thrown him into an inexpressible perplexity; that I saw by the secret steps he took with respect to
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me, that he would spare nothing in order to gain time, as he was not in a condition to act abroad, and was without hope of changing the face of affairs at home; so that I assured his Majesty more positively than I had hitherto done, that the Prince wished for nothing so much as some concessions in the proposals of peace to raise him with advantage from the disagreeable state he was in, and that I was persuaded, that this would be more prejudicial to his Majesty's interest, than even an augmentation made to these proposals.

That the report of the approach of his and the elector of Cologne's forces, had thrown Overijssel into such disorder, that the people were on the point of rising and plundering the houses of those persons in the government, who had consented to the raising of the sixteen thousand men; and that the Prince of Orange had so much the more reason to apprehend the effects of this disorder, as the nobles in this province were not more satisfied with him than the people.

That those in the government of Utrecht, who were entirely devoted to him, had desired him to send them some companies to prevent there being a sedition in their city.

That many persons in those two provinces, and also in that of Gelderland, sought the means of putting their best effects in a place of safety; that even some of the inhabitants of Utrecht carried a part of their moveables to Amsterdam, and that people murmured so loudly in these Provinces against the conduct of their superiors, and especially against the refusal of confirming the public tranquillity by accepting a truce, that the Prince of Orange, who was informed of it, caused a report to be spread, that he was going to form a camp of ten thousand men

in Overysfel, to put these provinces in a state of safety.

The Prince of Orange, who was at a loss how to proceed, pretended on the 18th of April, to go and spend some time at a country house he possessed near Harlem, and the better to cover his design, led thither the Princess of Orange; but he had the day before sent secretly thither the Pensionary Fagel, who had hoped to procure by the intervention of the friends he had at Amsterdam, a conference between the Prince of Orange and some of the magistrates of that city, in order to attempt an accommodation with those gentlemen; but not one of them would accept of this interview, and they remained more firm and resolute than ever in their resolution, not to yield in the least particular, till the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel should begin an accommodation of the disputes between the Kings of France and Spain.

On the 18th of April I also informed the King, that Mr. Sidney, who had been envoy to the King of England at the Hague, had dispatched his gentleman to the Prince of Orange with letters, the contents of which were kept very secret; that I had nevertheless discovered, that they gave him an exact information of the sentiments of his Britannic Majesty in relation to the state of affairs, of which he had been thoroughly informed by my Lord Sunderland, who betrayed his master.

I was the more uneasy at this information sent by Mr. Sidney, as I did not know whether the King had communicated to his Britannic Majesty the orders he had given me, and particularly those I had received that very day, which deprived me of the power of accepting the States General's consent to the proposals I had made them on the part of his Majesty; for if the Prince of Orange had been informed

ed of it, and had suffered the States General to declare to me that they truly and sincerely accepted either the truce or the peace, on the conditions offered by his Majesty, the answer I was ordered to return would have created such uneasiness, and filled the minds of those who were well disposed with such distrust, that they would have resolved on a war without any thing being able to prevent them.

The King's letter, which brought me this news, was dated the 13th of April, and informed me, that though he had learnt from my dispatches, what the city of Amsterdam, the principal towns of Zealand, and the provinces of Friesland and Groningen had done, nevertheless, the Prince of Orange continued to cause the troops of the States General to march to the assistance of the Spaniards, and to put it in the power of the Dutch officers, who were entirely devoted to his will, to engage the United Provinces in an open war with him, by committing acts of hostility against his troops; that in a little time I should know his resolutions in respect to what would be the consequence of these steps so contrary to the interest of the United Provinces, which required their avoiding a rupture: but as all the towns and provinces who were well disposed might, in so important a conjuncture, make new efforts to oblige the States General to take a resolution conformable to the last offers I had made them, and, as even the Spaniards and the Prince of Orange might not make any great opposition to it, from the design of preventing his Majesty's acting, and still gaining two months time, in order to wait for the ratification of Spain, it was the King's intention, that in case any overture was made to me, I should reply, that I did not know whether his Majesty would now be satisfied with the same conditions, and that I could only take
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upon myself to inform him of it by a courier, if they would give me passports to insure his safety.

And as to the conditions that might be granted by his Majesty for the re-establishment of the peace with Spain, that as soon as I received them, I should declare them in form to the States General.

His Majesty added, that he had been informed, that four squadrons of horse, commanded by Mr. de Sgrasmours, an officer belonging to the States General, had marched towards Ruremond, declaring, that they had orders to fall upon a detachment of his Majesty's troops, that were gone to raise contribution on the subjects of Spain; and that I might make what use I thought proper of this advice, with respect to those who were well disposed.

I had not, however, the disagreeable task of returning this answer to the States General; for the Prince of Orange, who was ignorant of my orders, had no notion of making them take a step, which he imagined would have led to a peace.

He only thought of engaging me in secret negotiations, unnecessary here to be related, which only tended to gain time, and to give him an opportunity of making use of his endeavours, to discover whether the King would make no abatement in his proposals.

In the mean time he omitted nothing that could encourage the States General to enter into the war; he sent the Count de Waldeck to Cassel, to sollicit the march of the troops with which the Landgrave was to supply the Spaniards; he also laid before the States General a letter from their envoy at the Emperor's court, which said, that the Elector of Bavaria had desired him to send his intreaties to the States General to raise the sixteen thousand men, and that he had assured him, that they should no sooner come to this resolution than he would send
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sixteen thousand men to the Rhine. On the other hand, he gave orders that his equipage should be ready to set out in three days to carry him to his quarters, marked out at Vilvorden. Many persons could not comprehend how he could resolve to march with auxiliary troops, the States having not entered into the war. For my part, I was more astonished at his daring to leave the Hague, at a time when the Republic was so greatly divided, and when many provinces openly shewed their discontent.

At length the King wrote to me on the 20th of April, that having taken the resolution to set out on the 22d to put himself at the head of his principal army, and in the mean while to lay siege to Luxemburg, he had thought proper for the last time to make known his intentions to the States General, by the memorial he sent me, and which he gave me orders not to present till the 29th of April.

This memorial signified, that since Spain had declared war against France, and the King had been unable to avoid employing his arms in the Netherlands, in order to oblige that crown to prefer the re-establishment of the peace to the continuation of the war; he had made all the concessions that could reasonably be desired from him, in order to clear the way to a speedy accommodation, by the offer of a truce of twenty years, and by all the other expedients he had since proposed to bring the Spaniards to consent to this truce, or at least to give the States General the means of preventing the Netherlands from being the seat of the war.

But the intrigues and solicitations of the ministers of Spain having had such power at the Hague, as not only to prevent the States General from deliberating on his Majesty's last offers, but also to oblige them to send all their troops to the Spaniards; so that it was in the power of those who commanded

ed these troops, by some act of hostility, to engage the United Provinces in a war with his Majesty, and totally to break the good correspondence, which the cities and provinces most attached to the ancient and true maxims of the Republic, would still preserve with France.

That this had determined his Majesty, after every milder method had failed, to set out immediately to put himself at the head of his armies, in order, by force of arms, to pave a way to peace: With this view, he had resolved to besiege the city of Luxemburg, as well from its being intirely detached from every place that could be considered as the barrier of the Low Countries, as because his Majesty's design of rendering himself master of it, tended rather to a peace, and to put his own subjects in a state of security, than to incommode those of the catholic King, to whom this place could be of no service, as his Majesty already possessed all the country by which it was surrounded.

That nevertheless, as his Majesty only made war with an intention to conclude a peace on reasonable terms, he had given me orders to declare to them, that if before the 20th of May, the governor of the Netherlands would of his own motion, or at the solicitation of the States General, effectively put into the power of his Majesty the city of Luxemburg, with the fourteen or fifteen villages dependant on it, his Majesty would not only consent that the cities of Dixmude and Courtray, after their walls and fortifications were demolished, should be restored with their dependences to the Catholic King; but that he would also desist from the demand he had made of the forty villages, detached by the treaty of Nimeguen, from the government of Tournay, and re-united to the chatellany of Ath, and that of all the places he had possessed since the

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20th of August, 1683, he would keep in his possession only Beaumont, with the three or four villages that remained dependant upon it, Bouvines, which had none; and Chimay, with the fifteen or sixteen villages belonging to it; so that by means of this cessation and reciprocal renunciation, viz. on his Majesty's part of all his rights and pretensions on Alost, the old Borough of Ghent, and other places demanded by his Attorney General at the conferences of Courtray, and of all he had possessed since the 20th of August, 1683, excepting Beaumont, Chimay, and Bouvines, with their small dependences; and on the part of the Catholic King, as well the towns of Beaumont, Chimay, Bouvines, and their dependences, as of the city of Luxemburg, and the villages in its jurisdiction; and this being done, the peace might still be established, and all cause of division taken away; France and Spain being in other respects left in the possession of the same states they possessed before the raising the blockade of Luxemburg; without any other pretension being to be raised either on the one side or the other, on any pretence whatsoever.

That his Majesty had reason to believe, that if the States General had only in view the re-establishment of the peace, with the preservation of the barrier, they would oblige the Spaniards to preserve themselves from the consequences of a war, which could not be attended with any advantage to them, by a speedy acceptance of these last offers made by his Majesty; or if the Catholic King had no regard to their remonstrances, his Majesty expected that they would take such measures that their troops should not perform any act of hostility against those that belonged to him.

But as the sincerity of his intentions to procure the repose of Europe had hitherto led him to open to the States the ways by which they might procure the re-establishment

re-establishment of a peace; so, if they continued to neglect them, and to keep no measures with him, but to suffer their troops to act according to the pleasure of the Spaniards, his Majesty was pleased to declare, that at the first act of hostility they should commit against those in his service, out of the places belonging to the Catholic King, he should find himself obliged, tho' with reluctance, to give also his orders for seizing all the vessels, merchandize and effects belonging to the subjects of the States General, and to consider and treat them from thence forward, as those who fomented and upheld, to the utmost of their power, the obstinacy of the Spaniards, and who were not less at war with his Majesty, than his greatest enemies. That I had orders to make them this declaration, and to demand from them a positive answer within fifteen days at farthest; that his Majesty would wait for it at the head of his armies, and declared, that, from and after the expiration of the said fifteen days, his Majesty would no longer be bound by any of the proposals he had formerly made, nor even by those he made at present.

His Majesty ordered me at the same time to write to him my sentiments on what might be done in favour of Amsterdam, and of those who laboured, in conjunction with that city, to establish the peace.

His Majesty observed in the same dispatch, that if the memorial I was to present to the States General, should produce the good effect that was to be desired from it, with respect to the re-establishment of the peace, and they should resolve to press the Spaniards to accept his offers, in such a manner that no hing should be wanted but the time necessary, to make the governor of the Netherlands, and the court of Spain, agree to them, it was his intention, that I should immediately stipulate in his name with the States General, by a treaty which should be guaranteed

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rantied by the King of England, and likewise by all
 the Princes who would enter into that guaranty, that
 on their causing to be put into his Majesty's posses-
 sion, before the 20th of next May, the city of
 Luxemburg, and the States obliging themselves to
 make Spain agree within two months to the cessions
 and renunciations explained in the memorial, his
 Majesty would give orders to his armies to remain
 together in the countries belonging to Spain, and to
 wait there till the ratifications of the treaty should be
 exchanged, without, however, committing any
 act of hostility; on condition, nevertheless, that by
 the same treaty, it should be also stipulated, that
 in case the Spaniards should suffer the time of two
 months to pass without accepting his Majesty's last
 proposal, the States General should hinder their
 troops in Flanders being employed otherwise than
 for the sole defence of the places there possessed by
 the Catholic King; that they also should not give
 him any assistance elsewhere, either against his Ma-
 jesty or his allies, and that he would also oblige
 himself not to besiege nor to take possession of any
 other place in the Netherlands, on any account
 whatsoever, nor even to make war in the open
 country, if the Spaniards on their side would desist
 from it; his Majesty reserving to himself the power
 of carrying his arms into other countries belonging
 to the Catholic King, not in the Netherlands, after
 the expiration of the two months, till the Spaniards
 should have re-established the peace they had broken,
 and in short, that the differences subsisting between
 his Majesty and the Empire should not cause any
 obstacle to the re establishment of the peace in the
 Netherland: his Majesty also required, that I should
 give assurances of the continuation of his offers, of
 a truce of twenty years with respect to Germany, to
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be accepted by the Emperor till the 20th of May.

His Majesty commanded me to send a person to Amsterdam, to let the magistrates of that city know, that the desire they had shewn to procure the re-establishment of the peace, and the firmness with which they had opposed every thing that might set the United Provinces at variance with the King, was the sole cause that had led him still to offer the States General the means of terminating, or at least putting a stop, by a peace of a long duration, to all the differences that subsisted between him and Spain; and that I might assure them, that this war should be no sooner finished, in the manner proposed by his Majesty to the States General, than they should acknowledge, from the good treatment they should receive from him with respect to their commerce, how advantageous their wise conduct was to themselves, and how salutary to all the United Provinces.

I answered the King, that on the 29th of April I should give the memorial which he had ordered me to deliver to the States; that the opposition every day made by Van Buning to the good designs of his colleagues, prevented my being able certainly to answer for the effect it would produce in the council of Amsterdam; that I did not doubt of this burgo-master's taking occasion from it, to make the principal persons of that city conceive a distrust of his Majesty's designs; that I nevertheless hoped, in spite of him, to cause the resolution his Majesty had taken to besiege Luxemburg, to be approved, since I had already found means, three or four months before, to make them consider the taking that place as a step necessary to oblige the Spaniards to consent to a peace, and that might even facilitate the conclusion of it, by its preceding a manifesto,
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in which his Majesty should declare, that he would be contented with that place as an equivalent for his pretensions, and in which he should promise to restore Courtray and Dixmude, reserving to himself the forty villages in the chatellany of Ath; but that the city of Leyden having suddenly changed by Beverning's means, and the Prince of Orange having caused the province of Holland to resolve to make the levies by a majority of votes, the magistrates of Amsterdam then declared to me, that the siege of Luxemburg would absolutely oblige them to consent to the levies, and submit to the Prince of Orange's pleasure, which had prevented my sending to his Majesty, the letter I had wrote on this subject, as I saw that things were then entirely changed; but, as since that time, they were perfectly re-established, and as I had lately founded the magistrates of Amsterdam on this enterprize, I believed that it would not be difficult to make them consent to his Majesty's taking this equivalent, which was out of the barrier, for the satisfaction of his pretensions; that I might add to all I had hitherto told them, that his Majesty had been constrained to take this step by the conduct of the Prince of Orange, whose continual enterprizes had carried things to an extremity; and that had it not been for his regard for the republicans, he would before that time have attacked the Netherlands. That they had no other means of securing themselves from the misfortunes with which they were threatened, than to prevent, all that lay in their power, a rupture with his Majesty; and that since he was still desirous of preserving a good intelligence with the States General, they ought to act in such a manner, as to prevent the Prince of Orange's abusing his power so far as to engage them, in spite of his Majesty and themselves, in the war. I represented to the King, that when I had spoke

to them in this manner, and they were informed of his intentions. it would then be natural for them to explain their desires ; and that if they were capable of suffering any distinction to be made between them and the rest of the republic, they themselves would desire what they would perhaps refuse was I to offer it to them. That hitherto I did not think it at all proper, to make any distinction between the magistrates of Amsterdam and those other members of the republic who were well disposed, since this would render them odious, and put it out of their power to endeavour, in a successful manner, to preserve the peace ; that it was sufficient to let them see the advantage of the delay of twenty days, which his Majesty still granted the Spaniards, and to exhort them to improve this new favour.

In the mean time, I found myself obliged to desire an explication of two things contained in this memorial ; the first of which was, that there was no mention made of a truce, but only of a peace ; and I did not know whether, after the conquest of Luxemburg, the King would any longer agree to a truce, but only to a peace : and the other, from which I apprehended that the Pensionary Fagel would raise some difficulties, was, the King's declaring, that after fifteen days, he would be bound neither by any of the proposals he had made before, nor by those made at present : from these words I did not doubt, but that the Pensionary Fagel would endeavour to persuade the States of Holland, that the King, during these fifteen days, thought himself bound both by the new and old proposals. We shall afterwards see, that I did not send to court on these subjects without cause, and that this last clause had like to have broke off the peace.

I added, in the same letter, that I had reason to believe that the Pensionary Fagel's sickness was only

a pretence; that in the evening he had been at a private assembly of the principal towns in Holland, but had the vexation to be told by the deputies of Dort and Leyden, that he ought plainly to declare to the Spanish envoy, that if he would not accept of the proposals offered by France, the States General would remain neuter, and not ruin themselves to please the Spaniards. It would have appeared surprizing, that the city of Dort should make use of this language, since the Pensionary of that city, together with the greatest part of its magistrates, had hitherto been blindly attached to the interest of the Prince of Orange, if it had not been known that they did not dare to act otherwise, the people of Dort having threatened them in the streets, that if things continued on the present footing, and a war should break out, they would cut them to pieces.

Mr. Canon, who arrived at the Hague on the 15th of April, in quality of envoy extraordinary from the Duke of Lorrain, sent the English envoy some days after, to ask me, if I would consent to receive him; but I did not think proper to return him a positive answer, before I had obtained the King's orders on this subject: however, as his Majesty had been formerly willing that I should see Mr. de Serinchant who appeared at the Hague under the same character; I replied, that I knew Mr. Canon, and if he would pay me a visit on this footing, I should receive him; but if he came in a ceremonious manner, as the Duke of Lorrain's envoy, I should not, as I could acknowledge no other minister from the Duke of Lorrain at the Hague besides myself.

His Majesty informed me, by a letter dated the 2d of May, that he consented to my seeing Mr. Canon in the manner I had proposed; however the English envoy having told him my answer, he said, that

that he had thought better of it, and would not come to see me. I do not know whether he did not expect my refusal, or whether the Austrian ministers, on whom he absolutely depended, did not prevent his design of coming to pay me a visit.

Some days after I wrote to acquaint the King my master, that I had sent to Amsterdam and the provinces of Friesland and Groningen to inform them of the siege of Luxemburg, and the conditions on which they might still obtain a peace, and that I had represented whatever I had thought most capable of bringing them to approve of this siege; that I hoped to obtain an agreeable answer, but had not yet received it; that I had delivered the memorial to the States General on the 29th of April; that the Prince of Orange, and those who were attached to him, were filled with great consternation; that the Prince who was to have set out on the 30th, to repair to Vilvorden, had put off his journey, and had caused a part of his equipage, and the relays of horses that were already set out, to be brought back.

That the declaration contained in this memorial, that on the first act of hostility committed by the troops of the States against those of his Majesty, he would seize the vessels and effects belonging to the subjects of the States General, had filled the whole province of Holland with great terror; and that the Prince of Orange finding that his Majesty had touched the people of Holland so nearly, and in the most sensible manner, as well in that part of the memorial, as in many others, and that he had entered so deeply into the secrets and sentiments of the republicans, pretended from thence, that I had been at Amsterdam to concert this memorial; and therefore endeavoured to invalidate whatever the magistrates of Amsterdam said in the support of it: that, how-

ever, the towns in Holland declared more resolutely than ever, that he ought to bring about a peace; that I had secret advice that the city of Delft should not suffer by it; that the Prince of Orange had caused the cannon to be taken from the magazine which ought to have been left for the guard of that city; that I more and more confirmed what I had written, that all honest men should approve his Majesty's design; that even some of them had already told me, that this would either produce a peace, or the Prince of Orange would be forced to draw upon himself the hatred of the public, by a war, to which all the towns, the provinces, and the people had an extreme aversion; that the King nevertheless ought not to depend on any thing, since the Prince of Orange did not submit, but on the contrary, had said with much heat to some persons in the state, that he had rather perish at the head of twenty thousand men, than appear at the Hague surrounded by his footmen; that therefore it ought to be expected, that he would make use of his last efforts to hinder the States General from taking a resolution conformable to their interest; but though he should have such credit as to be able to do this, (which I did not believe would be the case) this memorial would always have such an effect, that if his Majesty undertook any thing after the 20th of May, the people would be persuaded, that he was forced to it by the Prince of Orange's conduct; so that their confidence in his Majesty's promises, and in the sincerity of his intentions in regard to the welfare of the Republic, not being destroyed by his having recourse to arms, it would not be so difficult in a short time, to re-establish the good correspondence which had been interrupted.

I also informed his Majesty, that the solicitors who were accustomed to advance money to the officers
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of the army, were no longer able to furnish them, not only because they themselves were unable to borrow, but because the treasuries of the towns were shut; and therefore the solicitors being unable to advance money as usual, to the colonels and captains, the lower officers and soldiers remained unpaid, which occasioned great disorders

But that nothing, in my opinion, better shewed the good effects that might be expected from the resolution his Majesty had taken to besiege Luxemburg, and at the same time to present to the Spaniards terms of peace, than the extravagant behaviour of the envoy of Spain; that this minister was gone to Brussels to confer with the Marquis de Grana, when he received my memorial of the 29th of April, where they composed one in answer to it, which they presented to the States General on the third of May, which declared, that the orders the Marquis de Grana, and he had received from the King their master, obliged them not to listen to any of the unjust, artful and impracticable proposals of France, and not to enter into a negotiation with that power, but upon such a footing as had been at all times observed between Kings and Princes who were equals, and both christians and sovereigns, and not to conclude any accommodation which was not just, sure and general, and including all the allies; that on these principles his Catholic Majesty was resolved to hazard the rest of the Netherlands, rather then consent to submit to laws dictated by violence and treachery. That the new proposals made by the King of France to the States General, were more insolent, more liable to be distrusted, and more opposite to reason than those he had hitherto made; yet his views were always the same, since his only intention had been, and was still, to violate treaties, amuse the States General, and to make

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them pass amongst mankind for States extremely ignorant, and entirely to deprive them of their liberty, since the delay granted by the French of not acting on the one side, when they were besieging such a considerable place as Luxemburg on the other, was only a new snare which they had laid, by an imaginary appearance of peace, of which they had for so long a time, by these methods, deprived Spain, since the States General were not only obliged to assist the Spaniards in the Netherlands, but also in any other part of the world whatsoever, since whatever progress France might hope to make against Spain in other places besides the Netherlands, the effects would be felt in the Netherlands, and since in what manner soever France should acquire the Netherlands, the States General would immediately become slaves to France; of this he did not doubt of their being but too well convinced: but, the artifice and venom of the French ambassador's memorial was so plain, that he hoped, by God's assistance, they might, by uniting their joint strength, prevent or repair the loss of Luxemburg; assuring the States General, that whatever happened, the King of Spain's resolution would remain unshaken, since he had taken it according to his conscience, his honour, and his interest.

The Spanish envoy's memorial only served to raise the indignation of the States General, who could not bear such arrogance mingled with such weakness: but if this envoy gave me no pain, that of England gave me no assistance; for tho' he at length went to speak with the president of the week of the States General, to support my memorial of the 29th of April, yet whatever he said was of no advantage, since he gave nothing in writing, the President of the States not relating to his Masters what he said to them by word of mouth. Besides this

this I informed the King, that in the present state of affairs, nothing could be expected but from the fear the Dutch were in of entering entirely into the war, and the means his Majesty offered them for avoiding it; that these two motives were the only ones capable of strongly affecting the minds of the Dutch; and that these two were so well managed, in the memorial of the 29th of April, that nothing more could be desired.

The person I had sent to Amsterdam and into Friesland, returned on the third of May, and informed me, that the ruling persons were thoroughly convinced, by the reasons I had caused to be given them, and very well satisfied with the memorial I had presented on the 29th of April; that the magistrates of Amsterdam had resolved to accept his Majesty's proposal, and to give orders, in the first place, for the troops in the Spanish Netherlands to retire into the strong places, and to forbid the officers suffering them to take the field. That the provinces of Friesland and Groningen were going to take the same resolution, and that they had summoned extraordinary assemblies on that subject. That the magistrates of Amsterdam sent a burgomaster and two echevins to the Hague, who, though they were not to enter the States of Holland, would be more ready to support the two secretaries who assisted on their part at the assembly of that province; and that the King could wish for nothing more.

The magistrates of Amsterdam were not long before they performed their promise: the province of Holland being assembled on the fourth of May, many towns resolved to accept the proposals of the 29th of April; and the secretaries of Amsterdam strongly maintained, that it appeared by this memorial, that the King had no longer any design to conclude a truce with Spain, and that he insisted on a peace upon the

the conditions therein contained ; and that therefore they ought to accept of these conditions, and obtain a peace : but the Pensionary Fagel pretended, that they had already the liberty of chusing the truce, and maintained, as I had already foreseen, that this truce might be made on the conditions offered on the 17th of February, because his Majesty declared, that after fifteen days he would not be bound either by any of the proposals he had before offered, or by those he made at present ; from whence it followed, that his Majesty would be bound during the fifteen days to consent to these new proposals, and also to those he had made before. The secretaries of Amsterdam, and those who adhered to them, maintained that this argument was fallacious, that the sense of the memorial was clear and plain, and that this Pensionary only gave it this turn, in order to elude the good effect that might be produced by the King's offers. Fagel, who foresaw, that though the magistrates of Amsterdam should not prevail in favour of a peace, yet they would always be ready to accept of a truce, made use of an artifice in order to elude both the peace and the truce. He therefore put the question, whether the States General alone should engage to oblige the Spaniards to accept of the truce, or if they should not agree before-hand, first to demand the approbation of their allies. This proposal was discussed with much heat ; but at last twelve of the principal towns declared, that they ought not to ask the opinion of their allies, but only to give a simple notification of what was doing at the Hague, without retarding, on this account, the resolutions of the State. The nobles exclaimed loudly against this, and the States separated without concluding on any thing till after dinner. The disputes then began again, and were carried on with great heat,

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so that the assembly sat till late at night without coming to any resolution.

The next morning the States of Holland assembled again, and found themselves divided for the third time; many towns resolved on the peace, while others imagined that the King would still consent to the truce. The secretaries of Amsterdam constantly maintained, that the memorial of the 29th of April plainly expressed, that the King no longer held himself bound either by his first offers, or the truce; and as they saw that the Pensionary Fagel was obstinately bent on supporting the contrary opinion, and that he brought many of the deputies of the towns to be of his sentiments, they proposed to send a deputation to me to obtain an explication; but this they were unable to effect. They were therefore obliged to consent, that the States General should sound me on the truce, without mentioning the peace: but they protested, that in case his Majesty was resolved on a treaty of peace, they should always be of opinion, that there ought to be one.

They did not so easily submit in the debate on the manner in which they ought to behave to their allies. This affair was of most consequence, as it actually related to peace or war, since the allies would never consent that the States General should abandon the Spaniards. They therefore remained firmly resolved, with eleven of the principal towns of Holland, to oblige the Spaniards to accept the truce, on giving only a simple notification to their allies; and the six others, viz. Harlem, which was absolutely governed by its Pensionary, who was Fagel's nephew; Rotterdam, where the Prince of Orange had a powerful cabal, and four small towns, concluded on accepting the truce only by the consent of their allies. As to the nobles, who had the Prince of Orange at their head, and Fagel for their

Pensionary, they were for accepting neither a peace nor a truce, but absolutely for fulfilling the obligations they were under by their treaties with the Spaniards.

Affairs were carried on in Friesland and Groningen much better than they were in Holland: I the same day received a letter on this subject, by which I was informed, that these two provinces had agreed on a resolution relating to their recalling their troops; that the Prince of Nassau had already put under an arrest all the officers that were at Lewarden, whose companies were raised out of the provinces of Friesland and Groningen, that this arrest might prevent their being charged with any crime in not obeying the Prince of Orange's orders; and the next day I had further advice, that these two provinces had taken a second joint resolution to oblige the Spaniards to conclude a peace on the conditions offered by the King on the 29th of April.

It was not difficult for me to convince the King, by the account I sent him of all these things, that they were resolved on an accommodation, let it cost what it would; and that I had reason for writing so often, that when the Dutch saw, on the one hand, a certain war, and that on the other, means were offered for avoiding it, they would readily enough embrace them. That it now appeared, that the towns in the greatest subjection to the Prince of Orange, were come to a determination without hesitating, as soon as they found that they were on the point of entering into the war, notwithstanding the repeated assurances that Prince had given them of the contrary; and that provided the States General should shew themselves disposed to assist the Spaniards in a powerful manner, his Majesty would be able to obtain better conditions. I did not lose this opportunity of shewing, that the
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least abatement the Prince of Orange might be able to obtain from his Majesty, would be of more prejudice than the augmentation of his proposals, if they let the time he had granted them slip to no purpose.

Two things happened about this time which embarrassed me extremely. The envoy of Cologne told me, that the elector his master had wrote to inform him, that M. Tambonneau had shewn him my memorial of the 29th of April, by which he found, that *notwithstanding the siege of Luxemburg*, the King of France was still willing to conclude a peace with Spain on the foot of my memorial of the 17th of February; that therefore he had ordered him to make use of his good offices to engage the States General to consent to the truce on these conditions. This envoy represented, that if it had been, *notwithstanding the taking of Luxemburg*, his master would have had no doubt that the truce could not be concluded, without giving up this place to the King; but as it was only, *notwithstanding the siege*, he believed that if the truce could be accepted and concluded before the taking of that place, it might be done without the King's having Luxemburg; so that he had resolved to demand a conference of the States General, to bring them to agree to the truce on this footing.

I was extremely astonished at this discourse; and shewed him, that as it might be possible that the King would consent to a truce, though in the memorial sent me by his Majesty, he had only mentioned a treaty of peace; yet I could assure him, that he would neither consent to a peace or a truce without having Luxemburg; that, therefore, as he was the minister of a Prince in alliance with his Majesty, he ought not to press the States General to do a thing to which his Majesty would never

consent. And as to exhorting them to agree to the truce, without telling them on what conditions, his good offices here would be unnecessary, since they were already sufficiently disposed to accept of it.

He acquiesced in what I said, and did not demand a conference: but however he greatly obstructed my negotiation; for having a large acquaintance in Holland, he insinuated, that the King would be contented with a truce on the conditions expressed in my memorial of the 17th of February; and this made such strong impressions, that I had the greatest difficulty to efface them, especially as the States General drew the same inductions from a letter, wrote by their ambassador at London, which the Pensionary Fagel made use of with success in the assembly of Holland; and this was the second affair that gave me trouble. Mr. Citters informed his masters, that the Duke of York and the ministers of the King of England, had exhorted him to press the Spaniards to accept the truce, without mentioning Luxemburg, or any change made in the proposals of the 17th of February. This letter was dated on the 28th of April; and they were told by Mr. Chudley, that the King of England and his ministers were then informed of the new proposals made by his Majesty; from whence the Pensionary Fagel concluded, that the Duke of York and the English ministers inferred, that his Majesty's proposals did not exclude the truce proposed on the 17th of February.

I should have been very glad to have removed the difficulties the States General laboured under; but many reasons prevented me. I was not permitted to enter into these debates; and it would not have been proper for me to let them know that I was acquainted with them: besides, I saw by the situation of affairs, and the disposition of peoples minds, that
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a premature explication given to the States unasked; would have produced rather bad than good effects. I also imagined, that it would be proper to see what would be their first step, since, if they once took the resolution of bringing the Spaniards to accept the truce, this first step, taken from the unanimous desire of all the provinces, to avoid a war, would be opening the way to their acceptance of the peace. I therefore resolved to reply in such a manner, as to leave his Majesty at liberty to take what measures he pleased. In short, what absolutely prevented my giving them my sentiments, either on the peace or the truce, was my not really knowing whether the King, after the taking of Luxemburg, would be contented with a truce; and my finding myself enabled to conclude a peace, if they were resolved to render it secure.

On the other hand, the ministers of the allies and the Pensionary Fagel were not asleep: from the fourth of May till the eighth, they had held continual conferences, of which they had four or five a day; sometimes held by the States General and their allies separately, and sometimes by all together. The ministers of the allies assured the States General, that their masters were able to resist the King of France; that the elector of Bavaria had fifteen thousand men, composed of his own troops and those of the circle of Bavaria; that the Emperor would add to them five of his, without reckoning those of the circle of Swabia, which the above elector hoped to have. That the count de Waldeck would have an army of nineteen thousand men, composed of the troops of the circles of Franconia and the Upper Rhine; of those of the dukes of Sax-Gotha and Eysenach, and the counts of Wetteraw, and Westerwalt, without reckoning the troops of Hesse, which might join these or those of
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Lunenburg, as occasion offered; and that all these troops should be ready by the 12th of May; and that if they could hinder the elector of Brandenburg from entering upon action, as they did not doubt but they should, the house of Lunenburg would give considerable succours.

The Pensionary Fagel, who was charged to make the report of these conferences to the States of Holland, represented these advantages in the strongest light possible; and added, that their allies threatened to leave them, and never more to enter into an alliance with them, if they abandoned them on this occasion: but the apprehensions of a war had made such strong impressions on the minds of the Dutch, and had given them such eager desires to preserve peace in their neighbourhood, that it was impossible to make them change their sentiments; and all he could obtain was, as I have already said, his turning their thoughts to a truce, rather than to a peace: however, the magistrates of Amsterdam sent the same day to give me fresh assurances, that they should persist in obliging the Spaniards to accept of a peace, if the King would only agree to an accommodation on this footing.

The States General did not lose a moment in taking a resolution conformable to that of the province of Holland, relating to the acceptance of the truce, on the conditions of the 17th of February, and sent to demand an audience of me the same day, notwithstanding its being Sunday. The Prince of Orange took no care to oppose this torrent; but on the contrary, was very glad that the States General would speedily enter into a conference with me, to endeavour, by this means, to save Luxemburg, because he apprehended, that if it was once taken, they would the more readily be brought to consent to its remaining in his Majesty's hands.

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The Pensionary Fagel had in this even a still more malignant view; for having had the address to engage the States General to chuse the truce, on the conditions offered on the 17th of February, he was glad to have them come and make this declaration to me, as he was persuaded, that this was far from being the King's intention, and that my refusal to listen to this proposal, would give him an opportunity of making the States General conceive a distrust of his Majesty's veracity.

The deputies of the States General, therefore, came to my house, to make me some proposals, that were scarcely intelligible, on the acceptance of the truce, and to give me a resolution that was not much better digested; the substance of which was:

That they offered to make known to the ministers of their allies, that they were of opinion, that it was necessary to counsel, persuade, and advise the King of Spain to accept the truce proposed by France, for as long a time as that to be agreed upon between France and the Empire; that as to what regarded the possession of the two crowns during the truce, this point should be regulated either by a treaty, or by the arbitration of England; and that the States General would desire their allies to co-operate in the same.

Before I returned them any answer, I resolved to have a more express explication of their intentions, in order to penetrate how far they would carry their engagement; I therefore desired them to explain what they meant, when they talked of counselling, persuading and advising the King of Spain to accept the truce; and if they did not resolve to engage, by a treaty with the King my master, to oblige the Catholic King to agree to it, and to abandon him in case of his refusal. They seemed loath to explain themselves on this subject: nevertheless, after having
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hesitated for some time; they at last positively replied, that they would use their utmost endeavours to engage the King of Spain to accept the truce, and if they were ineffectual, they would give his Majesty all the assurances he had required. I then asked, why they fixed no other term to the truce they proposed to conclude, but that of the truce his Majesty had proposed to the Empire? They told me, that they had fixed the duration of this truce, relatively to that of the Empire, only because his Majesty had himself expressed in the memorial of the 17th of February, that he was willing to grant a truce to Spain, like that with the Empire, but that would make no difficulty; and when I should have declared, that I was still impowered to accept the truce, this condition would soon be regulated. In regard to their saying, that if any difficulties should arise about the possession of any place, they should be referred to the arbitration of the King of England, I only told them, that the possession was so well regulated, that there was no need of arbitrators.

After their having taken these steps, I let them know that I was surprized to find, that after they had suffered the time to expire without any effect, and without giving an answer to the memorial of the 17th of February, by which on certain conditions they were offered the truce, they should now mention it, when that was no longer the subject in question, and when new conditions had been made by his Majesty. They then said, that there was not one of them who was not fully persuaded, that his Majesty still continued to adhere to his first proposals, since he had not limited the time for their accepting them by the memorial of the 17th of February, nor revoked them by that of the 29th of April; that this appeared the more certain, as his
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Majesty declared, at the end of the memorial of the 29th of April, that after the term of fifteen days, he would not be bound to adhere either to the proposals before made, nor to those made at that time; and that it followed from thence, that his Majesty still consented to be bound not only to adhere to the last, but also to the first proposals.

I let them see, that his Majesty's offers of the 17th of February, which had not been accepted, were rendered void by that non-acceptance, and revoked by the fresh proposals I had made them in my memorial of the 29th of April; that his Majesty had ordered me to demand an answer within fifteen days, to this last proposal, and not to that of the 17th of February. I endeavoured at length to convince them, that their reasons were destitute both of the least foundation or probability; and that they ought to confess, that his Majesty had so distinctly explained the conditions on which he was still disposed to consent to a peace with Spain, that they could not be in the least doubt about them, unless they were resolved to blind themselves out of mere wantonness. That his Majesty having declared, that he would have the city of Luxemburg as an equivalent for his pretensions, and he having at the same time informed them, that he was going to lay siege to that place, it was impossible for them to believe, that he would consent to the truce, on the conditions proposed on the 17th of February, in which Luxemburg was not so much as mentioned: to which they only replied, that Luxemburg was not yet taken. Our debates were warm, and lasted above two hours: but at length they desired me to tell them, in plain and express terms, whether I was or was not still impowered to grant the truce. I had not the least doubt that the King would neither agree to the peace nor the truce, except on the
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conditions proposed on the 29th of April; but I did not know whether he would not consent to a truce on these proposals, for the memorial had been sent drawn up in form, with orders not to alter a single word; I therefore imagined, that I could not do better than to evade a direct answer with respect to the peace or the truce, and to speak only of the acceptance of the offers of the 29th of April, and that by way of question.

I said that his Majesty had commanded me to present the memorial on the 29th of April; that he only agreed to an accommodation with Spain on the conditions there expressed; and asked, if they accepted them; that for my part, I had the power to conclude the treaty on these last proposals, and was ready to sign it. From thence I took occasion to explain the ease with which his Majesty had enabled me to put an end to this affair, in case they took the resolution that might be expected; for I did not doubt, but that their acquainting the other members of the State with this particular, would produce very good effects: and I desired them not to lose the time that remained, but to prevent the misfortunes that would doubtless be the consequence of their not accepting his Majesty's last offers, before the expiration of the time he had given them.

The deputies of the States General, at their leaving my house, had a conference with the envoy of England, and the envoy and resident of Cologne, to exhort them to make use of their good offices to their masters and me; that his most Christian Majesty might be brought to grant the conditions of the 17th of February. These envoys did not positively charge themselves with this commission, nor did they give them a denial; they were so far from doing this, that they came to me, and told me, that they

they had found the minds of the people under great agitation at my refusing to sign an accommodation on the conditions proposed on the 17th of February, and made use of the same arguments as if they had been come on the part of the States General. We may judge of the small assistance I should have drawn from the solicitations of the English envoy, to the president of the States General, even though he had given an account of them to his masters, from his coming two days after to press me to sign the truce on the conditions offered on the 17th of February.

The States of Holland assembled three times on that day, which was the eighth of May; and they continued their last sitting till two in the morning, at which time they separated, in order to go and receive instructions from their principals, in relation to what they should do, in case there remained no hope of obtaining a truce on the conditions proposed on the 17th of February.

On the ninth of May I received two letters from the King; the one dated the fourth of the same month, by which he informed me, that if it should happen that the principal means made use of by the Prince of Orange and the marquis de Grana to prevent an accommodation, should be their making known to the States General, that the marquis was not empowered by the King his master to put the city of Luxemburg into his Majesty's possession, that consequently the States General could not oblige him to do it; and that though they should have taken the resolution to grant his Majesty what he demanded, it would be impossible to execute it. That if I found that a like objection was capable of making such an impression on the towns, as to engage them to do what the Prince of Orange desired, or even that it might be a great obstacle to the acceptance

ceptance of his Majesty's proposals, he thought proper, after I had shewn, that there was room to believe that the confidence his Catholic Majesty placed in the person of d'Ess, Governor of the Netherlands, was so great as to permit him to give up a place he could no longer defend, in order to save many others: that I should declare, that if they would oblige themselves before the 20th of May, by a treaty, supported by the guaranty of the King of England, not to give any assistance to the Spaniards, either by defending Luxemburg, or committing the least act of hostility against the troops, subjects and allies of his Majesty; he would also promise to be contented with the city of Luxemburg, with the other places I had demanded, by the memorial of the 29th of April; and to restore to the Spaniards all those proposed to be restored by that memorial, provided that Spain, within the space of a month, would approve the said cessions and renunciations.

That I might still promise, that if, notwithstanding the Catholic King's refusal, the States General would oblige themselves by the 20th of May to adhere to the engagements expressed in the said memorial, his Majesty would neither attack or take possession of any place in Flanders, reserving to himself the liberty of making war against the Spaniards in other places, till he had reduced them to the necessity of consenting to a peace.

The other letter, which was dated the sixth of May, was sent me with great dispatch. It informed me, that having found by my letter of the fourth, that the Prince of Orange, and the partisans of Spain, might make use of a pretence, from the last lines of the memorial of the 29th of April, to make the States General believe, that they were still left to accept the offers I had made on the 17th of February,

bruary, his intentions were, that I should use all possible diligence not to leave the States General in an error that would be so prejudicial to them, and that would make them take false measures, which would infallibly engage them in the war, which it was so much their interest to avoid.

That for this purpose I might tell them, that though my memorial of the 29th of April explained his Majesty's intentions, and let them clearly see that he would not agree either to a peace or a truce with the Spaniards, except on condition that Luxemburg should be put into his hands, I was still obliged, in conformity to my orders, to declare, that his Majesty would now agree to either a peace or a truce with Spain, provided that the city of Luxemburg was ceded to him; and that this was the condition, without which he could enter into no treaty, on either a peace or a truce; but that as the Spaniards made it sufficiently known, that they were so far from being willing to give up this place to his Majesty by way of accommodation, that they hoped, that the States General, on their not being able to fulfil this condition, would find themselves under an indispensable necessity of entering into the war, he repeated what he had before ordered me to offer them in his preceding letter, as the means of maintaining peace in their neighbourhood; and to the end that I might be able to sign a treaty on such proposals as they would accept, he sent me three different powers.

The one gave me power to conclude and sign with the States General or their deputies, equally provided with full powers, such articles as I should judge necessary for arriving at a speedy accommodation with Spain.

The other gave me power to conclude and sign with the ministers of Spain, the States General,
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and their allies, jointly or separately, and equally furnished with full powers, a treaty of peace or a truce, or such other articles as I should judge necessary.

The third gave me power to conclude and sign with the ministers of the Catholic King, and those of the allies of Spain, jointly or separately, and equally furnished with full powers, a treaty of peace or a truce.

As the answer I had returned on the eighth to the deputies of the States General might be applied to his Majesty's last orders, since I had not explained myself with respect to a peace or a truce, but had been satisfied with maintaining that the King would agree to no accommodation, except on the conditions expressed by the memorial of the 29th of April; I immediately sent to desire the States General to come to me. I told them, that I believed I had so perfectly convinced them by the last conference I had with them, of the small foundation they had to infer from some words in the memorial of the 29th of April, that his Majesty was still engaged to adhere to his first conditions, that I did not think I had left them any room to doubt of this truth. That the King having observed, that the Spaniards had only made use of the delays he had for so long a time granted, in order to declare war against him; and that they had let more than three months slip without agreeing to any of the expedients he had proposed on the 17th of February, he had found himself obliged to appear at the head of his armies, to open a way to a peace, by force of arms: that notwithstanding this, he had been pleased to declare to the States General the last conditions on which the peace might still be concluded, without making any further mention of a truce; that this had obliged me, from my knowing
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that the States General were more inclined to accept of the truce than the peace, to intreat the King to enable me to give them satisfaction, if they thought it most adviseable to terminate by a truce, the differences subsisting between his Majesty and the King of Spain. That his Majesty, who had always out-stript the good dispositions of the States General, by proposing all the expedients he imagined most proper to re-establish the peace of Europe, was willing still to give them a new proof of it on this occasion, by permitting me to allow them the choice of concluding either a peace or a truce on the proposals contained in the memorial of the 29th of April; and that I was sufficiently authorized to sign the truce on these conditions: I at the same time protested, that they ought not to expect any further concession on the part of his Majesty, nor any other alteration in them; and that the conditions of the truce, as well as those of the peace, ought to be regulated by this memorial; intreating them earnestly not to let the time that was left slide away, without returning such an answer as his Majesty waited for at the head of his armies. I afterwards gave them in writing the substance of what I had said.

On the 11th of May I sent the King an account of the effect this explication had produced, and observed, that it had not appeased the noise made by the Prince of Orange's creatures, because he was equally averse to either a truce or a peace, while the city of Luxemburg remained in his Majesty's power. That he maintained that France behaved in a perfidious manner; since the King had expressed the conditions on which he would agree to an accommodation, when the States General, after having had great difficulty in bringing their allies to give their consent, found that his Majesty would

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not agree to them, though he had never revoked them. This Prince acted in so passionate a manner, that finding the States General would not wholly enter into his sentiments, he declared, that they might recal their troops, or order them to be shut up in the strong places belonging to Spain; that they might abandon Luxemburg, and do whatever they pleased; but for his part, he would lose his life rather than suffer Luxemburg to be taken, and he had rather perish before that place, than consent to abandon it. I was thus more and more convinced, that as neither his honour nor interest would suffer him to let Luxemburg fall into the King's hands, it ought to be expected, that he would make use of his utmost endeavours to prevent the States General's accepting these last proposals.

As to the magistrates of Amsterdam, and all the well affected in general, they would have been much better pleased with a peace than a truce, because they imagined, that by the last the public repose would be more solidly established; and I assured the King, that if he had thought good to allow me to persist in demanding a treaty of peace, I should not have found more difficulty in bringing the States General to approve it, than I should find in obliging them to consent that Luxemburg, by a truce, should remain in his Majesty's hands.

Besides I was greatly embarrassed by the intrigues of the resident of the Elector of Cologne; for he gave many persons room to conceive an opinion that the truce might be settled on the conditions of the 17th of February, from his making them imagine that I had power to grant it at the last extremity. And when the States General desired him, in the conference I have observed they had with him and the envoy of England and Cologne, to make use of his good offices to prevail on me and his

his master to bring his Majesty to accept of the truce on the conditions of the 17th of February, he replied, that the Elector of Cologne had learnt, with great displeasure, that the King had changed his proposals; that his electoral Highness had always approved of the truce of the 17th of February, and had ordered him to press the conclusion of it. But as I had received the King's letter on the sixth of May, when these ministers came to talk with me, I communicated it to them, and desired them to support the declaration I had just made to the States General, that his Majesty would agree to a truce only on the conditions of the 29th of April. The English envoy gave his consent, and the envoy of Cologne also would have given his; but the resident of Cologne having refused, the English envoy would do nothing in it. I could not help reproaching the resident of Cologne, some days after, for his conduct, when he told me, that the orders the envoy extraordinary of Cologne and he had received from their master, was, to speak for the truce, without mentioning Luxemburg; and at length he was constrained to tell me, that the King's being master of Luxemburg was contrary to the interest of the Princes of the Empire; and that therefore they were right in taking all possible measures to bring about an accommodation, without delivering up that city to his Majesty. In answer to this, I told him, that his conduct would not prevent the King's obtaining Luxemburg, though it might prevent a peace.

A judgment may be formed from all I have said, of the situation in which I found myself, during the whole course of this negotiation. I had against me the Prince of Orange, the Pensionary Fagel, those of the States who were devoted to them, and all the ministers of the allies of the States General, who had a free and open intercourse with them, which

gave them the means of forming cabals. I could expect to receive assistance from none but the King's allies, which were Denmark and Cologne; or from England, which was to perform the office of mediator. As to England, it has been seen, that there every day came advices that were capable of overturning whatever I thought I had established, without their ever being disavowed by the King of Great Britain, and his envoy at the Hague had never but once endeavoured to obtain an accommodation, and that in a manner that produced no effect, since he would deliver nothing in writing; and the resident at Cologne was so far from assisting, that he raised up obstacles against me. We shall see, in the sequel, that the ambassador of Denmark would have been very glad if his master would have taken advantage of a conjuncture which he believed favoured his entering into a war: but he threw in no obstacles to the conclusion of the truce, but such as were very artful, and this he did with great precaution.

In the mean time the States of the provinces of Friesland and Groningen went on in their own way. Those of Groningen had already put in execution the resolution they had taken in concert, of recalling their troops; they had wrote to all the officers of their repartition who were in the Spanish Netherlands, or in the garrisons belonging to the States General, that they should immediately repair with their regiments and companies to the province of Groningen. The Prince of Orange, on his being informed of this, went to the council of State, where he complained of this proceeding, which he said was contrary to the laws of the union. He was not indeed entirely wrong in this particular, since the troops of the States General are subject to the captain general, when they are out of their provinces; he therefore shewed, that as captain general

ral he had the power to remedy this disorder; but that he wished the council of state would give orders about it, in order that it might make the greater impresson: thus he brought the council to declare, that the officers who obeyed the province of Groningen should be treated as deserters. It was remonstrated that there were already many of them who were arrested in the province, and consequently deprived of the power of obeying him; to which he replied, that the names of those should be posted on a gibbet, and those hanged who left their garrisons. It is easy to judge, that these proceedings must greatly sour the minds of the people, with respect to each other, and render the Prince of Orange unable to make use of a part of the troops of the republic.

As this Prince exerted his endeavours to persuade all the members of the State, that the King of France did not behave with that regard to his promises which they imagined, I sent to Amsterdam to discover whether this had made any impresson on the magistrates of that city, and to explain this affair to its burgomasters. They assured me, that they would never change their sentiments; that they only wished the King would adhere as constantly to what he had the goodness to promise them; and that their resolutions should continue unshaken, to oblige the Spaniards to accept of a peace or a truce on the conditions desired by his Majesty.

The King wrote to me again on the seventh of May, and after having reiterated the orders he had already given me, and ordered me to take care not to engage that his troops should leave the Netherlands before the ratifications of the treaty signed by the minister of Spain were exchanged, he told me, that in order to hinder the differences which subsisted between him and the Princes of Germany, being an

obstacle to the conclusion of the treaty, he was willing that I should promise in his name, that the day on which it should be signed, he would allow the Diet of Ratisbon one month longer for the acceptance of the truce on the conditions he had offered.

His Majesty added, that as the interests of his allies were not less dear to him than his own, I ought to stipulate in their favour for the same engagements on the part of the States General, as those I demanded for him; and if there was a truce with Spain, or the Empire, or with both, it should also be in common with his allies, in case they were willing to come into it, in such a manner as that they should be neither troubled nor disturbed, any more than his Majesty, in the possessions they enjoyed on the first of August, 1681.

That nevertheless, I ought not to explain myself so clearly, at the time the possession should be regulated, at least, if I was not obliged to it by the States General, at the solicitation of those whose interest required that the King of Denmark should not enjoy, during so long a truce, what he had already in his possession.

On the 11th of May I informed the King, that the States of Holland were going to be reassembled; that I should be informed, after every sitting, of what had passed in it; and that I should send an exact account to his Majesty of their proceedings, by the couriers I had at the Hague. That things were disposed in such a manner, that the Prince of Orange was no longer in a condition to hinder the States General from returning me an answer, as he had hitherto been, or to tell me, that it was not in their power to constrain the Spaniards to agree to an accommodation; that therefore they could only take one of the three resolutions following, either to accept the peace on the conditions proposed on
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the 29th of April, or the truce on the same conditions, or to remain obstinately bent on desiring the truce on the conditions offered on the 17th of February..

That I could hardly believe, as there were only the city of Amsterdam and two or three others in Holland that were for accepting the peace, that they could be unanimous, or even have a majority in favour of the peace; that on the contrary, it ought to be expected that the magistrates of Amsterdam, on finding the King ready to agree to a truce, would conform themselves to it, not because it would be most advantageous to Spain, but because it would be more easy to make it accepted by all the other towns. And I did not doubt, but that the States General would resolve on making this truce on the conditions of the 29th of April, if they were informed of the surrender of Luxemburg: but as this was a thing that could not yet be hoped for, on account of the strength of that place, I apprehended the Prince of Orange would raise up great opposition against me; for he had sent the Pensionary Fagel to most of the towns in Holland, to convince them, that the memorial of the 29th of April did not contradict that of the 17th of February, and consequently, that his Majesty violated his promise by refusing to conclude the truce without having Luxemburg. And as he knew that nothing could have such an effect upon peoples minds, as making them conceive a distrust of his Majesty's intentions, he would omit nothing that could impose upon them in this respect.

His endeavours were attend'ed with such success, that on the 12th the States General brought me a resolution in answer to the memorial I had delivered to them on the 9th. This resolution declared, that having examined the memorials I had presented to

the States General, and particularly those of the 29th of April, and of the ninth of May, they had been greatly surprized to see, that his Majesty had changed the conditions of the truce proposed on the 17th of February, and confirmed on the 13th of April following, which had not been retracted by the memorial of the 29th of the same month; and that at a time when the States General had proceeded so far as to declare, that they would persuade his Catholic Majesty to accept the truce, and to this effect had required the co-operation of their allies. That his Majesty would easily understand, that as neither they nor their allies had been hitherto able to bring Spain to accept the conditions of the truce proposed on the 17th of February, it was absolutely impossible for them to oblige that crown to cede Luxemburg, since it had not been prevailed upon by any persuasions, and the States General could not be desired to constrain the Spaniards by violent measures. That therefore they were obliged still to declare, that having explained themselves on the subject of the truce, as explicitly as possible, by the last resolution, and in the conference they had since had with me; they could expect nothing less than to be seconded in their desire to obtain a peace by his Majesty, who ought to grant the truce on the conditions offered on the 17th of February, and for want of that they should be obliged to shew, that it was with great regret they saw that the differences were not decided in a way which his Majesty had before judged to be equitable, and even continued to think so, till the 13th of the preceding month; and that they should at least have this satisfaction, that the Kings and Princes who loved peace would be persuaded, that the States General had contributed as much as they were able to finish affairs in an amicable manner, and that it was not their fault
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if the accommodation was not concluded in the way proposed by his Majesty himself.

The deputies of the States General spoke to me this day with more resolution than they had hitherto done. This proceeded from my having declared, that his Majesty would consent to a truce after his having proposed a treaty of peace; so true it is, that the least concession was dangerous. They plainly declared, that they could not consent to Luxemburg's being given to the King of France, either by a treaty of peace, or a treaty on a truce; that their honour, their interest, and their own safety were against it; that more particularly their allies were of opinion that the Spaniards ought not to give it up, and that after this, they could not constrain them to do it.

They desired me to tell them, whether I had yet had an answer from his Majesty on the offers they had made on the seventh of May, which they were persuaded were so reasonable, that he could not but acquiesce in them. I told them, that I had not yet given myself the honour to write about them to his Majesty as of a thing on which I expected an answer, and that I should have no other besides that which his Majesty had before sent, which I had put into my memorial of the ninth of May; that I conjured them not to lose the time in which they might conclude an accommodation with his Majesty; and that I could assure them, that he had ordered me by his last dispatch positively to declare, that they had no further concessions to expect, nor no change to hope for in relation to these last conditions.

They also asked, if I should not send his Majesty the resolution they then brought me; on which I replied, that as this resolution contained nothing more than that they had given me on the seventh, it was unnecessary to send it.

At length, they pretended not to know certainly what time they had still left for enabling them to conclude an accommodation. I told them that his Majesty had declared, that the treaty should be concluded on the 20th of May; that after that day he had revoked the power he had given me to sign it, and that when he ordered me to demand an answer of the States General within fifteen days, this was from his resolving to know within that time the resolution of the States, that he might take his measures accordingly, and from his judging, that they would want two or three days at least to settle the conditions of the peace or the truce; that therefore if they would sign the treaty on the 20th, they ought to give me a definitive answer without loss of time; that I should within two days dispatch a courier to his Majesty, to give him an account of the state of affairs in Holland, and that I was apprehensive of the consequence that would follow, if his Majesty was not informed of their being disposed to take the resolutions on which alone a peace or a truce could be concluded.

As the States of Holland were assembled while the deputies of the States General were with me, they would not separate without knowing my answer; which I hoped would have a good effect, since that very morning many of the towns of Holland were of opinion, that they ought to agree to an accommodation on the conditions of the 29th of April; I could not however inform his Majesty of it before the next post; but I had one thing to inform him of that was of greater consequence, and more surprizing than any thing I had yet the honour to write to him. That the council of the city of Amsterdam had taken a secret resolution, jointly with the provinces of Friesland and Groningen, that in case the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fa-
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gel should be so powerful as to engage the States General in the war, these provinces and that city would not enter into it, but would shut up their treasuries. That his Majesty might easily judge, that was this to take place, the other provinces could not be two months without being entirely ruined, and the Prince of Orange lost without remedy: that I could not certainly answer for these two provinces and the city of Amsterdam's remaining firm in a resolution that would dissolve the union of the republic, since there were so many heads who bore a part in these councils: but that I could positively assure his Majesty, that the resolution was taken after mature deliberation, and that there was great probability that it would be executed, if they continued to find, what they had hitherto acknowledged, that his Majesty was desirous of a peace, and that it was nothing but the bad dispositions of the Prince of Orange that involved them in the war.

I the same day sent the King a new memorial, presented by the envoy of Spain to the States General, in which he said, that he had for some time hesitated, without knowing whether he ought still to assist at the conferences of the allies, since he found that the States General had not the least regard either to the dignity of the King his master, or to the interests of his crown; that however, the good sentiments he had discovered in the ministers of the allies, had prevented his absenting himself, and avoiding the mortification he had suffered, at hearing the deputies of the State General read the memorial of the ambassador of France; which shewed, that in Holland, there were more thoughts of the acceptance of a truce than a peace; and that if the States General judged it more proper to accept the truce than the peace, his most Christian Majesty gave them the choice of concluding the peace or the

truce on the conditions he had proposed to them on the 29th of April.

On this the envoy of Spain observed, that he seemed to hear the King of France say, that he was at war with the States General and not with Spain; or that the States General had a full power from Spain to accommodate the differences between that kingdom and France. That he would willingly know whether the States General or the Catholic King were the masters of Luxemburg, and all the other cities, towns and countries which France pretended to retain, or whether his most Christian Majesty imagined, that the choice he gave the States General of the peace or the truce, could induce or constrain his Catholic Majesty to give his consent. That the States ought to consider, that the King of Spain was not their pupil, but their friend and ally; that if they thus continued to treat their allies, they would find themselves abandoned in their necessity; and that the King his master had in his own hands the means of making them repent of their conduct, since by granting the French all their demands, their State would be infallibly ruined, and lost without remedy. He finished his memorial with a parallel between the siege of Luxemburg and that of Vienna; and desired the States General, in the name of that God who had delivered Vienna, not to neglect the preservation of a place, on which, no less than on Vienna, depended the fate of all Christendom.

The King wrote to me on the 11th of May, in answer to my letter of the seventh, that tho' I had mentioned to the deputies of the States General all the reasons that ought to convince them, that their putting Luxemburg into his hands was a condition, without which his Majesty could no longer consent to any treaty in relation to a peace or a truce; and
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though the memorial of the 29th of April, which he had sent me, would not admit of the captious interpretation they had given it; nevertheless, he could have wished, that I had not softened matters, towards the end of the conversation with the States General, nor spoken with such mildness; his Majesty then reiterated all the different orders he had already given me on this subject, and particularly added, that in regard to the proposal they had made of referring the difficulties they might meet with in regulating the possessions which his crown and that of Spain should continue to hold, to the arbitration of the King of England, he permitted me (provided it was agreed, that their possessions should, both on the one side and the other, remain in the same state they were in before the taking of Luxemburg) to consent, that if the possession of any place was disputed, the decision should be regulated by the King of England.

His Majesty also commanded me to press the States General in the warmest manner, to give me a direct answer within the time he had appointed, and to declare, that he would know in what manner he ought to behave in respect to them.

On the 15th I begged the King to permit me to tell him, that I had imagined the advantage of his service required, (in case I did not accept the offers of the States General) my softening, in some degree, the manner in which I expressed my refusal; and that for this I had two reasons: first, because I foresaw that the Prince of Orange and his creatures would not fail to make use of an absolute refusal, as a means proper to exasperate people's minds, and to make it pass for an evident proof of the little sincerity there was in his Majesty's offers. The second reason was, that the resolution formed by the States General was the first effective step they had

yet taken to obtain a peace, and that by coming to me positively to declare, that they would abandon the Spaniards, if they did not accept that truce, they engaged themselves in a manner that would hardly admit of their going back; so that, by my softening this refusal, and yet giving the States General no hopes of his Majesty's going back, I had flattered myself, that I should do more good than harm, especially as I had constantly assured the States General that he was no longer bound by his first proposals, and that the last absolutely annulled the preceding.

In the same letter I complained to the King of the prejudice done to the acceptance of his last offers, by the ministers of Cologhe; that having made them fresh reproaches, they had assured me, that since the Elector their master's being acquainted with the proposals of the 29th of April, he had sent them orders to support those of the 17th of February, according to their first instructions; and that the allies of the States General, to whom the ministers of Cologne explained their orders, flattered themselves that that Elector would not suffer his Majesty to remain master of Luxemburg; that he knew better than I, the effect that must necessarily be produced, by such a conduct observed by the ministers of one of his principal allies.

Notwithstanding the oath of secrecy which the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel had engaged the States of Holland to take, I discovered, that on the fifth of May, they had formed the resolution of not making me any other proposal during the fifteen days his Majesty had given them, besides that of the acceptance of the truce on the conditions of the 17th of February. However, when they saw, that all the attempts, and particularly the last of the 12th of May had not succeeded, and that the

the end of that term was drawing near, they began to be afraid, and assembled twice the next day, and the last sitting lasted till ten o'clock at night: in this sitting the deputies of the towns least devoted to the Prince of Orange declared, that they would grant no assistance to the Spaniards, if they continued obstinately bent on not accepting his Majesty's proposals.

The deputies of Amsterdam took advantage of the state in which they beheld the province of Holland; and after having engaged the principal towns to come over to their opinion, they had no difficulty in bringing over the others; so that they summoned the Pensionary Fagel to form a conclusion: but he would have no hand in it, and whatever arguments they made use of, he continued to refuse them with the greatest obstinacy. The towns then sent a deputation to the Prince of Orange (who no longer appeared in the assembly) to complain of the Pensionary Fagel's acting directly contrary to the laws of the government, in refusing to form a conclusion, when they were all of one mind: but he returned them no other answer, besides that he had made some days before to the deputies of the States General, which was on that account only the more offensive; for he told them, that he had rather perish in Flanders at the head of twenty thousand men, than appear at the Hague with them, and then turned his back upon them. The assembly therefore separated, without concluding on any thing, and the deputies of the towns found themselves obliged to send their Pensionaries to their principals, to know in what manner they ought to act in such an important and pressing conjuncture.

On the 12th of May a rumour was spread abroad that the Prince of Orange was going into Flanders; and when this rumour was raised, it instantly ceased, and

and there was not a person of common sense who did not treat it as chimerical; yet I set men to keep watch all night, near his stables, in order to be informed of what passed. At length, I was informed, at midnight, between the 14th and 15th, that six horses were set to his calash, and that all his other horses were saddled: an hour after I learnt that his baggage waggons were set out; and at five in the morning I was told that my spies had seen him get into his calash; and the same morning I was assured, that one of his valets-de-chambres had set out the day before with his arms.

It was impossible for me to guess the Prince of Orange's design, or to know whether he was going to put himself at the head of his troops, in order to undertake some desperate enterprize, or whether he did not leave the Hague to avoid being present at the resolutions which he perhaps imagined they would take in spite of him. This however is certain, that he went without the order or permission of the State, which was contrary to his oath. He only desired Mr. Dickfeld, who was that week president of the States General, to tell them from him, that he was gone to see the troops, and would return in four or five days.

The King wrote two letters to me on the 13th of May: by the first, he repeated his orders to press the States General to give me speedily a positive answer, and ordered me to declare to them, that he would know within the time he had appointed, what he had to depend upon. He informed me of the bombardment of Genoa, and commanded me to acquaint the States General that he had no design to possess himself of any place on that side.

In the second, his Majesty said, that he had just received my letter of the 11th of May, with the memorial I had presented to the States General on the
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the ninth, which appeared to him a little too much softened, and that it did not declare with sufficient plainness, that the condition of the truce or peace proposed by his Majesty in the memorial of the 29th of April, and without which they ought not to hope for any accommodation, was, his having Luxemburg; and as he was able to render himself master of it by force of arms, he expected also to be informed, as soon as possible, of the resolution the States General had taken on his offers, resolving to know what he had to expect from them.

That he hoped, before his letter reached me, the States would have given me their last resolution; and if it was conformable to what his Majesty had informed me of, in relation to his intentions, I had nothing to do but to let him know it by an express, and in the mean time to prepare the treaty in the manner in which he had directed me; but that if I had yet no answer, or if it was not such as I demanded, his intention was, that I should declare, that he had ordered me to return to him, if they let slip the 20th of the month, without taking any of the measures he had proposed in my memorial of the 29th of April; and that I should actually prepare to return a few days after. That he, nevertheless, left it to my prudence whether I ought to set out till I found that the States General were entirely agreed with the Prince of Orange in refusing my last proposals, and the United Provinces had left those who commanded their troops at liberty to enter the field against those of his Majesty.

That if I judged, that the interest which the Spaniards and the Prince of Orange had in there being no longer a minister on the part of his Majesty at the Hague, who was capable of maintaining the well affected cities and provinces in their good resolutions, could meet with such support from the
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States General, as to prevent their taking any step to detain me, or to satisfy his Majesty, I should, in that case, avoid making the declaration that I had any such order to depart, and that I should wait for fresh orders from his Majesty, in consequence of what I should write after the 20th of May.

I imagined that the new and pressing instances his Majesty ordered me to make in these two letters, would not produce any good effect. The States General were sufficiently certain that the time his Majesty had given them would expire on the 20th of May; and so many admonitions one after another, could only make them conclude that the King was too fond of a peace; and more apprehensive even than they, lest the 20th of May should arrive before any treaty was concluded.

I nevertheless durst not dispense with my going to carry a memorial to the president of the States General, by which I declared, that his Majesty had shewn me, by his letters of the 13th of May, that he expected that the States General would not suffer the fifteen days, in which he had demanded an answer to his proposals, to expire without producing any effect; and that as he was able to render himself master of Luxemburg by force of arms, he would also be informed, as soon as possible, of the resolution they had taken on his offers, and know what he had to expect from them.

That as his Majesty had assured himself, that I should have received an answer by the 15th, he would be greatly surprized at finding by the courier I had dispatched to him that same day, that they had not yet answered the memorial of the 29th of April; that I therefore found myself obliged to repeat the same declarations I had already made them three times, because his Majesty repeated the same orders, to wit, that he had only given me the power
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to sign a treaty till the 20th of that month inclusively; so that if the treaty was not signed on the 20th, I should not have any power, and his Majesty would take other measures.

I the same day, viz. on the 16th of May, wrote to inform the King, that I had just presented the memorial his Majesty had ordered me to deliver to the States General; that though I had inserted in that I presented on the ninth of May, certain terms which he had found too mild, I had done it only in conformity to a preceding order, to regulate my conduct according to the advice I should receive from certain persons; and that I, as well as they, had imagined, that if stronger expressions had accompanied my refusal to sign the truce, on the conditions proposed on the 17th of February, I should have raised against me every mind, and have thrown them into a despair capable of re-uniting them to the Prince of Orange; that I had imagined, his Majesty would be satisfied, provided that I gave no hope, no abatement on his part, nor no change in the conditions of the 29th of April, nor no farther delay after the 20th of May.

I also took the liberty to tell his Majesty, that he might have formed a judgment of the good effect of this conduct, if Mr. Tambonneau had informed him, that the envoys of Cologne had wrote to their master, that since the refusal I had given on the 7th of May, to consent to the truce I had proposed on the 17th of February, all the friends of France were changed, and the well-disposed no longer talked of any thing but a war; that it was true, this had outwardly appeared for two days, and there would have been room for fearing an effectual change, if I had not, by gentle means, brought back their minds to the point at which I informed his Majesty they were now fixed.

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To this I added, that I did not believe, in the present disposition of affairs in Holland, that it would be of any advantage for me to declare, that I had orders to return to him, in case the States General should suffer the 20th of that month to pass without agreeing to any of the resolutions I had proposed by my memorial of the 29th of April; that this would reduce to despair, those of the well affected, who had hitherto remained firm and unshaken; that I durst not flatter myself with their being strong enough to bring the States General to take any public steps to detain me, and that the Prince of Orange, as well as all his party, would find themselves greatly relieved, if there was no-body in Holland on the part of his Majesty; and as he had also ordered me not to set out till I found the States General were agreed with the Prince of Orange in refusing his Majesty's last proposals, and they were far from consenting to them, it would then appear, that I uttered threats which in the end I durst not execute; that therefore I had thought it most proper to wait for fresh orders from his Majesty, and at all hazards first to see, what would that day be concluded in the assembly of Holland, which I could not be informed of till four hours and a half after the post was set out. That I was very certain that the Prince of Orange would never have such power there, as to make them come to a resolution to refuse his Majesty's proposals; that all I apprehended was, lest the Pensionary Fagel should, by his cavils about forms, prevent there being one signed on the 20th of that month; but that I hoped his Majesty would think good, that if the States General should come to declare to me on the 20th, that they would accept the proposals of the 29th of April, and should desire a delay of two or three days, in order to regulate

gulate the articles of the treaty, I should not refuse them.

The King, some days after, sent me an answer to my letter, that he was very glad I had deferred the order he had given me to declare to the States General, that he had commanded me immediately to return to him, if they suffered the 20th to pass, without giving his Majesty a satisfactory answer; and that as I was capable, by being on the spot, of knowing the effect the overtures he had given me might produce, he left it to my prudence to make such use of it, as I should judge to be most for his advantage.

In the mean while, the troops of the States General in Flanders were diminished by the loss of above six thousand men, occasioned by desertions, the departure of those that returned to the Provinces of Friesland and Groningen, or by hardships; for they complained heavily of the ill treatment they received in the Spanish Netherlands.

On the 18th I wrote to the King, that there was no obstacle nor no art that could be used, which the Pensionary Fagel did not put in practice, to hinder the States of Holland from taking a resolution conformable to his Majesty's intentions. That one of the means he made the greatest use of was, not to resolve on any point, without consulting the ministers of their allies, in order that what they said in the conferences might make an impression on those in the government of the State. That these ministers had made a great noise on the cession of Luxemburg; declaring, that they ought rather to hazard every thing than to give it up: the Swedish minister had signalized himself on this occasion, as that of Hanover had also done, and that I had learnt from one of the members of the assembly of Holland, that the States would already have taken a definitive resolution,

resolution, conformable to his Majesty's offers, had it not been for the opposition made by the ministers of their allies.

That the deputies of Amsterdam, on their side, had done all that was possible to make the Province of Holland take the resolution of signing the treaty with his Majesty; and that, in spite of all the artifices of the Pensionary Fagel, and all his practices in the interior part of the government, he had been unable to hinder the most considerable towns in Holland from persisting in their resolution to abandon the Spaniards, if they would not enter into an accommodation with his Majesty; that those of Dort, Delft, and Leyden had signalized themselves and spoken with great warmth; that things had been carried to such a length, that the towns having been acquainted with the Pensionary Fagel's refusal to form a conclusion in the assembly of Holland, had resolved, that the conclusion on the acceptance of his Majesty's proposals should be drawn up by the Pensionary of the first city, and in his absence, successively by all the others, according to their rank, if the Pensionary Fagel still refused to do it, which was a thing of great consequence, and of which there had hitherto been no example; and the Pensionary Fagel having refused to form a conclusion, they would have ordered him to leave the States of Holland, if two deputies of two of the small towns had not changed their opinions, without orders from their superiors.

Nevertheless, this Pensionary could not hinder the States of Holland from taking, the same day, a very remarkable resolution, which was to regulate the actions of their troops according to the King's desire, and to forbid their committing any act of hostility against those of his Majesty. The Pensionary Fagel sent the Prince of Orange advice of this resolution by a courier, and in the mean time form-

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ed divers pretences for not bringing it before the States General till after the return of the Prince of Orange, who was expected at the Hague on the 20th.

This was all the advantage which those who were desirous of a peace were that day able to obtain, and as this resolution was confirmed on the 21st by the States General, those who were well disposed imagined they had carried things very far, in having engaged the States, in spite of the authority of the Prince of Orange, and the Pensionary Fagel's cabals, to suffer patiently the taking of Luxemburg, in having made them agree to the resolution of granting no assistance to the Spaniards, and in ordering their troops not to perform any act of hostility against those of his Majesty.

Things being in this situation in Holland, I was still further confirmed in my sentiments, that I ought not to declare that the King had ordered me to depart on the 20th of May, if nothing was concluded on that day: but seeing, on the other hand, that all the good designs of those who were well disposed would be rendered ineffectual, if they did not intimidate the others so far as to oblige them to join with them, I imagined that it would be necessary to spur them on, in such a manner as not to frighten them too much, which would perhaps have as great, and perhaps a greater effect than the declaration his Majesty had given me the liberty of making.

With this view I, on the 16th, told in confidence a person who was one of my best friends, the order I had received to retire after the 20th, if within that time nothing was concluded. Immediately after he went to tell it to the magistrates of Amsterdam, not as if I had made him this declaration, but as if he himself had discovered it, and related it

it with such an appearance of truth that they made no doubt of it. This rumour, in which his Majesty was not engaged, presently reached the Hague, and gave a much greater alarm than if I myself had made the declaration, which they would have imagined was only feigned.

As I on the next day, viz. on the 17th, saw this uneasiness spread, I demanded a conference with the deputies of the States General, in which I threw in certain expressions which they might attribute to the orders I had received to retire, and to which I might give a very different interpretation whenever I pleased.

I told them, after my having made a recapitulation of all my preceding arguments, that they ought to remember, that I had demanded, on the part of the King, a positive answer to my memorial of the 29th of April within fifteen days, and a treaty signed on the 20th of May; that on the little appearance his Majesty had found of a speedy answer, he had already made his army march three leagues farther into the countries belonging to Spain; that they were absolutely deceived if they imagined, that they might stay till the 20th before they accepted his Majesty's offers, without they gave themselves time to sign the treaty on the same day; that if they did not declare their accepting it to me, soon enough to have the treaty signed on the 20th, their doing it afterwards could not change my orders; that after the 20th I should know what I had to do, and that on the 21st, I should be far from being able to sign it.

This declaration obliged them immediately to call an extraordinary assembly of the States of Holland, in which fourteen towns were of opinion that they ought to oblige the Spaniards to come to an agreement with his Majesty on any terms

terms whatsoever. When the Pensionary Fagel perceiving that this affair was going to be carried, proposed that the assembly should separate for some hours, and to refer the conclusion of this debate till another sitting, which was appointed to be at eight at night, and which lasted till one in the morning.

He in this last sitting brought a letter from their ambassador in England, which asserted, that the King of Great Britain had assured him, that his most christian Majesty had only besieged Luxemburg to oblige the Spaniards to accept of a peace; that he could answer for his stopping there, and that he had taken measures to prevent his laying siege to any other place. Upon this he shewed them, that it was needless for them to expose themselves to no purpose, to force the Spaniards to give up Luxemburg in order to save the rest of the Netherlands, or to secure themselves from his Majesty's arms, since they had nothing to apprehend either on the one side or the other; that this being the case, it was better the Spaniards should lose Luxemburg, by its being taken by his Majesty, than for them to oblige an ally to make a cession of that city, or shamefully to abandon it. This reasoning supported by Mr. Citters's letter, wrought a change in one of the towns, and made the deputies of four of the others declare, that they would wait for fresh orders; thus there remained no more than nine towns in the same sentiments, and consequently they had no right to press the Pensionary Fagel to form a conclusion.

This gave me room on the 18th, to write to the King what I had not yet dared to mention, that I did not think it proper to press the States General any farther; that they were sufficiently informed of his Majesty's intentions, and that the Pensionary Fagel would make an ill use of any fresh attempts, after those

those I had already made; that he would not fail to say (what he had already intimated) that there was no reason to apprehend the continuance of the war; that his Majesty had no design of undertaking any other enterprize, and that, on the contrary, he was in more fear than they, lest the time he had fixed would be suffered to slide away before they had concluded a treaty of peace.

I also let his Majesty know, that the deputies of the well affected towns, had in the strongest terms pressed the magistrates of Amsterdam to send their deputies to the assembly, because their presence would be of great use in supporting those who entertained right sentiments; that these remonstrances had obliged them to send the Pensionary Hop, who was that morning, at the assembly of Holland, where he spoke with great force, and that the next day they were to send some of their burgomasters, being resolved, for the advancement of the peace, to pass over the resolution they had taken not to appear in the States of Holland, till they had obtained the satisfaction they required.

I the same day wrote a second letter to the King, by which I informed him of what had just passed in the assembly of Holland, which lasted till four in the afternoon.

That the letter from Mr. Citters had entirely ruined the hopes that were entertained in Holland, of speedily seeing an accommodation concluded; that what his Majesty had ordered me to say, had so intimidated every body, without entirely discouraging them, that the Prince of Orange was almost forsaken, and there were only four towns in the States of Holland that supported his sentiments. But that this fear was dissipated, and no attention was paid to what I had said, since the King of England had ordered Mr. Citters to declare on his part to
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the States General, that his Majesty would not attack any place besides Luxemburg; and that if he should besiege others, or cause the Spanish Netherlands to be attacked by his allies, he would join his forces to those of the republic to oppose it.

That the Pensionary and secretaries of Amsterdam had asserted, that no credit ought to be given to that letter, and that if they continued to behave in that manner, his Majesty would shew his resentment both against the Spaniards and the States General; but though they spoke with great warmth, this letter had given such encouragement to many deputies, that they joined those who were the most attached to the Prince of Orange.

That the Pensionary Fagel had shewn them, that the Kings of France and England had made no other demand on them, but that the troops of the States General should perform no act of hostility; that his Majesty would be satisfied, since the forces of the States had not been sent to the assistance of Luxemburg, and as he was to undertake no siege after that of Luxemburg, the States General had nothing to fear, and consequently no measures to take; that they would soon see that the Prince of Orange had reason for his never suffering himself to be intimidated by the menaces of France, and that the magistrates of Amsterdam had been in danger of ruining the country, by their own fear, with which they had inspired others.

I added, that their apprehension of seeing a great division in the state also began to be dissipated by the hopes of the peace they expected abroad; since the city of Amsterdam and the provinces of Friesland and Groningen would no longer have cause for executing the declarations they had made of shutting up their treasuries, if the ill conduct observed in
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Holland should engage the States General in the war.

The King, in his answer to this letter, observed, that there was no appearance of the King of England's having charged the ambassador of the States General to make such declaration on his part, and that he did not doubt but that his Britannic Majesty would soon undeceive the public. Yet the King of Great Britain took no notice of it, nor ever disavowed one single letter of all those in which Mr. Citters attributed to him sentiments so contrary to those which, in France, it was pretended he entertained.

Though the Pensionary Fagel had hindered, by means of the letter sent by the ambassador of the States at London, any conclusion being formed in the States of Holland; the magistrates of Amsterdam caused me to be told on the nineteenth, that if his Majesty would behave to the States with his usual generosity, they hoped that they would furnish them with the means of bringing all the other towns into their sentiments. That if the King, on seeing that the States General did not interest themselves in the defence of Luxemburg, notwithstanding the solicitations of the Spaniards, and that they had forbid their troops performing any act of hostility; and knowing also, that if Holland had not taken resolutions entirely conformable to his intention, it was not the fault of the greatest and soundest part of the republic; he would resolve on this consideration, and from the greatness of his soul to declare, that after the taking of Luxemburg, he would still adhere to the conditions he had proposed on the 29th of April, though this should be only for the term of ten days, he would gain the hearts of the Dutch, and let them see, the truth and sincerity of his intentions in regard to the peace and welfare of the state; that if this was done, the magistrates of Amsterdam hoped they

they should be able to bring over those who had suffered themselves to be drawn away by the persuasions of the Pensionary Fagel : otherwise, it was indubitably certain, that if his Majesty augmented his proposals after the 20th of May, or attacked any place after the taking of Luxemburg, though he might do it with justice, this would have a very bad effect even on those of the greatest probity.

On this I did myself the honour to write to the King, that I plainly saw, from my knowledge of the affairs of the interior part of the republic, that as a delay given without cause, or without his Majesty's deriving any advantage from it, would be prejudicial to his interest, and his views of a peace, so it would be of advantage to give one of eight or ten days after the taking of Luxemburg, even though, on his granting this delay, he imposed harder conditions, in case they let it slip without reaping any advantage from it. Moreover, that I was persuaded, that if his Majesty should add to his proposals after the 20th of May, and even obtain all he demanded, this would never be of such advantage as the affection of the people of Holland, which he would gain, if he resolved, during ten days after the taking of Luxemburg, to adhere to the same conditions; that this conduct would procure him the hearts of the whole republic; and that in this case, one of the two following things would happen, either that those in the government of Amsterdam would find the means of improving it, by bringing all the towns to accept his Majesty's proposals (which appeared to me highly probable) or if they could not do that, the King might, after this delay was expired, lay siege to other places, and increase his proposals, without producing any ill effect, if he did it immediately after the 20th of May. I besought his Majesty to believe, that the orders he should give me on this

subject, would either greatly contribute to ruin, or to re-establish the authority of the Prince of Orange.

I added to this, that as I had had the day before the honour to send his Majesty an account of the state of affairs in Holland, without informing him of this request made by the most considerable persons in Amsterdam, which I did not hear till after the departure of the post, I believed that he would agree to my not executing the orders I should receive in answer to my letter of the preceding day, at least till they were confirmed after his reading this second letter.

The magistrates of Amsterdam informed me the same day, viz. on the nineteenth at night, that one of the small towns in North Holland having changed its sentiments, and two others having excused themselves from delivering their opinion, they found that day after dinner, that they had nine voices in the assembly against seven, and the voice of the nobles which made eight; so that, with that additional voice, they might have taken a resolution, if the Pensionary Fagel had not produced reasons of such weight as made them refer the conclusion till the next day.

The Prince of Orange arrived from Brussels on the 20th in the evening. Besides the reasons I have already set down, which it was thought had obliged that Prince to go into Flanders, two others were alleged, the one, to let the Spaniards see that he was ready to set out at the head of the States General's army to succour Luxemburg; but that the allies not having sent their troops thither, and the forces of the States General alone not being sufficient, they ought not to charge him with the loss of Luxemburg.

The other was, the almost general desertion of the troops of Friesland and Groningen, which was so great,

great, that out of two regiments, there only remained thirty men, the rest having returned, either to Friesland or Groningen, on the orders given by those provinces.

Seven of these Friesland soldiers were seized on their return home; when the Prince of Orange would have caused them be hanged, in conformity to a decree of the council of state; but the deputies of Friesland told him, that they would hang the same number of Dutch merchants that belonged to the towns whose sentiments were opposite to the magistrates of Amsterdam, whenever they found them in the province of Friesland. This declaration stopped the Prince of Orange.

I wrote to the King on the 21st of May, the day after the fatal term prescribed by his Majesty for the acceptance of his offers, that on the 20th, the assembly of Holland had lasted till four in the afternoon, without agreeing on the part they had to take, in order to terminate the differences subsisting between his Majesty and the King of Spain; that the deputies of Amsterdam had exerted all their endeavours to bring them to accept the truce on the conditions of the 29th of April; and that the Pensionary Fagel, with the Prince of Orange's creatures, had done as much to prevent it; that he had spoken with such extraordinary heat, and had declared, that if they took such a resolution, the States General would have no allies for the time to come; that they ought for ever to renounce them, and blindly to throw themselves into his Majesty's arms, in order to conform themselves from thence forward to his pleasure. The ministers of the allies had menaced all the deputies of the towns in the same manner; but this did not produce so great an effect as the considerable sums which the Pensionary Fagel had told out to some of the depu-

ties who remained faithfully attached to him ; but notwithstanding this, the deputies of Amsterdam, who had eleven of the principal towns of their opinion, had pressed that Pensionary to form a conclusion of the assembly of Holland ; and he having refused, they resolved to oblige the Pensionary of Dort, the first town in Holland, to do it ; but he, from his being attached to the Prince of Orange, found the means of eluding it, by alledging, that this affair could only be determined by an unanimous consent ; that the deputies of Amsterdam had been much irritated, and spoke with such resolution, that the other towns were astonished, particularly when they read their protest, which declared, amongst other things, that they would not be chargeable with the misfortunes they should infallibly suffer, if the States General did not accept his Majesty's offers ; that consequently they would not be bound to contribute to the expence of the war, if it should be kindled ; that for this reason they would shut up their treasuries, and that, though this should oblige them to separate themselves from the union, they were resolved to do it, rather than to suffer themselves to be engaged in the war.

In this sitting they demanded, that at least they should give me as an answer, the secret resolution of the States of Holland, which I have already mentioned, and by which their troops were forbid to perform any act of hostility against those of his Majesty : but the Pensionary Fagel formally opposed it, and would not consent to their acquainting me with a resolution which laid the States General under a too solemn engagement. He repeated what he had already said an hundred times, that in reality the States had done all that his Majesty desired from them, by hindering their troops from committing any act of hostility against his ; that it was sufficient
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they had ordered it, and that his Majesty would know it by the effects, without their dishonouring themselves by a public declaration, which would ruin their interest with their allies; that the worst that could happen was the taking of Luxemburg; and that they had nothing more to fear, since the King of England had assured them that his most Christian Majesty would make no further attempts in the Netherlands.

All these considerations rendered the endeavours of the magistrates of Amsterdam ineffectual: and these gentlemen sent to me to renew the intreaties on the subject on which I had wrote to his Majesty the day before; hoping that such an extraordinary act of generosity, after the taking of Luxemburg, would put them in a condition to surmount the obstacles they had not yet been able to overcome; and that if they were not so happy as to accomplish it, his Majesty, after this, would have the greater reason for carrying his pretensions farther.

Mean while, the envoys of Cologne resolved to begin a negotiation that would have ruined all I had hitherto done, if I had not prevented them. The cardinal de Furstemberg having learnt the dispositions of Friesland, Groningen, and the city of Amsterdam, had ordered these envoys, on the part of the Elector their master, to ask the city of Amsterdam, and these two provinces, if they would separate themselves from the others, in order to form a neutrality with the King of France and the Elector of Cologne, and there needed nothing more to reunite those who were well disposed to the Prince of Orange. I wrote about it to the King and to M. de Strasburg, and desired these deputies to wait till I received an answer, before they made any such proposal. I informed the King, that whatever dislike these provinces and that city had to the Prince of

Orange and the Pensionary Fagel, they would not in cold blood comply with such proposals; that it required a kind of despair to oblige them to it; and if they were reduced to take this part, as they had shewn they had some thoughts of it, it would much sooner be effected by themselves, when, by the different conduct of his Majesty and the Prince of Orange, they should see that his Majesty's actions tended only to the support of their liberties, and to maintain peace in their neighbourhood; and that the Prince of Orange had no other end besides that of restraining their liberties by engaging them in the war.

I informed the King, on the 25th of May, that the States of Holland had concluded on nothing since the 23d; that on the 24th, they had even separated for eight days, and therefore they kept to the resolution they had taken of not succouring the Spaniards, and would probably wait to see, what the King would do after the taking of Luxemburg.

I represented, that as the people of Holland were assured, that he would undertake no siege after that of Luxemburg, it might be objected, that the declaration the magistrates of Amsterdam besought him to order me to make, after the reduction of that place, could not produce any great effect, and that they could not be much affected by a promise of not attacking any other place in the Spanish Netherlands within ten days, since they believed that he had entered into an engagement with the King of England not to attack them at all; but that I could answer, that the most sensible and judicious persons in the government were persuaded, that their ambassador at London made great additions to the least things the King of England said to him, and that the Pensionary Fagel added still more of his own, in the commentaries he made on the letters of that ambassador;

embassador; besides, that when Luxemburg was taken, the States General would see things in a quite different light from what they did at present; that the sincere desire his Majesty shewed for procuring a peace by not encreasing his proposals, after so great an advantage, would appear of such a kind, that no-body could have any further doubt of it; that there was even great probability, that the States General, who had been unwilling to oblige the King to give up a place which he had in his possession, would not have the same scruples when it was in the hands of his Majesty, and while they had no hope of taking it from him; that therefore this declaration on the part of his Majesty, whatever interpretation they could put upon it, appeared to me extremely necessary towards the advancement of the peace; that I was persuaded, that if the magistrates of Amsterdam could not make as good a use of it as they pretended, and I hoped, in bringing the States General to accept his Majesty's proposals, he could not fail of reaping very great advantage from it, by its convincing the ruling persons in Amsterdam, that he had omitted nothing they desired, in order to procure the re-establishment of the peace; and by this means he would engage them still to remain unshaken in their sentiments, and in the resolutions they had taken.

That his Majesty saw the effects produced in the minds of the ruling persons in Amsterdam, and in the provinces of Friesland and Groningen, by the regard he had been pleased to pay to what they had shewn to be agreeable and useful towards promoting the success of their good intentions; that they even believed that it was no small matter, that while his Majesty was carrying on the siege of Luxemburg, the deputies of Amsterdam were not satisfied with preventing any resolution being taken to succour that

city, but also had declared that it should be ceded to his Majesty; and that if, for want of their doing this, a war should be the consequence, the treasury of the city should be shut up, and they would rather break the union than enter into a war against him.

As the magistrates of Amsterdam placed an entire confidence in his Majesty's goodness, they communicated to me the substance of a memorial which they believed was nearly such a one as ought to be presented, if he resolved, after the taking of Luxemburg, to adhere to his last proposals; and this I sent to the King, without making the least alteration in it, in order that his Majesty might be the better acquainted with the naked sentiments of the principal persons in that city. It was to this effect, that notwithstanding the King had been obliged to employ his arms in the taking of Luxemburg, and though he might reasonably enlarge his pretensions against the Spaniards, as he was still able to reap greater advantages from his arms, by gaining considerable conquests in the Spanish Netherlands, yet he had resolved to make it appear, that he would always preserve a sincere intention to procure the general welfare of Christendom, by proposing all the means possible of procuring a peace; he therefore made known to the States General, that he would still be satisfied with the city of Luxemburg, together with the villages and hamlets dependent on it, Beaumont, Bouvines, Chimay, &c. and restoring to the Spaniards the cities of Courtray, Dixmude, &c. provided that the States General, on their side, would employ every good office to oblige the Spaniards to accept the peace or the truce on the conditions proposed in the memorial of the 29th of April; and in case the Spaniards resolved still to continue obstinate in refusing to accept the just proposals made by his Majesty, he would still adhere to the articles proposed

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to the States General by the memorial of the 29th of April, on condition however, that they should declare themselves within fifteen days; because, if they still let the term of fifteen days slip, without giving their positive answer, his Majesty would have sufficient cause to keep no measures with them, but would consider them as his formal enemies, and as those who fomented the obstinacy of the Spaniards; and for making use, from thenceforwards, without the least reserve, of the means God had put into his hands, to vindicate his rights and the justice of his arms.

Both the King of England and the Elector of Saxony at this time solicited the Prince of Orange to become reconciled to the King of France, and offered him their interposition; but he gave them both a refusal. I never knew in what terms he explained himself to the English envoy, who made a mystery of this negotiation: that of Brandenburg however told me, that the Prince only replied in general terms, and even gave a different turn to the discourse whenever he began on this subject, though he frequently repeated, that he would perish with the unhappy, if that was necessary; but the blame of all the misfortunes that should happen, ought only to be laid on the magistrates of Amsterdam, and the other members of the republic, who had hindered the States General from putting the State in a condition to resist the King.

The Pensionary of Amsterdam reiterated his solicitations, and gave a memorial to the States of Holland, expressed in very strong terms against the body of the nobles, and principally against the Pensionary Fagel, by which he demanded, in the name of the city of Amsterdam, that their papers should be restored.

On the 22d of May his Majesty wrote me word,

that he approved very much of the conduct I had observed in the execution of his last orders; that however, if the States General would agree, at the end of the month, to the proposals I had made them, and offered to sign the treaty in the manner in which he had explained it to me, he permitted me to sign it, and to take upon me the task of engaging him to agree to it.

I returned an answer on the 26th, that I did not believe the States of Holland would take any resolution till they knew that Luxemburg was taken; that every body, except the most zealous partisans of the Prince of Orange, heartily wished to hear that that place was reduced to the obedience of his Majesty.

That if he approved the proposal I had taken the liberty to make him, of still granting ten days after the taking of Luxemburg, to sign the treaty on the same conditions, I most humbly besought him to permit me to represent, that though the magistrates of Amsterdam assured me, that they should be strong enough to oblige the States of Holland to accept these proposals, in spite of the Prince of Orange; it was possible, though there was not the least appearance of it, that the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel might be so powerful as to prevent any resolution being taken by the States General. I therefore believed it necessary, that the same day I presented a memorial to the States General, I should have the permission to shew to the ruling persons of Amsterdam, that his Majesty, displeased at the conduct observed in Holland, had resolved to attack the Netherlands; yet, at their request, and on their account, had resolved to defer it for some days; but that it was neither just nor consistent with his dignity, in case the States General should not take advantage of this goodness in his Majesty, for him
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not to bring them to reason by force of arms; that therefore I desired them not to be surprized, if after this delay was suffered to slide away to no purpose, he should lay siege to a place in the Netherlands.

That I could not be certain, that the magistrates of Amsterdam would upon this enter into any formal engagement with me, though I hoped they would; but that I could at least assure his Majesty, that I would conduct things in such a manner, that they should see with as much tranquillity his taking another place in the Netherlands, as they saw him lay siege to Luxemburg; that I always supposed his Majesty would make his troops engage in some action in Flanders, after the expiration of this new delay, as I believed that this would be very necessary if the States General did not within the time prefixed give him the satisfaction he had a right to expect.

On the 26th of May, Don Carnero brought some remittances to the Hague for the Landgrave of Hesse; and the Count de Waldeck dispatched a courier from Bavaria to the States General, to let them know, that the allies desired them to cause their troops to march to the assistance of Luxemburg; and that, in that case, the Elector of Bavaria and the other allies would give him above thirty thousand men, with which he would join the States General's army near Luxemburg.

I informed the King and M. de Barillon, that the Duke of Monmouth had assiduously paid his court to the Prince of Orange, in a journey he made into Brabant; and that he paid him such respect, that the Prince of Orange being on horseback, and dropping his cane, the Duke of Monmouth threw himself off his horse to take it up, and presented it to the Prince of Orange, who remained immovable on his; and that there was a greater talk than ever of
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making the Duke of Monmouth General of horse, in the room of the Prince de Vaudemont. That the Prince of Orange had not only shewn his want of respect to the King of England and the Duke of York, by the good treatment he had given the Duke of Monmouth; but had expressed it much more strongly by the excessive civility with which, contrary to his custom, he had treated the Lord Brandon. That this lord arrived at the Hague on the 24th of May, in the evening, when Mr. Benting, who hardly ever paid a visit, and therefore could not be expected to make the first, immediately went to see him, and made use of a thousand expressions of friendship; that the Prince of Orange shewed him the next day equal marks of respect, and the Princess of Orange being at Onstardick, where she was to stay some days, he invited him to go thither to salute that Princess.

On the 24th of May the King wrote to inform me, that since those who had contributed to make the Province of Holland take the resolution to hinder the troops of the States General from acting either directly or indirectly against those of France, desired that he would declare to the States General, that he was willing still to grant ten days after the taking of Luxemburg, for their concluding a peace on the conditions proposed on the 29th of April; and that by this means I hoped either to oblige the Spaniards to accept his Majesty's offers, or to bring the States General to conclude the treaty I had proposed to them; he consented, that I should let the States General know by a memorial; that though the success with which the siege of Luxemburg was carried on, insured its being soon reduced to his obedience, and though he might think of making new conquests, and of laying claim to greater indemnifications, without adhering to the offers he had made on the

29th of April; yet the desire the greatest part of the towns in Holland had shewn for the re-establishment of the peace, and the resolution they had taken to hinder their troops from acting against those of his Majesty, had induced him, on their account, to grant a delay of ten days after the taking of Luxemburg, protesting, that if they suffered these ten days to expire to no purpose, they ought not to hope for any new delay; and that he would regulate his demands only according to the success God should give to his arms.

The King left me the choice of making this declaration immediately after I had received his orders, or of deferring it till the city of Luxemburg was reduced to the last extremity; but that on no account I should suffer the first of June to pass before I gave this memorial to the States General.

His Majesty also gave me orders to assure the magistrates of Amsterdam on his part, that the treaty should no sooner be signed, than their city should know, by the good treatment its inhabitants should receive, as well in their commerce, as in whatever might concern their particular advantage, how well he was satisfied with their prudent conduct; and that from thence forward they might certainly depend on his protection and promises.

I wrote to the King on the 29th of May to inform him, that I would communicate to the magistrates of Amsterdam the permission he gave me to assure the States General by a memorial, that he would still allow them ten days after the taking of Luxemburg, to agree to the conditions of the 29th of April; and that I did not doubt but they would receive with all due respect and gratitude this new mark of his regard: but that however I was of opinion, that they would think, that I ought to defer my presenting this memorial as long as possible, because

cause the Prince of Orange's creatures having persuaded many deputies that Luxemburg would not be taken, the people of Holland would not reflect in the manner they ought on the favour granted them by his Majesty ; and that when they came at last to learn the news of Luxemburg's being taken, his Majesty's offer which preceded it, would not have the same weight, from its having failed in producing an immediate effect.

That the persons in the government of Amsterdam would be extremely moved by the assurance I should give them of the good treatment they should receive after the peace, in relation to all their concerns, and particularly in their trade, since they principally regarded, in the conclusion of the peace, a good understanding between the King and the republic, which was as dear to them as the re-establishment of the republican government, both of these depending on each other ; that therefore I might tell them, that the dispute was not only, whether they should have a peace or a war ; but which should be the master, the Prince of Orange or the republicans ; and whether the republic should from thence forward be allied by interest to France or England.

I immediately informed the person by whom I kept up a correspondence with the magistrates of Amsterdam, of the delay of ten days which his Majesty had consented to grant after the taking of Luxemburg ; at which he testified his extreme joy, and was entirely of my opinion, that if I gave the memorial before Luxemburg was taken, it would not produce the effect that was expected from it.

He the next day returned me the answer of the magistrates of Amsterdam, who desired him to tell me, that they could hear no news more agreeable : That they were going to make their last efforts, and that they hoped to be able to surmount all the difficulties

difficulties which the Pensionary Fagel was continually forming to prevent the acceptance of his Majesty's proposals; but that if I delivered this memorial before Luxemburg had surrendered, it would be of no use, from the false, but yet strong, prepossession that was entertained, that this place would hold out all the month of June, and that it would perhaps be relieved by the Germans.

This obliged me to write to the King on the 1st of June, that though the day was arrived in which he had ordered me to deliver a memorial, I hoped he would not disapprove of my waiting till the next day, when I expected to receive an answer to the letters, by which I had had the honour to inform him, that the magistrates of Amsterdam besought him to make this declaration after the taking of Luxemburg; that I was also willing to have their sentiments on a draught of the memorial which I had communicated to them, and which I had drawn up as agreeably as I could to what his Majesty had wrote to me on the 24th of May.

That I could assure him, I had so happily made the magistrates of Amsterdam comprehend the necessity of besieging a place in the Spanish Netherlands, if the States General should suffer this new delay to be pass'd over without producing any effect, that they were convinced that they ought no longer to desire his Majesty not to engage in any new enterprize; and that they knew the necessity there was, both for the King's service, and in support of the good republicans, that he should attack a place in the Netherlands, in order to let the States General know the error into which the Prince of Orange had thrown them.

I also wrote, that this Prince was persuaded that those who were in the opposition against him, had formed a project for performing three things as soon

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as the peace should be concluded, by which they would greatly diminish his influence on the deliberations of the state, and entirely lessen his authority. The one was to disband twenty or twenty five thousand soldiers, and to make this reform themselves, for fear he should only disband the Dutch, as was the case after the peace of Nimeguen. The other was, to cause the ancient custom to be established in the election of those who composed the governments of the provinces of Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overysse, which had been done by the nomination of the Prince of Orange since the year 1673, which rendered him the master of these three provinces. The third was, to demand from him an account of the contributions raised during the last war, and especially of those levied in the county of Liege, which amounted to above two millions, and which ought to have been employed, according to the constitutions of the State, in supporting the army. 'Tis true, that their design of doing these things after the peace was concluded, was become so public, as well as that of turning out the Pensionary Fagel, that one of the Prince of Orange's most faithful adherents could not help publicly talking of it to a foreign minister.

I had advice the same day, that the province of Friesland were so irritated at the resolution taken by the Prince of Orange in the council of State, and which the States General had confirmed, against the officers of the army who obeyed the orders of that province, that they had shut up their treasuries, and taken a resolution that was so bold and of such importance, that I immediately sent a copy of it to his Majesty, which I had received in a very extraordinary way, before it was signed by the four districts of that province, as it ought to be, in order to its being sent to the deputies of Friesland

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at the States General. This resolution was to this effect: That having seen that of the council of State of the 8th of May, which had been confirmed by the States General, and which enjoined all governors not to suffer any officer or soldier to quit their garrisons; and by which it was agreed, to write to those who were already fled, to order them to return as soon as possible, and to treat those who did not return as deserters, the States of Friesland declared by unanimous consent, that these two resolutions of the Council of State and of the States General had appeared to them so extraordinary, that they had resolved to disband their troops, and to take new ones, conformably to what had many times been done, and particularly in the year 1674, by the States of Holland, who broke many regiments in their repartition, and took in their room English and Scots troops, without the knowledge and consent of the union.

That they had expected, that such attention would have been paid to the declaration they had made to the States General and the Prince of Orange as that declaration deserved; but, on the contrary, they learnt with great astonishment, that instead of shewing any deference to remonstrances so serious and solemn, they treated this affair in such a manner as to abolish the indisputable right of sovereignty enjoyed by the province of Friesland.

That they persisted in their resolution, and expressly forbid their officers and soldiers paying obedience either to these resolutions, the letters of the governors, or of any other person whatsoever, since they were under a greater obligation to obey the orders of the States of Friesland than those of the Council of State; that so far was the oath which the militia took to the council of State, and the commission they received from the States of Friesland,

Friesland, from rendering these powers so equal that there was no difference between them, that, on the contrary, the council of State was enjoined by the eighteenth and the twenty seventh articles, to oblige the militia by oath to be obedient and faithful in particular to the province by which it ought to be paid; so that by this oath, and by the commission received from the council of State, they could not require any thing contrary to the superiority which those who paid them had over them.

And in case the council of State should continue the prosecution to the disadvantage of the militia of Friesland, the States of Friesland engaged themselves to protect them from and to recompence them for the distresses, sufferings, disgrace, and all the other inconveniences they had, or might meet with, being resolved to treat on all occasions those who should have given sentence in any council of war whatsoever, against the officers and soldiers of Friesland, in the same manner as their militia were treated by them, and to take these affronts as directly offered to the sovereign states of Friesland; declaring, that by this resolution, or others of this nature, which they had already taken, or which they should afterwards take, that nothing should be done to the disadvantage of the union; but that the conduct which the States General had observed for some time past was directly and in many ways contrary to the union; as their having authorized the Prince of Orange to send more succours than they ought to the Netherlands, not only without the knowledge and communication, but also against the will, and in spite of the express protests of two considerable Provinces; in having made use of a majority of voices in an affair in which it ought not to take place; and in having by this means endeavoured to reduce the Provinces of Friesland and Groningen to a state of
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vassalage and subjection, no longer allowing them the disposition of their own militia, which is the true and most considerable privilege of sovereignty; and that the States of Friesland not being willing to suffer it, they had resolved to make known their sentiments to the States General, the Council of State, the particular States of the Provinces, and to the Prince of Orange, desiring them to desist from such proceedings, by repeated protests as above, incessantly ordering their deputies to deliver their resolution to the States General, and to employ the most powerful means, to the end that the intention of the states of Friesland might be accomplished.

The Province of Groningen took a like resolution.

The person who acted for the Prince of Nassau and the States of Friesland at Amsterdam, on my sending for him, informed me, that the Provinces of Friesland and Groningen were not contented with taking this resolution, and shutting up their treasuries, but had resolved besides to send deputies into all the Provinces of the republic, to represent that the Prince of Orange had acted directly contrary to the union, in sending troops into the Spanish Netherlands, notwithstanding the opposition of these two provinces, and to exhort them to follow their example,, as the only means by which they could remedy these infractions of the union, and also to bring them to accept the conditions proposed by his Majesty on the 29th of April.

These steps appeared to me to be of very great consequence, and I was persuaded that such a deputation, of which there have been but few examples since the peace of Munster, would make a great noise, and could not fail of producing a very good effect, by contributing to the advancement of the peace,

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peace; and that this was the direct way to bring over the other provinces, in case they were not of the same sentiments.

The same person informed me, that the Prince of Orange, thinking to deceive the magistrates of Amsterdam, had caused them to be told some days before, that he was very sorry to see the state the republic was in, both abroad and at home, that he desired them to give him their advice, and to tell him, what they thought might be done to remedy it; and that these gentlemen had replied, that in order to re-establish the tranquillity of the republic, and the repose of its neighbourhood, it was necessary that he should acknowledge the fault he had committed in acting contrary to the laws of the republic, and place things in the state they were in before; banish the Pensionary Fagel from the United Provinces, or at least deprive him of his employments, and that they should accept the conditions offered by his Majesty.

The Count de Waldeck wrote to the States General, that before the 10th of June there would be a large body of troops at Coblentz ready to pass the Rhine in order to succour Luxemburg; that it was only owing to them that these troops were not ready a month sooner. The ministers of the allies, who endeavoured by all possible means to support these suppositions, held a long conference on the 2d of June, in which they drew up an account of the troops, which, about the 10th of June, were to appear before Luxemburg, and which, according to them, amounted to fifty thousand men, and demanded to know of the States General, what they would do on their side; but they only answered them by a compliment. The magistrates of Amsterdam tired of the Count de Waldeck's letters, which made the troops under his command at the camp of Wezbar,

Wezbar, amount to above thirty thousand men, and of the false lists given them by the ministers of the allies, desired one of their friends at Frankfort to go and visit the so much boasted camp at Wezbar, and to write a faithful account of the number of troops that were there. They learnt from him, that there were but four thousand five hundred men; and this letter they shewed in the States of Holland on the 14th of June. At this the Pensionary Fagel was so confounded, that he made no more mention of the Count de Waldeck, or the troops of the allies.

The King informed me, by a letter dated the 30th of May, that he approved very much of the draught of a memorial I had sent him on the part of the magistrates of Amsterdam, and permitted me to give twelve days delay after the taking of Luxemburg. He ordered me to assure the persons in the government of Amsterdam, that they ought never to harbour the least uneasiness about a particular accommodation between the King and the Prince of Orange, and that I could not give them too strong assurances, that the conduct he had till that time observed, ought to give him no room to hope for the least assistance from his Majesty, in relation to his private interest and satisfaction; and that nothing should be able to make him abandon the inhabitants of Amsterdam, while their magistrates behaved with such wisdom as they had hitherto done, and while they acted with such firmness and resolution in opposing every thing capable of ruining their commerce and their liberty.

I wrote to the King on the 2d of June, that I should insert, at the end of my memorial, such menaces as should be thought most proper to bring the States General to agree to the peace; but tho' he wished that I would lose no time in presenting it, the

the persons in the government of Amsterdam earnestly desired me not to do it before Luxemburg was taken; and constantly assured me, that if I offered a delay before that place had surrendered, or while it was in such a state as to be capable of making any farther defence, they would pay no regard to it, let the conditions be ever so advantageous.

I wrote the next day to inform the King, that I did not dare to defer any longer delivering the memorial he had ordered me to present, without giving him a more particular account than I had done the day before, of the reasons which prevented my doing it; that the magistrates of Amsterdam had caused me to be told, that all the members of the assembly of Holland were the day before disposed to send a deputation to me, to know on what conditions his Majesty would still listen to a peace, and that the Pensionary Fagel had only prevented this resolution being taken, by his assuring them that I would present a memorial, and that it was necessary for them to demand what it was my business to offer. The magistrates of Amsterdam replied, that they ought not to rely on these suppositions, which would infallibly ruin them; and protested that they would have no share in the war which would certainly follow, if the States General did not speedily take the best measures.

I had no difficulty in discovering by what means the Pensionary Fagel was informed of the order I had received to grant a delay of ten days after the taking of Luxemburg, when I learnt the next day, that the English envoy had been informed of it by the King his master. I complained of this to the King, and represented the difficulty of bringing that negotiation to a happy conclusion when his secrets were not kept; which they could not be, while the King of England's council were acquainted with

them, since the Prince of Orange knew whatever was conducted there with the greatest secrecy.

The magistrates of Amsterdam therefore caused a representation to be made to me, that if I had that morning given a memorial, I should have authorized the Pensionary Fagel's conduct, justified what he had advanced, and discredited the magistrates of Amsterdam; that they did not yet despair of bringing the other towns to resolve on this deputation; but that if they should not be able to accomplish it, it would be of no service for me to present a memorial before the taking of Luxemburg was known at the Hague. That the case would be much altered when his Majesty had reduced that place under his obedience; that the people of Holland would be astonished at their having let so much time slip to no purpose, and that the proposals I should then make would be received with pleasure.

I was, during the four first days of June under extreme uneasiness; for on the one hand I had the King's express and repeated orders, not to suffer the first of June to pass, on any account whatsoever, without presenting a memorial: but on the other, when I considered that his Majesty only granted this new delay at the request of the magistrates of Amsterdam, who assured me, that if I should make it known before the taking of Luxemburg, they should be so far from being able to make use of it, that it would be made a handle of, to hurt them; and that I myself was more convinced of this truth than they themselves were, I determined not to deliver the memorial; and I wrote to inform his Majesty, that though I clearly saw from my knowledge of what passed in the country, that a memorial presented before the taking of Luxemburg would produce no effect, I should not have presumed to defer the execution of his orders for a quarter of an

hour, merely on account of my own private sentiments; but that I hoped, after the pressing entreaties of the magistrates of Amsterdam, he would pardon me, if I did not do what I knew could not be attended with success, the want of which, after the advice they had given me, would be laid to my charge.

I added, that I had spoke to some others of the well affected, who made no doubt but that the magistrates of Amsterdam would be able, by the assistance of my memorial, to cause a peace or a truce to be concluded on the conditions proposed on the 29th of April; but that they were absolutely of my opinion, that it was necessary that his Majesty should execute his threatenings, if, contrary to all appearance, the magistrates of Amsterdam should not succeed. That otherwise, their labours would only tend to the ruin of all the republicans, and the elevation of the Prince of Orange, who constantly proclaimed, that let them do what they would, they had nothing to fear, and that the King would make no attempt. That it would be great rashness in me to pretend to answer for the success of an affair in a republic, where I saw towns every day changing their sentiments; but as far as I could form a judgment of it, it was morally certain, that if the Prince of Orange should still be able to prevent the States General's returning me an answer, and his Majesty should attack a place in the Netherlands, though it should be only Charleroy, in order to demolish it, there would soon be seen a terrible confusion in Holland; and the States General, far from thinking of succouring it, would make haste to offer his Majesty more advantageous proposals than those they had neglected.

This was all founded on the same principle, that nothing but fear was capable of making the States

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act in opposition to the Prince of Orange and his creatures; thus it appeared, that when the news was spread abroad in Holland, that the King was sending troops to Cologne, in order to advance to Rhineburg, the Provinces of Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overryffel, were ready to rise, and the people were on the point of falling on their magistrates; so that I did not doubt, but that the least step that tended to some new enterprize, in case the delay of twelve days should expire, without producing any effect, would be capable of bringing things into such a situation as his Majesty desired.

The news being arrived at the Hague on the 4th of June, at four in the afternoon, that the city of Luxemburg had surrendered on the first day of the month, the Prince of Orange set out the same day to put himself at the head of the army of the States General, who were greatly offended at his going without informing them of it. As I received this news by a courier from Marshal de Crequy, I the next day presented a memorial to the States General, by which I declared, that having learnt that the city of Luxemburg was reduced on the first day of that month to the obedience of the King my master, I was unwilling to defer letting them know what were his intentions after the taking of that place. That his Majesty had had reason to hope, that after all the expedients he had proposed to them since the 29th of April, for speedily re-establishing the peace with Spain, or at least for preserving their barrier, and maintaining a good correspondence between the King and the States General, they would have returned an answer, which would have no longer left his Majesty any room to doubt of their good intentions; but as they had, without any effect, let slip all the delays he had granted them, and as he had been obliged to put himself in possession

of Luxemburg by force of arms, he found himself in a condition to make new and more considerable conquests, and to encrease his pretensions in relation to the Spaniards, without confining himself any longer to the offers he had made on the 29th of April.

That nevertheless his Majesty, in order to discover that he still persevered in maintaining the same intention, to procure the general welfare of Christendom, by proposing all possible means of obtaining a peace, had commanded me to let them know, that notwithstanding the great advantages he might promise himself from the prosperity of his arms, he was resolved still to remain obliged, during twelve days, reckoning from the day in which Luxemburg was taken, to adhere to the same offers he had made by my memorials of the 29th of April, and of the 9th of May last past, and to all the expedients I had proposed in the conferences I had had on the subject of these memorials, for the preservation of the barrier, and the re-establishment of peace in the Netherlands.

That his Majesty was led to give so much the more willingly, this new proof of his moderation, by his being glad of an opportunity of seconding the good intentions of those who, wishing for the welfare of their country in particular, and for that of all Christendom in general, had shewn a great desire to procure a speedy re-establishment of the peace, and to keep up a good correspondence with his Majesty; therefore, as the sending of their troops into the Spanish Netherlands, had determined his Majesty to put himself at the head of his armies, in order to pursue the just satisfaction that was his due, so the knowledge his Majesty had obtained, that the States had hindered these troops from performing any act of hostility against his, had induced him to

give still on their account, this delay of twelve days after the taking of Luxemburg.

That his Majesty hoped, that the States General would improve it, either by concluding and signing the treaty he had proposed, jointly with the King of Spain, or by concluding and signing it by themselves, on the conditions he had so often proposed for the preservation of the barrier, and the re-establishment of the peace of the Netherlands; and that they would declare their resolution within the term of twelve days after the taking of Luxemburg, because his Majesty resolved to know exactly what he had to expect from them, protesting, that if they let the time slip without giving him a positive answer, his Majesty would no longer stop on any account, and from thence forward would regulate his demands and pretensions only by the success which it should please God to give to the justice of his arms.

I did not make use of the same terms which the magistrates of Amsterdam had put at the end of their draught of a memorial, because they seemed inserted only to inspire fear, and because these gentlemen themselves thought the above expressions had more dignity, and would have a greater effect, since, without offering any menaces to the States General, in particular, it left them room to apprehend every thing.

The King informed me, that as I must have learnt by a courier from Marshal de Crequy, the news of the taking of Luxemburg, he persuaded himself, that I had not lost a moment's time in presenting a memorial, and that it was even to be wished that I had done it sooner.

That I ought above all things to let the deputies of the States General know, that they had no longer any time to lose, if they had any desire to maintain a good correspondence between his crown and the United

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Provinces; and that after so many delays granted by him to re-establish the peace, they might well judge that it would be contrary to prudence, for him to suffer his arms to remain any longer unemployed, at least if his offers were not speedily accepted. However, he added, that as he was persuaded, that they would be complied with, he should return to Versailles, and leave orders with Marshal de Crequy to execute his projects.

The King's departure made me apprehend, that the States General would not feel so strong a sense of fear as would be necessary to engage them to make a peace, and I was the more convinced of this, as I had been informed the day before, by the envoy of Holstein, who being brother to the deputy of the circle of Franconia, had certain intelligence, that the Prince of Orange was assured, not only by the letters of the ambassador of the States General at London, but by the King of England himself, that the French King would not attack any place in the Netherlands after the taking of Luxemburg; this the Prince of Orange had represented in the strongest light to the allies, without reckoning what the Pensionary Fagel had declared on the 20th of May to the States of Holland; and though I had informed M. de Barillon by three letters successively, of what importance it was, that the envoy of England should undeceive the States General and their allies, and remove these impressions that might prevent the conclusion of the peace; and though he had wrote to me, that this envoy had received such orders, Chudley had assured me, that nothing had been wrote to him about it, and that he had been only ordered to exhort the States General to improve the delay of ten days given by the King after the taking of Luxemburg. From hence I was under great apprehensions, lest the Pensionary Fagel should re-
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vive their hopes as soon as he was informed of the King's speedy return to Versailles, by persuading them, that this was the effect of the secret convention between his Majesty and the King of England; for they were too well accustomed to see the King desirous of animating his troops by his presence, to believe that they would undertake any thing of importance when he was not there. Besides, I did not doubt, that the well affected would be under great uneasiness at their hearing of the King's departure, before the province of Holland had deliberated on the memorial; for they knew the terror his presence impressed on the minds of the people of Holland, and that this was the strongest argument by which they could have backed his menaces, and the most powerful means of leading the States General to accept his offers.

I had not finished the reading of my letter, when the States General brought me the resolution they had that morning taken, which was to this effect:

That the delay of twelve days granted by his Majesty was so short, that it was impossible for them within the time limited, to enter into any deliberation in the Provinces of the States General, much less with the ministers of his catholic Majesty, and their allies; that therefore they desired a sufficient time to communicate these last offers to their provinces and their allies, and to receive their answers.

They likewise said, that they believed it was his Majesty's intention, that the accommodation should be universal, and extend to all their allies, and that all disputes that had arisen in any part of the world whatsoever, whether in the north or the south, should cease.

I answered, on the first point, that it was unnecessary to give a longer delay to the Spaniards, who were principally concerned. That the Marquis de

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Grana had sufficient powers; and however, the King had removed this inconvenience by his offering to remain obliged, during six weeks, to adhere to the conditions that should be regulated by a treaty at the Hague, provided that Spain would ratify them in good and due form within six weeks. That with regard to the States General, the term of twelve days was sufficient, and that they would have thirteen, if Luxemburg did not surrender before the third. And as I knew it was really difficult to obtain an answer within twelve days from the distant provinces, I told them, that if they demanded delays only to make an ill use of them, the King would be as far from granting them, as he would be indulgent, when nothing but the form of their government prevented their giving me a resolution of all the provinces: as for example, if at the end of the eight days which remained, the provinces of Holland, Gelderland, Utrecht, Friesland, and Overijssel, came and declared to me, that they had accepted the proposals, and that a day or two was only wanting to receive the resolutions of Zealand and Groningen, I would intreat his Majesty to permit me to sign the treaty a day or two later; but if the provinces, that might come to a determination within eight days, did not do it, they ought to expect, that so far from giving them a quarter of an hour's delay, his Majesty would make use of his arms to obtain the just satisfaction that was his due. This declaration laid me under no engagement, for I knew that when the province of Holland, which had no need of eight days, had come to a resolution on this affair, I might depend on its being infallibly concluded. However, this let them see, that the King did not pretend to impose conditions on them, which they could not accomplish, and that he proceeded in a fair and equitable manner.

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In regard to the second point, I replied, that it was the King's intention to procure the peace of all Christendom; and it was certain, that as soon as the States General should have accepted his Majesty's proposals, all other differences would soon be terminated. And as they spoke of those which subsisted between the King of Denmark and the Duke of Holstein, I shewed them, that these were things that had no relation to what were to be treated of at the Hague; besides, that the King had offered, and offered still, that if there was a truce with the Empire, or with Spain, or with them both, it should be common to his allies, in case they would accept of it; so that they would be neither incommoded nor disturbed in the possessions they enjoyed.

At the breaking up of this conference, I told the Danish ambassador the answer I had given the States General, at which he seemed extremely satisfied; and we agreed that he should complain of their having mentioned an affair relating to the King his master, and of their not having addressed themselves to him. But Mr. Dickfeld, who had mentioned it to me, told him, that I had spoke of it first, and the States sent him their resolution, to let him see, that no notice was taken of it there. We were not displeased at this answer, and this denial made us imagine that these gentlemen had only mentioned it, in order to sound my sentiments, without being willing to give themselves much concern about such affairs.

The magistrates of Amsterdam were not less satisfied with the explications I had given the States General. They caused me to be told, that it would be of great service in undeceiving those in whom the Pensionary Fagel was willing to create a belief, that the King desired impossibilities, or things

which did not depend on them; but it was necessary, after these explications, that those who believed that the Low Countries were in a state of safety, when the States General took no resolution, should see preparations that would persuade them, that they ought to entertain quite contrary sentiments; and that in the mean time, I should offer no menaces, because they would imagine that I only intended to intimidate them. I therefore resolved to sit still, and imagined that the King's interest required, that after I had laid before them what his Majesty had offered them, what he desired from them, and the consequences which their refusal or negligence might draw upon them, I should appear very indifferent; since this would make them think the more of what I might say to them; provided, that they were informed, that the King's troops were preparing to undertake some enterprize after the term should be expired.

The envoy of Hanover came to see me the day after this conference, and represented with more warmth than the States General had done, the injustice of the King of Denmark's keeping Holstein, the contributions he drew without the least right from the duchy of Mecklenburg, and his designs on the city of Hamburg. I returned him the same answers I had made to the States General; that these things neither came within my knowledge, nor within my ministry; that it was sufficient, I had promised the States General, in the King's name, that from the day in which the treaty should be signed at the Hague, his Majesty granted the diet of Ratisbon one month for the acceptance of the truce, on the conditions he had offered; and if there was any thing more to be regulated, this might be done at the diet of Ratisbon.

However, I wrote to the King, that if the States General pressed me still farther on this subject, I would

would conform myself to the orders he had given me on the seventh of May; but that I should find myself much more embarrassed, if they should tell me, that it was not just to stipulate by a treaty, that they should give no assistance against his Majesty's allies, at the same time that he preserved the liberty of acting against the allies of the States General; that if the thing in dispute had been only the interests of Spain, this clause might stand, as his Majesty had expressed it; but that there were Princes in Germany, without reckoning the King of Sweden, with whom they had entered into alliances; that if these Princes had any disputes with the crown of Denmark, it would not be just in the States to abandon them, while the King assisted Denmark. That I did not doubt, but that the Pensionary Fagel would raise this difficulty; for as to what regarded the States General, I could see no probability, after they had refused to enter into a war with his Majesty for the preservation of Luxemburg, of their being willing to engage in one to support the interests of Sweden.

On the seventh of June the magistrates of Amsterdam demanded their papers by a memorial; but they could not obtain them.

The envoy of Spain presented the same day a memorial to the States General, which contained, that he had received no advice of Luxemburg's having surrendered the first of June; but that though it should be taken, he still declared, what he had so often affirmed, that the King his master would never accept of the unjust and impracticable proposals of France, and would neither make a peace nor a truce without having Luxemburg; since it was impossible for him, without that place, to preserve the rest of the Netherlands, principally on account of the separation it would occasion between Ger-

many and the Netherlands. That all their allies had ever been so sensible of the importance of Luxemburg, as well for the defence of the rest of the Low-Countries, as for the safety and liberty of the Empire and the United Provinces, that they had been of opinion, that every thing ought to be hazarded for its preservation, which also secured that of the circle of Burgundy. That France was not contented with sowing division in the Republic of Holland, but would also, by new artifices, make a breach between that Republic and its allies, by asserting that the States General had prevented the troops they had sent into Flanders for the defence of the Spanish Netherlands, from performing any act of hostility against those of his most Christian Majesty. That he had declared, and declared still, that he had no power, and that he should receive none to sign the proposals of France; and that no power in Europe could ever make the King of Spain agree to these proposals; that therefore he hoped the States General and the other allies of Spain would take such measures, either by treaties, or by force of arms, that Luxemburg might be restored into the possession of his most Catholic Majesty.

This memorial was confirmed by the letters received this day at the Hague, by which they were informed, that Luxemburg had not surrendered on the third. There needed no more to suspend all the deliberations they had begun on my memorial of the fifth: so true it is, that these people were only conducted by fear, and that a memorial, presented before the surrender of Luxemburg, would have been entirely useless: but the news of the taking of that place being arrived on the eighth, and the Pensionary Fagel finding that all his stratagems were exhausted, resolved to break up the assembly of Holland; but the magistrates of Amsterdam

dam declared, that if the deputies of the province were separated, without taking a resolution on my memorial, they would take their measures by themselves, and would no longer contribute to the support of the state. The Pensionary Fagel was struck at this declaration, and turned extremely pale; and it became impossible for him, notwithstanding all his endeavours, to separate the assembly before they had taken a resolution on the King's offers. The affair was brought on, and all the deputies unanimously resolved to press the Spaniards to agree to an accommodation; and on its being necessary, for that purpose, to have a conference that very morning with the ministers of the allies, eleven of the principal towns were of opinion, that they ought to sign the treaty with the King, either with or without the consent of Spain: but the others having no instructions about it, it was resolved that they should speak to the Spanish envoy, and that then, from his answer, they would know what they had to do.

They immediately carried this resolution to the States General, who agreed to it. The deputies of Friesland and Groningen, explained themselves on this occasion, according to custom, in very strong terms, in relation to the necessity of a speedy accommodation, and gave in writing the protests they had for a long time prepared, declaring that if, for want of accepting, in time, the proposals the King of France had offered for concluding a peace, or a truce, the States should become engaged in the war, they would not pretend to enter into it in any manner whatsoever; and that they would rather separate themselves from the other provinces, which, by their ill conduct, had thrown the States General into this precipice.

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The deputies of the States General had, on the ninth, the conference with the Spanish envoy, which had been before resolved upon, when they made use of as strong terms as they were able: but that minister only replied by passionate expressions, and such an extravagant behaviour, that the envoys of Sweden and Lunenburg durst not support what he advanced; but endeavoured, in an indirect manner, to retard these affairs, under the specious name of a general accommodation. On the report which the deputies of the province of Holland made to the States General on this conference, they separated, in order to go and consult their superiors, on condition of their returning on the 13th of the same month, so as to assemble on the 14th in the morning, under the penalty of paying a large fine. The magistrates of Amsterdam informed me, that the Pensionary Fagel had laid before the assembly four principal points, which, he said, had been proposed by the allies, on which the deputies had orders to know the opinion of their towns, at the same time that they demanded their sentiments on my memorial.

The first point was, that during the truce, the Prince of Orange should not be obliged to pay fealty and homage to the King of France for his estates of Wianden, St. Witt, and others, which he possessed in the province of Luxemburg.

The second, that this Prince should be re-established in the peaceful possession of Orange as formerly.

The third related to the decree concerning his estates, for which the Princess of Isenghien was at law.

And the fourth was, that the King should consent not to interfere in the disputes between the King of Denmark and the Duke of Holstein.

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The States General had the same day a long conference with the envoys of England and Brandenburg, relating to the affairs of Holstein, and the interests of the Prince of Orange. I was informed of it by my friends; for these two envoys did not speak to me about it, till the letters were sent for England and Berlin. That of Brandenburg came first to tell me, that they were resolved to demand a declaration from his Majesty, that he would not interfere in the disputes between the King of Denmark and the Duke of Holstein.

That as to what related to the Prince of Orange, he did not insist on his not paying fealty and homage to the King, but only on his not being obliged to do it in person; that he had not engaged to make any kind of application to me, nor even to the King of France, but only to his master the Elector of Brandenburg, and that he had given his reason for it to the States General, which was, that the Elector had only charged him to speak to the Prince of Orange, in order to persuade him to become reconciled to his Majesty; and that if the Prince was pleased to return a favourable answer to the advances made him, he had orders to dispatch immediately a courier to the envoy the Elector his master had in France; but that the Prince of Orange having rejected it, he had nothing to say about it. These kind of advances made by the Elector of Brandenburg, produced no accommodation, with respect to the general affairs; and all the assurances I could give, did not quiet people's minds, when they were informed, that the peace only depended on the Prince of Orange's entering into the good graces of the King; more especially as that envoy had already told the magistrates of Amsterdam, that the King had assured the Elector of Brandenburg, that if the Prince of Orange took one
step,

step, he would take ten, and that this was the reason of the Elector's pressing the Prince of Orange to enter into an accommodation.

It is certain that the envoy of Brandenburg resolved to improve this opportunity, in order to ingratiate himself with the Prince of Orange; and to effect this, he endeavoured to draw him out of the embarrassment he was in, before the peace was concluded, as he imagined, that the Prince would not easily extricate himself, when the public disputes were at an end. With this view he resolved to render himself mediator between the Prince of Orange and the magistrates of Amsterdam, alledging, that the Elector his master had ordered him to re-unite the republic.

In a letter I wrote to the King on the 10th of June, I recapitulated all that had passed till that time, and gave a plan of the present state of my negotiation, in which I observed, that the Pensionary Fagel, and the envoys of Sweden and Lunenburg, finding that they could not directly oppose the peace, endeavoured to prevent the conclusion of it, by all the incidents that might arise from the interest of the Prince of Orange, and the disputes between the King of Denmark and the Duke of Holstein. I at last enumerated the difficulties I had foreseen these envoys would raise, and the answers I resolved to make to them, if the States General mentioned them to me, before I could have the honour of receiving his Majesty's orders.

That what related to the Prince of Orange was divided into three points. That he should not be bound during the truce to pay fealty and homage to the King for the lands he possessed in the province of Luxemburg. That he should be established in the principality of Orange as formerly; and that a

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stop should be put to the suit at law, carried on by the Princess of Isenghien for his estates.

I assured his Majesty, that I should not suffer any of these things to be put into the treaty, because they did not belong to it. That I would say, with respect to the first point, that to deprive his Majesty of the fealty and homage which was his due, would be not leaving his Majesty in possession of what he enjoyed; and that this implied a contradiction.

As to what related to the principality of Orange, that this Prince was established in it, conformably to what had been regulated by the treaty of Nimègue; and that therefore nothing was left to be stipulated on that subject. That the assignment by which it was given to him was the consequence of a suit at law, which lasted all the time the house of Nassau was in the possession of that principality; and that the King left a free course to justice in his kingdom.

That I should return nearly the same answer on the decree which the Princess of Isenghien had obtained against the Prince of Orange.

The envoy of Lunenburg did not stop only at the discussion of the disputes between the King of Denmark and the Duke of Holstein; but pretended that it was not just that the King of Denmark should remain in possession of the duchy of Holstein, of the countries of Mecklenburg, Jever, and other places he then possessed; nor that, during a truce of twenty years, he should raise contributions in them. He added to this, that the King of Denmark had resolved to besiege Hamburg; that the house of Lunenburg would rather suffer itself to be reduced to the last extremity, than ever permit this to be done; that the King of Sweden would also oppose it with all his forces; that if France succoured the King of Denmark, and the States General assisted the King
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of Sweden and the house of Lunenburg, the feat of the war would only be changed : and from all this he concluded, that if the King resolved to stipulate, that the States should not perform any act of hostility against his allies, they could not, without forfeiting their honour, avoid making the demand, that his Majesty likewise should not act against their allies.

That as to what related to the disputes between the King of Denmark and the Duke of Holstein, I should strive as much as I was able not to enter into these questions, and to refer them to the diet of Ratisbon ; but if I found they put a stop to the signing of the peace, I should execute the King's orders, which required, that the truce to be made at the Hague should be common to all the allies ; so that they should neither be incommoded nor disturbed, any more than his Majesty, in the possessions they held on the first of August, 1681.

That as to what related to the siege of Hamburg, I should shew to the States General, that I was entirely unacquainted with it ; however, they ought not to doubt, that when the King should conclude his treaty with the Empire, all the other disputes would be soon decided ; but that this was not a question that could be decided at the Hague, where nothing was to be determined but the affairs of Spain.

That I should be more embarrassed about the clause which the King had resolved I should insert, that the States General should not act against his allies ; for they would doubtless tell me, that as the King only made a treaty with them in relation to Spain, he could only require the States General's not performing any act of hostility against his Majesty's allies, in favour of the Spaniards ; but that the differences between his Majesty and some Princes of the Empire not being terminated, the alliances that

that subsisted both on the one side and the other, and the reciprocal ability of assisting their allies, still remained. That the case was not the same with respect to the treaty of Nimeguen, in which the King, by restoring many places to the allies of the States, made it equally necessary for the States General to restore others to his Majesty's allies, or to suffer him to retake them.

That I ought not to omit that they might object to me, that the King demanded, with respect to Spain, cessions, renunciations, &c. but making only at the Hague a treaty on a truce, Spain ought not to cede or renounce; and that it was sufficient that the Spaniards should, within six weeks, ratify in good and due form the treaty of a truce that should be concluded at the Hague. His Majesty acknowledged it, and wrote that he desired nothing more.

I sent in the same dispatch, a memorial, presented by the envoy of Spain to the States General, on the ninth of June, by which he again shewed, that after the particular declarations he had made on the seventh, of his having no power to sign the unjust proposals of France, to which the King his master would never agree; he was surprized to see in one of my memorials, that they had represented to me, that the delay of twelve days was too short for them to be able to enter into deliberations with the ministers of his Catholic Majesty; since they had nothing to deliberate upon, in relation to the proposals of France and these delays, either with him, with the governor of the Netherlands, or with any Spanish minister whatsoever; that all the States General had to deliberate amongst themselves was, whether they would violate the friendship and the treaties they had made with the King of Spain; whether they would abandon the Netherlands, and break the obligation they were under to assist his
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Catholic Majesty, in what part of the world soever he should be engaged in war; and whether they would separate themselves from all their other allies.

That France, ever since the peace of Nimeguen, had only endeavoured to prevail on the States General, not to join in the defence of the Netherlands; but that though the States shou'd abandon them, the King of Spain, while he had a soldier there, would not cease making war on France. In a word, that neither the King his master, nor the Emperor would accept of either a peace or a truce, but, by a general and common treaty, resolved, concluded, and signed at the same time, and comprehending all their allies.

The Prince of Orange's creatures, and the Austrian ministers imagined, that these declarations made by the envoy of Spain, the discussion of the differences subsisting between the King of Denmark and the Duke of Holstein, the affairs of Mecklenburg, and the interests of the Prince of Orange, were not capable of preventing the conclusion of the treaty; they therefore resolved to cause fresh memorials to be presented on the 12th of June, by all the allies; to the end that this might make a greater impression on the towns that were actually deliberating on my propositions.

The envoy of Spain's memorial appeared the first. He declared, that though he had made known in the last conference he had with them the day before, the importance and necessity that the accommodation of the differences that had arisen between the crown of France and the republic of Genoa, should form a part of the general accommodation; nevertheless, as he had that same day received orders from Spain, he found himself obliged to declare to them, in the name, and on the part of the King his master, that the fate of the Republic of Genoa

was

was inseparably connected with the interest of his Catholic Majesty, not only on account of the necessity of his supporting the Republic of Genoa, in order to preserve the liberty of all Italy, and a free trade in the Levant, but also on account of a point of honour, to which the King of Spain found himself bound to adhere, since the Genoese, though they saw their city reduced to ashes, had resolved not to lose the honour of his Catholic Majesty's friendship, notwithstanding France had strove to force them to it: therefore the King of Spain, from his gratitude for so noble, so firm, and so heroic an action, had resolved to make neither a peace nor a truce with France, without the inclusion and satisfaction of the Republic of Genoa, which he considered as one of his most faithful allies.

This memorial was followed by those of the resident of the Emperor, the envoy of Holstein, and the envoy of Lorrain. The envoy of Holstein declared, to the deputies of Amsterdam, who were at the assembly of the States General, that he would not pretend that the interest of his master ought to stop the general affairs; that he only desired the States General, as guarantee of the treaty of Rastchild, to prevail on his Majesty, who had been pleased to guaranty the treaty of Fontainebleau, to cause his master to be re-established in his dominions.

The deputies of the towns of Holland returned on the 13th at night; those of Amsterdam caused me to be told, that they would demand the seal to be taken off their papers; but in such a manner as to let it be seen that they would absolutely have it done; and that they had eight deputies, in order that their opinions might be supported with the greater vigour: that they had resolved to oblige the Pensionary Fagel to form a conclusion on a majority
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of votes; and that if he refused, they would oblige him to leave the assembly of Holland, and cause the conclusion to be drawn up by the Pensionary of Dort, or by that of some other of the towns.

That in case Fagel should, either by reasonings, seduction, menaces, or otherwise, hinder the States of Holland from agreeing on a majority of voices, to make the truce on the conditions of the 29th of April, they had brought strong protests, which they would deliver in writing, with a plain and full declaration, that they would separate themselves from the other members of the state.

They had already begun to execute the declaration they had made of their having resolved not to contribute to the support of the state; for they had forbid their receiver-general to pay for any thing in their name out of the money in the public chest. And two days after they shut up their treasury, and declared to the States of Holland, that they would steadily maintain their resolution till they had given them satisfaction on the restitution of their papers.

As I had let them know, that including the affairs of the north, and the interests of the Prince of Orange, would be obstacles to the peace, they informed me, that they had resolved in their city, not to put a stop to the treaty on either of these two affairs; that they would be satisfied, that with regard to those of the Prince of Orange, I should take upon myself the task of writing about them to his Majesty; and this they should recommend, in order to avoid shewing any personal resentment against that Prince. That as to those of the north, they should make a slight attempt, but should not insist upon them.

I informed the King, that affairs could not be in a better situation, since the sentiments of this city

were commonly embraced by many other members of the States General.

That if the Prince of Orange had such authority as to prevent the opinions of the magistrates of Amsterdam from being followed, a part of the States General would engage in a war, which they could not support for three months; and that the King might, whenever he pleased, put an end to it by a peace, that would firmly re-establish the republican party; that this was the effect of his Majesty's goodness, in not raising his pretensions after the taking of Luxemburg, which had established such an entire confidence in his word, that there were none, except the partisans of the Prince of Orange, who did not acknowledge, that his Majesty loved the Republic; and that he was sincerely desirous of procuring the peace.

That on the contrary, the Prince of Orange's steps made it evident, that he thought of nothing but of involving the States in a fatal war; and the camp he had formed at Notre Dame de Hall, without the orders of the States General, and contrary to their intention, was one of the things that best shewed his designs, and that did him the most injury.

The deputies the States General came to me on the 14th of June, at seven in the evening, and brought me the resolution they had taken that day, which was to the following purpose; that having examined the memorial I had given on the seventh of the same month, and the report made to them by their deputies, on the conference they had with me on the subject of that memorial, they had thought proper to represent to me, that they were inclined to persuade the King of Spain to accept the truce on the conditions I had proposed on the 29th of April, and on the ninth of May, on condition the accom-

accommodation was universal, as well with respect to the Empire as the north; and they would gladly consult with me, what were the most proper methods of treating on this affair, and of knowing what security they ought mutually to give, desiring that for this purpose a longer delay might be granted.

I replied, that the King was certainly resolved to obtain a peace; that I had no need to alledge any other proof of it besides those his Majesty himself had been pleased to give, by his still adhering, after the taking of Luxemburg, to the same conditions he had before offered; and besides this, he still consented to remain obliged, for the space of a month, reckoning from the day when the treaty should be signed at the Hague, to adhere to the same conditions he had proposed to the Empire; that this was all that depended on his Majesty, all he had offered them, and all they could reasonably demand. That if afterwards any thing should give them just cause for uneasiness, his Majesty had granted them too many proofs of the care he had of their repose, for them to believe that he would suffer them to be troubled by other means; and if they would finish at the Hague the affairs between France and Spain, they ought not to doubt of his Majesty's freely making use of his endeavours to procure them whatever would contribute to their satisfaction; but that it was neither just nor reasonable to endeavour to oblige me to enter into any convention on this subject, either by articles to be inserted in the treaty between France and Spain, or by separate articles, since if they acted in this manner, they would infensibly fall, under the pretence of the affairs of the north, and those of the south, into the labyrinth of a general treaty, which had been attempted for three years together, by those who desired to involve all Europe in a general war, under the pretence of a
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general accommodation; and that this was what they still attempted under other terms, and in another manner. That this vague proposal about the disputes in the north made it evidently appear, whatever apparent colour they were able to give it, that it was only invented by those, who not daring directly to oppose the peace, endeavoured to raise so many obstacles to it, that the States General should be obliged to let the time pass, in which his Majesty had consented to remain bound by his proposals, without coming to any conclusion; and to repeat it once more, nothing else could be demanded of me, except I should treat at the Hague of the affairs of Spain, on the conditions proposed by his Majesty; that those which related to the Empire ought to be decided at Ratisbon; and, in short, that they might be concluded there, since his Majesty would there adhere to the same conditions he had already offered. - That those who composed that diet were men of wisdom and learning, who had the interest of the Empire at heart, and would labour successfully to establish its repose. In short, that if the States General were resolved neither to consent to a peace nor a truce between France and Spain, and to refuse the offers made by his Majesty for establishing the tranquillity of the Low Countries, and the safety of the barrier, unless I would engage to concert with them articles relating to things that were neither included in my ministry, nor came within my knowledge, it would be a great misfortune to Christendom, and the King having nothing to reproach himself with, I hoped that God would always continue to bless his arms. But if, on the contrary, they were satisfied with the offers of terminating, by a speedy accommodation, the disputes which had arisen between France and Spain, in order that peace might be restored to their neighbourhood,

bourhood, that the safety of their barrier might be provided for, and the tranquillity of the Empire re-established by a truce of twenty years, I would repeat it to them, that in this case, I was ready immediately to sign the treaty, and at the same time, to make such representations to the King my master, as they should please to charge me with.

That as to the prorogation of the delay, and their desiring to know at what day they ought to reckon that the twelve days began, I might reply, that the governor of Luxemburg had signed the capitulation on the fourth of June, in virtue of which that place passed into his Majesty's possession; and therefore they ought to reckon that that city belonged to the King from that day: but some of their deputies having objected, that the King's troops were not in possession of any of the city gates till the morning of the sixth, I had repeated to them what I had already declared in my answer of the seventh of the same month, that I should not insist on these two days, and that I would consent to commence the account of the twelve days from the sixth: they had therefore no need of any farther time, if they would employ what they had in a useful manner; but as I had already told them, that I would regulate this, according as I saw them seriously endeavour to obtain a peace, and they were only stopped by the form of their government, I was obliged to tell them, that I was sorry to find that they were not stopped by any thing of this nature; but by difficulties that were foreign to the present business, and by conditions which they were willing to impose on his Majesty's offers, that would destroy the possibility of their receiving them. That therefore I had told them, that if they were as sincerely desirous of a general peace as they pretended, the most speedy and the most certain expedient they could

could take, would be to agree fully and without restriction to his Majesty's offers, which I desired them to do, if this was their intention, before the term was expired, it not being in my power to grant any delay, they themselves being sufficiently able to judge that it would be imprudent in the King to lose, by new delays, the advantages offered him by the season, and those he might reasonably expect from the good condition of his army.

I informed the King that in this conference I had found the means to acquaint the partisans of the Prince of Orange, who were present, that their secret design, which was no other than that of engaging me in negotiations that could not be finished in many months, would inevitably involve all Europe in the war; that I had drawn from them, by several questions, that they only desired to know, if his Majesty would reconcile the differences in the north; that when they informed me that they were desirous of entering into a particular convention between his Majesty and the States General, by which the affairs in the north should be regulated, they included in these affairs the interest of the Duke of Holstein, those of Mecklenburg, those of Jever, those of Grietfil, those of the town of Dockster, those of the house of Lunenburg, and the complaints made by the King of Sweden of his Majesty's not allowing him to send troops into Germany. In short, they resolved to collect whatever they could think of, to prevent the affair being ever terminated: that I even suspected that they would do something more, and that I should no sooner have yielded so far as to tell them, that his Majesty would reconcile the differences in the north, than they would not only, on this account, put a sudden stop to the conclusion of the treaty with Spain, but would entirely put an end to it, in

order to engage in a convention which had so little possibility of being attended with success.

That they insinuated, that this was not the first time in which Princes had been brought to agree to prevent others entering into a war; that measures might even be taken between his Majesty and the States General, by which they would fix on certain conditions capable of putting an end to all the disputes between these princes; and that, at the same time, they should agree not to assist those who would not accept of them. At length they represented, that it would be unjust not to conclude a peace in the north, since his Majesty might assist his allies there, and the States General would be obliged to abandon theirs. I replied, in answer to this article, what is mentioned above.

The deputies of the States General did not mention the affairs of the Prince of Orange. In regard to those of Lorrain, they only engaged to make use of their good offices to his Majesty.

The States General having acquainted the States of Holland with my answers, these last put the affair under deliberation, and unanimously resolved, on the 14th at night, to press the Spaniards to accept his Majesty's offers.

The next day, which was the 15th, the States of Holland assembled again to read my answer, which I had put into writing; when they confirmed the resolution of the preceding day, and in consequence of this, the deputies to the States General, who had orders from their provinces to conform themselves to the opinion of Holland, resolved that after dinner they would have a conference with their allies, to invite them to press the Spaniards to accept his Majesty's offers; and the States of Holland resolved, that if the Spanish envoy refused them, they
would

would assemble the next day to take a definitive conclusion.

I could not tell what this conclusion would be, I only knew that the nobles had always formerly opposed the acceptance of the King's offers; but that out of the eighteen towns in Holland there were already sixteen who were for receiving them, in spite of the opposition of Spain: that Rotterdam was one of the two that was still in the opposition; and that as this was a powerful city, and its Magistrates were devoted to the Prince of Orange, they could not be certain of making them change, unless the populace should oblige them to it. I was informed that the other was Medenblick, a small town in North Holland, to which very little attention was paid.

The magistrates of Amsterdam, and all the well affected were pleased with my answer, and very much approved my having assured them of his Majesty's disposition to remedy every thing capable of involving the States General in the war, from its being necessary to deprive the Prince of Orange's creatures of the pretext they made use of, in order to intimidate weak minds, by making them believe that the King would make war against them in an indirect manner, by means of the King of Denmark and the Elector of Cologne. They were besides very glad that I had advanced nothing that would give the Pensionary Fagel a pretence for saying, that it was necessary to go and consult the towns, and thus to consume the short time that remained.

I did not fail to inform the ambassador of Denmark of what had been said in this conference in relation to the King his master. He came on the 15th to bring me a memorial, which he resolved to present to the States General, in which he said that

Jever was a fief disputed for by the Kings of France and Spain. I was apprehensive lest they should conclude from this, that the affair regarded Spain, and consequently ought to be treated of at the Hague; and on this account I made him leave out this article.

The King wrote to me on the 12th, that he was satisfied with what I had answered on the brevity of the delay of twelve days, and on what related to the differences between the King of Denmark and the Duke of Holstein, in regard to which I might add, that this was a family affair, that ought to be adjusted between these Princes themselves, and in which his Majesty would not pretend to interfere. That he was very glad to observe to me still, that the interest of his allies ought only to enter into the treaty he entered into with the Empire, and that the offers he had made at Ratisbon of a truce of twenty years, ought to leave all things both on the one side and the other, in the state they were in on the first of August, 1681. That nothing more could be stipulated in favour of the said allies, whether they desired to be included in the treaty signed by me, or whether they insisted on being comprised in that of the Empire; and that in both cases, the possession on the first of August, 1681, ought provisionally to regulate all differences of every kind, except those relating to Strasburg and its dependencies.

That he had made known to me, by his dispatch of the sixth of June, all that I ought to discover to the well affected, and by their means to the principal towns in Holland, and the most considerable provinces, in order to undeceive them, with respect to the hopes with which the Prince of Orange would inspire them; that his Majesty would not undertake any thing more during the rest of the campaign; and that if they should let the time he had granted them

them expire to no purpose, his army would act with the same vigour, as if it was animated by his presence; and therefore they ought not to imagine, that if their troops should be found in the places attacked by his, they could be able to preserve that neutrality to which they made pretensions, nor that he would engage not to attack the barrier, if they did not give him, by a good treaty, all the security I had demanded on his part, so that he might employ those troops elsewhere, which he had then in Flanders.

That he did not doubt but that the clause which the States had put at the end of their answer in these terms, "That therefore all the differences shall likewise cease, which have arisen in any part of the world whatsoever, as well in the north as the south," had some relation to what his fleet had just performed before Genoa; that he was willing, if this affair should stop the conclusion of the treaty, that I should promise, in his name, in an article of the treaty, that he would not take possession of Genoa, nor of any place or country which depended on it, either by force of arms, or by any other way whatsoever: but that if this city continued to give him cause for shewing his resentment, he would not deprive himself of the liberty of chastising it in the manner he had already done by means of his vessels.

His Majesty added, in this letter, that he was assured the envoy of England had received very positive orders to undeceive the States General with respect to the opinion of his having entered into an agreement with the King of Great Britain not to attack the places in the Netherlands; but that they might soon be convinced of the contrary by the actions performed by his army. In the mean while he consented that I should not make any proposal on his part, and permitted me only, in case those I had made in his name should be accepted, to sign the

treaty, till he had expressly recalled the power he had given me, or had made new demands. But I took particular care not to explain myself on this permission, even to the well affected, before they had actually accepted his offers.

In my answer to this letter, I observed, that I had behaved in the conferences I had had with the States General, according to the principles his Majesty had laid down, viz. that the interest of his allies ought only to be determined by the treaty he made with the Empire; that therefore I had always maintained, that every thing of this kind ought to be referred to the diet of Ratisbon. That the States General had not yet raised any difficulties on his Majesty's not allowing them to grant any assistance against his allies, and that none but the ministers of the allies had moved this affair; but that if the States General stopped at this, I should not hazard breaking the treaty, by inserting that clause in the manner in which the Danish ambassador pretended that it ought to be understood; for he had already told me, that the King of Denmark would have great cause for complaint, if, after having drawn many enemies upon his hands, his Majesty did not indefinitely oblige the States General not to give any assistance against his allies; and that I should follow his Majesty's intentions, which were plainly expressed in the memorial of the 17th of February, and in his letter of the 20th of last April, which declared, that the States General should give no assistance in any place whatsoever, either against his Majesty or against his allies, in favour of the Spaniards.

The Danish ambassador was a man of great wit, and this was exceeding delicate: but he could not however avoid sometimes discovering, that he saw with regret the measures I took with the States General,

neral, to obtain a peace; and that he would have been very glad to have had the King his master improve this opportunity making an advantageous war.

In the mean time all at the Hague were under an inexpressible agitation. The States General had, on the 15th, pressed the envoy of Spain to accept his Majesty's offers, to which that minister had only answered by reproaches and abuse. The others, except that of Hanover, made but little noise; however that of Sweden spoke with great heat, and said, that if the States General concluded such a treaty, he would protest in writing, that this was acting contrary to their alliances, and violating their veracity. The Prince of Orange's creatures had never before formed so many plots and cabals to prevent the acceptance of his Majesty's offers.

The States of Holland being assembled on the 16th, at eight o'clock in the morning, the disputes and debates were carried on with great warmth. I informed his Majesty, that I could not relate all the particulars; that I could have only the honour to tell him, that there being only the voice of the nobles, and that of Rotterdam, contrary to the common opinion, they had summoned the Pensionary Fagel to form a conclusion, and on his refusal very bitter expressions were uttered on both sides; when the seventeen towns declaring, that they would consider the affair as concluded, Fagel found himself forced, on that account, to form the resolution, after which they agreed to assemble at three in the afternoon, and desired the States General to assemble at the same hour. That the States of Holland, in order to shew how much they had this affair at heart, instead of sending their resolution, according to custom, by the deputy they had there, went all in a body (except the nobles, the Pensionary Fagel, and the

deputy from the city of Rotterdam) and desired the deputies of the six other provinces to conform to that of Holland; when those of Friessland and Groningen immediately complied with this request, but the Pensionary Fagel had so well taken his measures, with respect to the deputies of Gelderland, Zealand, Utrecht and Overysfel, who were all dependant on the Prince of Orange, that the day was spent in very hot debates. The deputies of these four provinces steadily maintained, that they had orders from their superiors not to consent to the truce, unless all their allies were comprehended in the same treaty, and the Prince of Orange had all his demands answered. They were astonished at hearing that Dickfeld, deputy of Utrecht, dared to talk in that manner, when he had positive orders from his province to consent to his Majesty's proposals; they therefore did not spare him, for a burgomaster of Amsterdam told him, he went contrary to his orders, and shewed a copy of them: to which Dickfeld replied, that nobody knew his orders better than himself; that it was his business to declare them to the States General, and that he was accountable for them to his superiors. Nevertheless the deputies of these four provinces could not hinder their sending couriers to their superiors, to give them an account of the state of affairs, and to demand fresh orders. The States General went at nine in the evening to make a final declaration to their allies; and at length they returned to the council-chamber, where the States of Holland went to meet them, in order to press them not to let that day pass without coming to a conclusion: but notwithstanding all their endeavours, they could obtain nothing more, though they staid with the States General till one in the morning.

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The Pensionary Fagel that day dispatched three couriers to the Prince of Orange.

As the eagerness of the States of Holland proceeded from my having declared, that the twelve days ought to be reckoned from the fourth of June, when the King's troops entered Luxemburg, I took no care to inform them that the King understood that this term commenced on the day when the news reached the Hague, which was the eighth. If they had suspected the permission his Majesty had given me to receive their acceptance of his offers, till he revoked my orders, the truce would never have been made.

Though the States of Holland had been till one in the morning with the States General, the deputies of Amsterdam did not neglect sending me that night, which was the 16th or 17th, the person by whom I kept up a correspondence with them, to tell me, that they found such great obstacles raised by the Prince of Orange's creatures, that they almost despaired of being able to bring the States General to agree to the resolution they had taken; that if this should be the case, they, that is the deputies of the provinces of Holland, Friesland and Groningen were resolved to come to me, and declare, that they, in the name of their provinces, accepted his Majesty's offers; but what filled them with the greatest apprehensions was, the Prince of Orange's marching with the army belonging to the States, which they did not doubt, was done with a design to engage in some enterprize. They therefore asked, what could be done to remedy this misfortune, if it should happen: and as they also desired to know, whether his Majesty's army in Flanders would make any attempt, I returned an answer in writing, which this person desired in their name.

I observed, that the King waited till the delay was expired, and that he would undertake no siege before that time.

That, if the States General took no resolution, he would certainly attack a place in the Netherlands.

That in order to remedy this inconvenience, if such of the deputies of the provinces as had resolved to accept the King's offers, came to inform me of it, I would take upon myself the office of making such representations to the King as they might reasonably desire, and that his Majesty would be always inclined to promote the designs of those who were for the peace, and who resolved to maintain the liberty of the Republic.

That if, before the term expired, the troops commanded by the Prince of Orange should attack those of the King, or should advance with them in such a manner as to come to blows, if the provinces who had accepted the peace would give me the means of remedying the consequences this might produce, I would most freely make use of them, and enter into all the expedients capable of preserving them in the possession of their liberty, and in the enjoyment of a perfect peace.

I explained myself more strongly, by word of mouth, but in giving the assurances of his Majesty's granting a powerful and effectual protection to those who were desirous of a peace, I did not shew any eagerness to engage these three provinces to separate themselves from the four others, believing that this would rather make them draw back than proceed forwards, and that their affairs would either bring them to it, or draw them from it, according to the success they were going to meet with, since if these provinces carried that day in the States General all they wanted, nothing in the world would be able to make them break the union; and that if they could
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not accomplish it, they would be obliged to think of their own preservation; and that, in this case, nothing could have a better effect than the strong assurances I gave by word of mouth, added to what I had written.

The same person also told me (not by order of the magistrates of Amsterdam, but as a thing he had heard them mention) that they apprehended that the Prince of Orange, on his being driven to extremities, would march with his whole army into the province of Holland, and that they would be glad to know whether I thought his Majesty would not, in this case, cause the Prince of Orange to be followed by his forces. I gave them all the assurances, on this subject, they could desire: but the States of Holland having the same day prevailed on the States General to form a resolution, they came to let me know it in the afternoon, and the treaty was signed in the manner that will presently be seen.

It is certain that the design of all the magistrates of Amsterdam (except Van Buning) was entirely to ruin the Pensionary Fagel, and so to diminish the authority of the Prince of Orange, that they might no longer have any thing to fear from him: but though from this time we took measures to bring this about, I shall not mention them, till I have given an account in what manner the treaty was at last signed.

The States of Holland assembled again on the 17th, at seven in the morning, and had that day many conferences with the States General, as the States General also had with the allies. The Prince of Orange's friends omitted nothing that was capable of being made an obstacle to the prosecution of this affair; and the States of Holland employed all the ways imaginable to bring it to a conclusion.

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The magistrates of Amsterdam had even such credit as to engage their province to declare in its own name, that it would execute what the city of Amsterdam had resolved to perform, when things should be carried to an extremity; and the States of Holland declared to the deputies of Gelderland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Overijssel, that the provinces of Holland, Friesland, and Groningen would abandon them, and leave them to support the war without granting them any assistance, and that they paying seventy-six per cent. the other four would see what they were capable of doing with the twenty-four per cent. which they raised, and which the province of Holland most commonly advanced for them.

But the deputies not being intimidated by these menaces, the three provinces declared, that if they would not consent to the States General bringing me the next day a resolution, importing, that three provinces, the names of which they should mention, had accepted the King's offers, and desired me to grant a delay of some days, in order to their having the consent of the other four; the provinces of Holland, Friesland and Groningen would come all together to give me their resolutions, and that they would declare to me, that they for their parts accepted fully and explicitly his Majesty's offers, and the other provinces might afterwards take their measures as they should think proper.

All the Prince of Orange's party united were incapable of resisting the force of such declarations; and the deputies of these four provinces were obliged to send couriers to inform their superiors of this, and expressly to desire orders conformable to the resolutions of the three other provinces. They also agreed to bring me a resolution of the States General, by which they would represent to me, that the provinces of Holland, Friesland and Groningen de-

clared, that they accepted his Majesty's offers of the 29th of April, the ninth of May, and of the fifth and seventh of July, and that the others waited the orders of their superiors to conform to them; that therefore they hoped I would grant them some days, to the end that these four provinces might within that time accept the King's proposals, that this great affair might be terminated.

However the States General resolved, that before they made me this request, they would speak once more to their allies, to declare, that they were going to accept his Majesty's offers, and to invite them to follow their example. This was the third time in which the States General entered this day into a conference with their allies. In the first, they carried them some propositions in writing, on which they imagined they ought to endeavour to obtain an accommodation. These propositions were:

That their High Mightinesses would promise his most Christian Majesty to make use of the most efficacious means to engage his most Catholic Majesty to accept the truce on the conditions proposed by his most Christian Majesty.

That, in order to their making use of these means with success, the term of six weeks should be granted them.

That the term of one month should be granted to the Empire, and to each member of the Empire, to accept the conditions proposed by his Majesty.

That his most Christian Majesty should neither augment nor aggravate the conditions during this time.

That his most Christian Majesty should make no attempt, during this time, either against the Empire or against Spain.

And

And that their High Mightinesses likewise, should not suffer their troops to come to an action during this time.

That in case his catholick Majesty and the Empire, or one of them, should think proper to accept the said conditions, and to make the truce on this foot, then the ratifications of the treaties that should be made on the truce and on this engagement, should be exchanged at the same time.

That their High Mightinesses and their allies, should guaranty the treaties that should be thus made, against all new enterprizes of whatever kind, or whatsoever name should be given them, whether of appendant, dependant, reunion, or under any pretence whatsoever.

But in case they could not bring his catholick Majesty to make the said truce on the said conditions, that then their High Mightinesses should no longer interfere in the affairs of Spain.

That his most christian Majesty and their High Mightinesses should endeavour by all kinds of good offices, and by friendly means, to accommodate the differences in the north during the time of two months; and in case no accommodation could be obtained, and injury should be done to one of their allies, and he should be actually attacked, that then their High Mightinesses should perform in behalf of the said ally that should be attacked, what they were obliged to in virtue of their alliances.

The ministers of the allies, except that of Spain, who would not appear, replied, after having examined this writing, that they found this affair of such great importance, that they desired time to look over their instructions, and that they would return in the afternoon.

They returned at four o'clock, and this was the second conference they held, in which they declared
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to the States General, that after having reviewed their instructions, they did not find any thing that related to this writing, which was a new thing, their instructions tending directly to a general peace or truce, and common safety, with the inclusion of the allies and the parties concerned; but not to such conditions. And therefore, considering the great importance of the affair, they found themselves obliged to communicate it to their masters; but they hoped, in the mean time, that the States General would remain in the union confirmed by treaties, and would do nothing that could separate them from their allies.

In the third conference which was held at ten o'clock at night, the States General declared to the ministers of their allies the resolution they had determined to take for terminating the differences subsisting between the Kings of France and Spain. The ministers of Hanover, the circle of Franconia and Lorrain spoke against this resolution as they had always done; and declared, that their masters would no longer live in friendship with the States General. That of Sweden protested, that by acting thus, they would break the treaty of association made with his master, and did all that was possible, by menaces and remonstrances, to make them change their sentiments. The Spanish and Imperial ministers were transported with anger beyond all imagination, and principally the last, who, according to custom, uttered a thousand absurdities.

The States General returning from this conference at midnight, the States of Holland went to them, and did not leave them till the resolution I have already mentioned was taken, and they separated at two in the morning.

As the States of Holland were under extreme uneasiness at the motions made by the Prince of Orange

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Orange with their troops, they had already writ to him to make no attempt; and this Prince had answered, that he did not design it, but the army of France being very near, he would put himself on his guard; and that, if his Majesty's troops did not give him occasion, he would do nothing on his side. The States of Holland were not satisfied with this captious answer, and therefore resolved the same day to write to him in very strong terms, and sent three Pensionaries of their province to order Pensionary Fagel to write in the name of the States of Holland: but he pretended to be sick, and would not speak to these Pensionaries; so that the States of Holland desired the States General, in this last conference, to write to the Prince of Orange. They had great disputes on this subject, the four provinces being unwilling to give their consent; but those of Holland made use of such strong arguments, that at last the others acquiesced, and they dispatched on the 17th, at about midnight, a courier to the Prince of Orange, and wrote to inform him, that they would not have him march their troops, nor suffer them to commit any act of hostility.

The next day, which was sunday, the 18th of June, the States General sent to me in the morning, to demand an audience: I appointed eleven o'clock, and on their communicating this resolution to me, I told them, that since three provinces had resolved to accept his Majesty's proposals, and they only desired a delay of a few days, in order that the more distant provinces might conform to them, I hoped his Majesty would not disapprove my waiting two or three days after the expiration of the term; but as this was a thing which I performed of myself, and not by his Majesty's order, I could not assure them that my power would not be recalled, if they suffered too much time to pass away.

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I also made them see the inconveniencies that might proceed from the march of their troops, and that if the Prince of Orange should commit any act of hostility, I could not bring any thing to a conclusion, without waiting for fresh orders.

The deputies of the States of Holland were satisfied with this answer, and told me, that since the twelve days did not expire till the 19th, it gave them room to depend on being allowed till the 22d at night.

I informed the King, that I should not cavil with them for a day or two, and that since the deputies of these four provinces had been willing to take this affair upon themselves, I ought to wait for their answer, which could not be received at the Hague in less than four or five days; that such a proceeding would produce a very good effect, and that his Majesty had already gained the affections of the people of Holland, by his being willing still to grant the same conditions after the taking of Luxemburg. That as affairs were in such a state, as that nothing could alter them, at least if nothing happened abroad that could not be foreseen, I hoped things would end in the manner his Majesty wished, if he consented still to allow me for three or four days the power he had given me of concluding a truce with the States General on the conditions he had prescribed.

The King wrote on the 15th of June, that as he saw by my letters of the eighth and ninth, that many of the towns in Holland were greatly disposed to accept his offers, either jointly with the Spaniards or separately, he persuaded himself, that they would no sooner have agreed to them, than the Spaniards would make haste to enter into the treaty, and that the Empire also would not defer entering into the truce; that therefore I should not find myself

myself under the perplexity I apprehended; that the States General would not obstinately persist in telling me, that they could not stipulate by a treaty not to give any assistance against his Majesty's allies, while he preserved the liberty of acting against the allies of the State; for since it was in the power of their allies to preserve themselves from suffering any act of hostility by accepting his Majesty's offers, it was not just that the States General, who would shew their approbation of them by the treaty they entered into with the King, should give assistance to those who refused them.

In regard to the proposals made by the Pensionary Fagel, in favour of the Prince of Orange, his Majesty observed, that I knew well enough that the conduct this Prince had always observed, could not oblige him easily to submit to what would contribute to his satisfaction, and that, therefore, I should not consent, unless I found that it would be an insurmountable obstacle to the accommodation, his Majesty approving the answer I had proposed to return on the three articles relating to the interest of that Prince. He at length wrote, on the 19th of June, that as he had granted to all the lords of the country, reunited to his crown by the treaty of Nimeguen, the permission to pay him fealty, and homage by an attorney, he should not refuse the same privilege to the Prince of Orange.

His Majesty added to the answers I had resolved to make in relation to the disputes between the King of Denmark and the Duke of Holstein, that this was a family affair, into which the King of Denmark would not consent that any foreign power should enter.

On the 20th of June I wrote to inform the King, that I believed the States General would pretend, that they should be under no obligation to avoid act-
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ing against his Majesty's allies, except where the interest of Spain was concerned; for they might object to me, that in order to oblige them not to succour their allies, it would be necessary, that his Majesty should enter into the same obligation with respect to his allies, or that they themselves should declare, that they would be contented with the same conditions as his Majesty; that is, with remaining, during the truce of twenty years, in the possessions they enjoyed in the month of August 1681, which his Majesty's allies were far from doing; and though I had pressed the ambassador of Denmark, he would never explain himself on this subject. That besides the envoy of Lunenburg pretended, that independently of the differences which had arisen between his Majesty and some Princes of the Empire, and independently of the disputes the King of Denmark might be engaged in for the countries of Mecklenburg, Sax Lowenburg, and others, a war might be kindled on any other account between his Majesty's allies and those of the States; thus the King of Denmark might besiege Hamburg, or attack the house of Brunswick; and it would not be just that the States General should put it out of their power, in this case, to assist their allies; which they would do, if they admitted, without any restrictions, the clause of not acting against his Majesty's allies.

I informed the King in this same letter, that I had this day advice from the province of Utrecht, that the burgomaster of Amsterdam had reason for reproaching Mr. Dickfeld with acting contrary to his orders; and that this province had ordered him to conform himself to that of Holland. He said, in his own excuse, that his orders could only mean, that he was to act thus, in case the province of Holland took a resolution according to the laws of the republic, and this they had not done, since an unani-

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mous consent was necessary, in order to conclude on peace or war. This made the three well affected provinces apprehend, that some other captious interpretations would still be found to defer the acceptance of his Majesty's offers; and this obliged them, on the 20th at night, to send deputies from these provinces to the States of Utrecht, in order fully to explain their sentiments. These deputies returned on the 21st at night, and reported, that the States of Utrecht had declared to them, that they had consented, and consented still, fully and without reserve, to the acceptance of his Majesty's offers. It was a sensible affront offered to Mr. Dickfeld, that three provinces should send to know the opinion of his province, from their being resolved not to give the least credit to what he said; and that they should actually find that he spoke contrary to the orders given him by his masters.

About this time I received a letter from M. de Louvois, which let me know, that as it was for the King's advantage that Marshal de Schomberg should be punctually informed of all the motions made by the Prince of Orange and the Dutch forces, it was necessary that I should seize every opportunity of writing to him an account of what I learnt on that subject.

I therefore immediately wrote to acquaint the Marshal de Schomberg with the state of affairs in Holland, the manner in which the Prince of Orange had sent away the troops of the States General, and the States forbidding his making the least motion, or his suffering their troops to perform any act of hostility.

The resolution of the province of Overijssel arrived on the 22d of June, and the house of the first of the deputies of this province to the States General had like to have been pillaged by the populace of Deventer,

Deventer, when they knew that he had refused, in the assembly of the States General, to conform to the sentiments of Holland.

Things being in this situation, the deputies of the States General came the same day to tell me, that it was impossible for them to have an answer from Gelderland till the next day, or from Zealand till Saturday the 24th, or Sunday the 25th; therefore they desired, that I would still consent to wait two or three days.

Before I replied, I asked what were the resolutions of the provinces of Utrecht and Overijssel; they told me, that they had sent their consent; but that they wished, that all the others had time allowed them to send their resolutions to the States General. I let them know, that after my having taken the liberty to wait four days beyond my orders, I could not venture to do it again; that they had had time allowed them ever since the 29th of April, when these proposals were made, and from the fifth of June when they were renewed, and that it was not just in them to make an ill use of the facility with which his Majesty had enabled them to conclude the peace. They told me, that the provinces might have given different orders to their deputies at different times; that they did not enter seriously upon this subject till Saturday the 17th in the evening, when the States of Holland brought their resolution to the States General; that the deputies then sent to their provinces; that it required eight entire days to send to Zealand, to assemble the towns, and to deliberate there; that therefore they could not have an answer till the 25th at night, or the morning of the 26th; and that they never gave their vote in the States General before all the deputies had had time allowed them to receive an answer from their provinces; for if they acted otherwise,

wife, this would be indirectly excluding them from the union. They had reason in this, and it was also true, that as the deputies of Zealand sent to that province on the night of the 17th, or the morning of the 18th, they could not receive an answer till the 25th or 26th; I therefore took advantage of the permission his Majesty had granted me of signing till he re-called my powers, and told them, that since five provinces accepted his Majesty's proposals, and only two days were required in order to obtain an answer from the two others, I hoped his Majesty would not disown what I did, if I waited till the evening of Saturday the 24th. Mr. d'Oudick, one of the Prince of Orange's creatures, and first deputy of Zealand, pressed me to allow him till the 26th; but I would not consent to it, and desired them to remember, that if in the morning of Sunday the 25th, there should arrive a revocation of my powers, or orders to augment his Majesty's demands; I this moment declared, that they ought only to take it upon themselves, and that they could have no room to complain of his Majesty's not adhering to what he had promised them. They then demanded, if they might not, at least, remain assured, that they should be allowed to accept the same offers till the 24th at night. To this I replied, after having suffered them to make many entreaties, that provided they brought me, on Saturday the 24th in the evening a resolution, by which the States General fully and truly accepted his Majesty's offers, I would engage to receive it, but not for a longer time.

What obliged me absolutely to resolve on receiving an answer by Saturday evening, was my knowing, that the province of Holland presided this week in the States General, and my being persuaded, that if I behaved with firmness, they would not suffer the

the week to pass without concluding this affair; but on the contrary, Mr. D'Odick being President the following week, in the name of Zealand, I was apprehensive, lest he should find the means of hindering the States General from taking any resolution that whole week, which might possibly ruin the affair.

I informed the King, that after my letter was wrote, the States General returned a second time, and expressed some uneasiness at the neighbourhood of his Majesty's troops and theirs, and also at the burning of some villages. I told them, that the Marshal de Schomberg had only advanced with his Majesty's troops from his being informed, that the Prince of Orange had marked out his camp near Notre Dame de Hall; that it was surprizing, that the troops belonging to the States, which had till that time remained in their quarters, should have encamped since his Majesty's declaring, that he would still adhere to the same conditions during the last delay. That since I found they had such good dispositions towards a peace, I ought to tell them in confidence, that the Marshal de Schomberg had orders closely to observe the Prince of Orange, and to attack him if he made the least motion towards encamping near the King's army. I replied, in regard to burning the villages, that his Majesty had not engaged to put a stop to all acts of hostility till after the treaty should be signed at the Hague. They replied, that they could assure me, that before Saturday was over, they would bring me a resolution of the States General; and they desired me to write to Marshal de Schomberg, to prevent any thing happening that might retard the conclusion of the peace; that for their part, they had resolved to write to the Prince of Orange; but after what I just told them, they would go and determine whether

they ought not to send deputies from the States, to prevent his doing any thing that might give his Majesty's troops room to come to an action with those of the States General. I shewed them, that I could do nothing more in this affair, than to inform Marshal de Schomberg of the state of the negotiation, and the orders they were going to send to the Prince of Orange, even by deputies from the States. I made use of the courier they gave me, in writing to the Marshal de Schomberg, and to send information of this affair to his Majesty; and the States General, on their side, sent that night three deputies of their body, to forbid the Prince of Orange to make any motion. At their leaving me they received a letter from this Prince, by which, after having assured them that he would make no attempt, he demanded, what he should do if the King's troops undertook a siege; if they attacked the army belonging to the States, if they continued to raise contributions by military executions; and by setting fire to the villages. The States General did not think proper to perplex themselves about answering all these questions; they only ordered their three deputies to tell him, that he had nothing else to do but to make their troops retire, and to put them into the fortified towns. They were a little more at ease after their sending these orders: but every body at the Hague imagined, that they would fill the Prince of Orange with great vexation; and they were some days after informed, that it was impossible for him to discover greater signs of it.

The King wrote on the 19th of June to inform me, that he had learnt with pleasure, that I had brought the magistrates of Amsterdam and others of the well affected, to leave the decision of the affairs in the north to the diet of Ratisbon, and to be contented, in regard to the Prince of Orange, with my making application in his behalf to his Majesty; which

which was much better than entering into the particulars of his pretensions; that it would also be proper not to make any mention of the article of Genoa; but that if I was forced to it, I should regulate myself according to the orders he had given me, and which he repeated in this letter.

That he believed what he had wrote by his last dispatch, ought to put an end to all the objections they made in relation to the clause, in which he required the States General to engage not to act against his allies, any more than against himself; but if they persisted, it was proper I should ask, if the States General would leave his Majesty the liberty of assisting the Elector of Cologne, and all his other allies, who were willing to attack them; and as he did not believe that this was the intention of the States, it was equally just that they, on their side, should oblige themselves not to act against his allies. But if, nevertheless, I found that all his allies together, that is, the ministers of Denmark, Cologne, and Brandenburg, should desire, that no mention might be made of them in the treaty, I ought in this case to conform to what they shewed me was most agreeable to the interests of their masters.

On the 23d of June I wrote to inform the King, that I could not help representing once more, that if I asked the States General, according to his orders, whether they would leave his Majesty the liberty of assisting such of his allies as should attack them, they would answer; No, they would not, any more than they would pretend to be at liberty to assist such of their allies as should attack his Majesty; but they would ask, If his Majesty would consent to lay himself under an obligation, not to succour his allies when attacked, in the same manner as he would have them lay themselves under an obligation not to assist their allies if they were attacked.

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That I should tire his Majesty, was I to give him a particular account of all the rubs I met with ; that I hoped, however, by means of the instructions he had given me, to be able to surmount the obstacles with which the Prince of Orange's creatures endeavoured to prevent the conclusion of the treaty ; that a single day did not pass, in which some new ones were not raised up, and as these persons filled the principal posts in the republic, it was very easy for them to invent a thousand plots and stratagems that were capable of throwing every thing into disorder.

That proofs of this had been given the preceding day, in relation to the affairs of the provinces of Utrecht and Overijssel ; for after all the pains that had been taken, and after the magistrates of Amsterdam had sent a solemn deputation to Utrecht, of which there had been but few examples in the republic, one would have imagined, that an end would have been put to these affairs, since the province of Utrecht had declared, that it had given orders to its deputies to follow the example of the province of Holland ; but the secretary of Utrecht, who was a man devoted to the interest of the Prince of Orange, had artfully inserted in this resolution, that it was in conformity to a precedent, and this precedent declared, that the deputies of Utrecht would conform to the resolution of the province of Holland unanimously taken ; thus Dickfield still found means to put a stop to this affair. That however, deputies from the three provinces had been sent to Utrecht, to cause this abuse to be corrected. That another incident had been raised on the resolution of Overijssel ; which had been so managed, that this province had consented to his Majesty's proposals, only on condition that the interests of the Prince of Orange should be regulated by the same treaty, and that three provinces had also sent to Overijssel to have this clause erased.

That

That I could assure his Majesty, that never any affair was attended with greater difficulties than this, in which, as I had already observed, the business was not only to conclude a peace between France and Spain; but to support or ruin the Prince of Orange's authority: these people, therefore, made use of all the cavils which the form of that government could furnish, and in the mean time they went in search of all the news which they imagined capable of souring the minds of the people, or of inspiring them with courage: they talked of the affair of Genoa; they spread a report that his Majesty pretended to be lord of Treves, in quality of duke of Luxemburg; and that he had already taken possession of that city, and caused it to be inserted in the gazettes, that in the provinces of Poitou and some others, all the children were taken from their Hugonot parents, to be educated at their fathers expence in the catholic religion. That on the other hand, they spoke advantageously of what passed in Catalonia; and asserted, that the Elector of Bavaria was marching, and would draw a great part of Germany against his Majesty. But that all these discourses did not stagger the wise, and as for the others, who did not adhere to the Prince of Orange's sentiments from reason, but from a blind dependence, this could not make them worse than they were before.

The King returned an answer to this letter, and particularly to what I had wrote in relation to the report raised by the partisans of the Prince Orange, of his having seized on Treves, pretending to be lord of that city, in consequence of his being duke of Luxemburg. His Majesty informed me, that he thought proper to let me know the foundation of this false rumour, which it would not be difficult for me to destroy; that so far from desiring to render

himself master of Treves, he had made an offer to the Elector, to renounce the right of protection which the Dukes of Luxemburg^h had exercised over that city; and that he had only demanded that he would forever secure its repose, by levelling the outworks, which might serve to defend those who might intend to render themselves masters of it, in order to draw the war thither. That he was only endeavouring to obtain the consent of the Elector and inhabitants to the demolishing of these superfluous outworks, without touching either the walls or the gates. This answer did not arrive till after the treaty was signed; however, they had made no farther mention of the affair of Treves.

The deputies of Holland, Friesland, and Groningen, returned the second time from Utrecht, on the 24th of June in the morning, with an entire satisfaction. He whom they had sent to Overysiel also returned, after having made them take out of their resolution, the clause which related to the interests of the Prince of Orange. The resolution of Gelderland arrived the same day; but as this province was obstinately bent on having the interests of the Prince of Orange regulated by the same treaty, without which it refused its consent, the States General concluded without this province, and also without the consent of that of Zealand, whose resolution could not arrive before Sunday the 25th at night, or Monday morning. Mr. D'Oodick, who was the first deputy of Zealand to the States General, exclaimed loudly upon this occasion, but was incapable of over-ruling this affair; and he complained in very bitter terms, that when he spoke of the interest of the Prince of Orange, no-body answered him. The Pensionary Fagel, likewise, did not forget himself on this last occasion; but the others shewed, that that was not a proper time to talk

talk of the interest of the Prince of Orange: that the subject of debate then was, whether they should accept or refuse the King's offers; and that after their accepting them, their recommendations of the Prince would be made with a better grace. And as I had declared, that after the 24th, I would not answer for his Majesty's adhering to the same proposals, they concluded the affair on the 24th in the afternoon, and the States General immediately came to bring me their resolution, by which they declared, that they accepted, so far as related to the States General, the conditions I had proposed to them on the 29th of April, the 9th of May, and the 5th and 6th of June, in the name, and on the part of his Majesty.

I shewed them, that though they had let slip a great deal of time beyond that allowed by his Majesty, I was nevertheless so perfectly certain, that his sole intention was to restore peace to Christendom, that I freely resolved to receive their acceptance; but that I imagined we ought not to lose time in preparing articles; this, they told me, they were going immediately upon, and desired me, in the mean time, to communicate their resolution to the Marshal de Schomberg. To this I consented, and made use of their courier to send, at the same time, the letter I had done myself the honour to write to his Majesty.

In the same letter I wrote to the King, that the deputies of Amsterdam had very strongly insisted on their taking the seal from their papers; that the province of Holland were of opinion, that they ought to be restored to them: but the deputies of Amsterdam were resolved, that the seal should be taken off by the same persons, and with the same ceremonies, with which it had been put on; which

was performed on the 24th of June in the afternoon.

On the 25th and 26th of June, the States of Holland, and the States General, laboured in preparing a draught of articles. I was informed, that the Pensionary Fagel resolved to insert many clauses which I could not possibly admit. I took notice of this to the magistrates of Amsterdam, who informed me, that they would not suffer any affair to be debated besides those of Spain; and that they had retrenched every thing added to them by the Pensionary Fagel. So that all the endeavours of the Prince of Orange's creatures, and those of the ministers of the allies, were ineffectual; and the States General having demanded an audience on the 26th in the afternoon, they brought me the plan of a treaty which was not very different from his Majesty's intentions, and in which no mention was made either of the north or the south, of Genoa, of the Duke of Holstein, the Duke of Lorrain, or the Prince of Orange.

They desired me to take these articles into consideration, in order to enter into a conference upon them the next day; but I chose to lose no time, and at all adventures to examine them immediately, and in their presence. I made many alterations in things of small importance, and changed several expressions which did not please me.

They had extended the delay granted by his Majesty to the Spaniards for the acceptance of his offers, even to three months; pretending, that it was impossible to make their representations to the King of Spain, to cause his council to deliberate upon them, and to receive an answer at the Hague in so short a time as six weeks; but after some dispute they submitted, and desired me only to intercede with his Majesty, that if they were informed with-
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in six weeks, that the council of Spain were ready to send the ratifications, he would be pleased to grant them a few days more.

The disputes were more warm on a clause inserted by themselves, that the King should immediately cause his troops to retire from the Spanish Netherlands. They represented the inconveniences of suffering them to stay there any longer; but I made them see, that it was not just to make them retire before that crown had entered into any engagement with his Majesty; and that it would not be proper to quarter them in his own dominions while he waited to receive the resolution of the court of Madrid, since their encampment would oblige the Spaniards to accept of his Majesty's offers. This debate, which was many times resumed, was ended by a conference which lasted four hours. Two or three deputies more obstinately bent on opposing me than the others, continually returned to the charge; but I shut their mouths every time I told them, I had let them know in the conferences I had already had with them, that his Majesty was resolved that his troops should remain together in the territories of Spain, without committing any acts of hostility, to wait there for the ratifications: These offers they had accepted, and I had orders not to depart from them.

They did not make the least cavilling about recalling their troops in conformity to my memorial of the 7th of June, in which I had not inserted, that his Majesty only demanded that their troops should not perform any act of hostility, as he had ordered me; but I had declared, that he desired they would make them retire, which they promised to do immediately.

I endeavoured to get the article suppressed which related to the levying of contributions, maintaining, that this was a thing that ought to be regulated

with Spain, and did not affect the States General; but they were obstinately bent on retaining it, and told me, that they could not oblige Spain to ratify the treaty within six weeks, if they did not first fix all the conditions relating to that crown; I therefore proposed, that this article should be regulated in the same manner as it was at Nimeguen, and that they should take away the clauses they had added to it.

They had put into another article, that his Majesty should not perform any act of hostility against Germany, during the whole month which he still allowed the Empire: but I shewed them, that nothing ought to be put into the treaty that had any relation to the Empire; and after some disputes they acquiesced.

I absolutely rejected a clause they had inserted, which declared, that the same guaranties might serve for the truce made by his Majesty with Spain, and for that he was to make with the Empire, and they desisted from it.

They had formed an article, which contained several things of a different nature; amongst others, that they would not give any assistance to the Spaniards against his Majesty's allies, and that the French King should not receive an equivalent in the Netherlands for the conquests he might elsewhere obtain over the King of Spain, in case this last did not accept his offers. I represented to them, that nothing in the whole treaty was of greater consequence than this second clause, which they had inserted as it were by the by; and after having shewn them its full importance, I declared, that his Majesty had allowed me to grant it. I here filled the well-affected with an extreme joy, by giving them the means of confounding the partisans of the Prince of Orange, by letting them see, the extraordinary sincerity

sincerity of his Majesty, who strove to prevent the apprehensions with which they might be filled, and to grant them, by this treaty, more than he had promised them. I did not chuse to revive the other difficulty relating to the allies; but thought it most adviseable to shew them, that this article was crowded with too much matter, which had better be separated; and for this purpose, I proposed their following the plan of a treaty I had drawn, in which this article was more fully expressed, it being divided into three. And as it also appeared to me, that the order of their plan was unnatural in the arrangement of the articles, and that the sense would bear a different interpretation, I read them that I had prepared, which was divided into three parts; the first of which, contained the establishment of the truce during twenty years, and specified all the places that were to remain in the possession of the Kings of France and Spain during that truce. I next explained, all the conditions his Majesty obliged himself to perform, in case it was ratified by Spain within six weeks; and then all the obligations into which the States General were to enter, in case it should not be ratified by Spain. They approved of this order, and took my draught.

When they rose up in order to go, they asked me, if I could not consent to have the interests of Prince Charles of Lorraine referred to the diet of Ratisbon; but they did not insist upon it, after my first refusal, which they had expected.

Thus the discussion of the articles of this treaty, which the Prince of Orange's creatures had flattered themselves with the hopes of extending to seven or eight days, was terminated at one sitting; for tho' we had two conferences more, they only turned on the same difficulties. I was surprized at their

so soon desisting from those they had resolved to raise, for I had a copy of a resolution, which they had communicated to their allies, by which they promised to stipulate in the treaty, that his Majesty should perform no act of hostility during the delay of one month, which he had granted for signing the treaty with the Empire; and that if they could not terminate the affairs of Lorrain at the Hague, they would refer them, by an article of the treaty, to the diet of Ratisbon.

The States General came again, on the 27th, at four o'clock in the afternoon, and stayed with me till nine in the evening. They had taken the order of the articles in my draught; but had inserted the same things I had before rejected, and I was quit by refusing them once more. They, however, so obstinately insisted on desiring that his Majesty's troops should immediately leave the Spanish Netherlands, that I could not help being surprized at it; and some of them even declared, that they could not give up this article, according to my desire, without receiving fresh orders from their provinces. To which I replied, that I did not believe the Marshal de Schomberg had the leisure to wait these fresh orders. At length they asked, if no expedient could be found. They proposed, that the troops should march away immediately after the States General had exchanged the ratifications, which was to be done within three weeks; on which I told them, that it was as impossible for me to depart from my orders for three weeks as for six. They also represented the inconveniences that would arise from his Majesty's troops entering into the heart of the country after the treaty was signed, since they might give jealousy to the strong places, and pass the canal of Bruges; and then asked if I could not agree that they should not pass that canal. I told them

them, that I did not believe that his Majesty ever intended to give such orders to his troops, but that I could grant nothing on this subject. They then proposed my drawing a line on a map, only to shew the place where I would answer for it, that his Majesty's troops should not go. I let them know, that I could not answer for any thing of this nature, and that I should more particularly avoid marking on a map a line beyond which his Majesty's troops should not pass. In short, after having rose up two or three times, they declared, that they had no orders to drop this article; but that if I would only write down the expedients I thought most proper, to hinder those who were desirous of kindling a war, from taking advantage of the different encampments of the King's army, and if I would promise them, at the same time, that I would make use of my interest with his Majesty, in order that he might regulate the march of his troops in conformity to my letter, they would mention it to their principals; and they hoped, that this would remove the apprehensions they were under. The magistrates of Amsterdam had desired me, under their hands, to yield in this particular as much as I could; for the Prince of Orange had so greatly alarmed the States by his letters, that people at the Hague began already to be filled with distrust; and his creatures, taking advantage of this opportunity, pressed me in the warmest manner to agree that his Majesty's troops, and those of the States General, should retire immediately, after the exchange of the ratifications of the States General; but not daring to depart from my orders, which were very explicit, I took the resolution to draw up immediately a writing which I expressed in these terms:

“ It seems to me, that no greater security can be
 “ given to prevent there happening any inconveni-
 “ ences

“ ences during the six weeks in which the troops of
 “ the King my master are to wait in the Nether-
 “ lands for the ratifications of Spain, than the
 “ engagement into which his Majesty has been
 “ willing to enter, that his troops shall not, during
 “ this time, perform any act of hostility; but to
 “ satisfy the demands that have been made to me,
 “ and as a farther precaution, I believe that nothing
 “ can be desired, except that his Majesty’s armies
 “ shall give no cause of jealousy to the inhabitants
 “ of the fortified places, and that they do not en-
 “ camp nearer to these places than the distance of a
 “ league; that they do not come on this side the
 “ canal of Bruges, or on this side the canal or river
 “ which runs from Ghent to Dendermond; that
 “ they come not within three leagues of Mechlin,
 “ and approach no nearer than three leagues to the
 “ canal, which extends from Brussels to Anvers.
 “ If this be thought reasonable, I offer to make a
 “ representation to the King of this affair, at the
 “ same time, when I shall have the honour to send
 “ the treaty signed to his Majesty; and I do not
 “ doubt but that my representations will prove suc-
 “ cessful. and that his Majesty will order his troops
 “ to conform to the above regulations.”

We also disputed for a long time on the article
 of contributions: these they pressed me to regulate;
 alledging, that since his Majesty would preserve
 their neighbourhood from being involved in the war,
 it would not be just to leave these differences un-
 decided that might occasion acts of hostility; but
 as I could see no reason to refuse what they demand-
 ed, I referred this affair to the article in the treaty
 of Nimeguen, which says, that the contributions
 demanded in countries that have been subject to
 them, ought to be paid till the ratifications
 are exchanged. Mr. Dickfeld denied it, and did
 not

not fail to alledge what happened after the peace, in relation to the contributions of Breda, which the King resolved should be paid, though the inhabitants of that barony had entered into no treaty, because contributions may be demanded of countries subject to them, and not of countries who have subjected themselves to them. The States General had maintained, that we ought not to pretend that a country owes contributions, if it had not consented to them by a treaty, or if it had not been actually and for some time forced to pay them by military executions; and that neither of these was the case with regard to the barony of Breda. M. de Louvois alledged, that this would have been true if it had been put, *the countries which have subjected themselves*; but that it was *the countries which are subject to contribution*, and that on this account, it was sufficient that contributions had been demanded, and that on their refusal they had suffered military executions; that by this means countries became subject to contributions; and on this foundation the barony of Breda had been made to pay them after the peace of Nimeguen, on the foot of the demand made by the intendant of Maestricht, though it would have been greatly moderated if that barony had entered into a composition; so that they might not fall a second time under this inconvenience, Mr. Dickfeld demanded, that it should be put *the established contributions*, or, *the contributions demanded of countries that have rendered themselves subject to them*; but I refused both, and this article remained undetermined.

But the greatest dispute was on the article which related to the allies; which they had drawn up in the following manner.

“ And in case the King of Spain does not accept the above mentioned conditions of the
“ truce

“ truce within ~~fourteen~~ weeks, and complete the
 “ ratifications in good and due form, the said Lords
 “ the States General oblige themselves not to give,
 “ as long as the present war shall continue, any assist-
 “ ance to the Spaniards in any place whatsoever,
 “ either against the King or against his allies; and
 “ his Majesty engages, that neither he, nor any of
 “ his allies, shall attack or incommode, by act
 “ of hostility, in any manner whatsoever, any of
 “ the towns or strong places in the Netherlands,
 “ much less reduce under his authority, or take
 “ into his possession, either by revolt, exchange,
 “ voluntary cession, or by any other way, any of
 “ the towns, forts, places and countries, in the
 “ said Netherlands, and even not to make war
 “ there in the open country, if the Spaniards ab-
 “ stain from it; and if they should continue to
 “ perform acts of hostility in the Netherlands a-
 “ gainst France, his Majesty obliges himself also in
 “ that case, not to attack any of the towns or
 “ strong places, and not to assault or incommode
 “ them by acts of hostility in any manner whatso-
 “ ever; his Majesty reserving to himself the power
 “ of carrying his arms into any other of the coun-
 “ tries of the catholic King, excepting only the
 “ said Netherlands, till such time as the peace be-
 “ tween the two crowns shall be concluded.”

I took a copy of this article, and the clock having
 struck nine, the deputies of the States General
 went to give an account of the state of the negotia-
 tion; while I went to communicate this article,
 which affected the allies, to the ambassador of Den-
 mark and the ministers of Cologne and Branden-
 burg. These ministers found the same difficulties I
 had observed in it; and I saw besides, that they
 were not satisfied with the States General's only en-
 gaging not to succour their allies, in case the truce
 should

should not be made. They would have the States General oblige themselves not to act against the King's allies, even after the truce was made; but I represented that his Majesty could not stipulate in favour of his allies, for more than he demanded for himself; and that it would not be just to require the States General indefinitely to remain neuter. I asked the Danish ambassador, as I had already many times done, if he would be satisfied with my granting, that every thing in the Empire that had a relation to the King his master, should remain on the same foot as on the first of August, 1681; because this would produce a weighty argument, if I could tell the States General, that as the King's allies consented that the truce in the Empire should be regulated, even with respect to them, in the same manner as had been proposed by his Majesty, it could only be the fault of their allies if the truce was not concluded; and that, after this, it would not be just for the States General to preserve the liberty of assisting them: he would not, however, make me a direct answer; but told me, that the King his master had disputes that had no relation to the Empire, as that of Sleswick, as he might also have with Sweden out of the Empire.

Though I found the Danish ambassador very unreasonable, I would not tell him the orders I had received, to agree for his master, in the same manner as for the King of France, that they should remain in possession of what they enjoyed on the first of August 1681, according to the offers the King had so often made, both at the Hague, and at the diet of Ratisbon, but made use of another expedient: as I had remarked that he had his pretensions, and that the envoy of Brandenburg had also his particular views, which did not agree with those of Denmark, I prepared an article relating to the allies, which

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which I sent to both separately, and desired them in a letter to give me their opinion of it. This article was as follows :

“ And if the said * sovereign lord the catholic King, does not accept the said truce on the conditions stipulated, and in six weeks, reckoning from the day in which the present treaty shall be signed, does not prepare an act of ratification in good and due form, the said States General oblige themselves in this case, to draw, immediately after the said time, all their troops out of the Spanish Netherlands, and not to give, while the present war shall last, any assistance to the crown of Spain, or its allies, directly or indirectly, by sea or by land, in any place whatsoever, and engage themselves not to commit any act of hostility against the troops, countries, or subjects, nor against the allies of his Majesty, in favour of their allies, if they refuse to accept the truce on the conditions offered by his most christian Majesty to the Empire, while the differences which at present subsist, shall not be terminated by a peace or a truce.”

“ And his most christian Majesty reciprocally obliges himself, &c.”

They did not fail to send me two answers that were entirely opposite: the one found that I took too much notice of the affairs of the Empire, and that I ought not to have mentioned them so particularly; and the other, that I did not mention them particularly enough, and that the Empire ought to have been more expressly mentioned. They agreed in nothing but in wishing that I would not join the obligation into which the States General entered,

* This article was drawn up only to be shewn to the ministers of his Majesty's allies, and was not delivered to the States General.

of not acting against the King's allies, to the refusal of their allies to accept the truce on the conditions offered by his Majesty to the Empire; as being willing that the States General should not, in any case whatsoever, succour their allies.

I communicated this affair to the magistrates of Amsterdam, who shewed themselves well informed of the steps taken by the ambassador of Denmark and the envoy of Brandenburg, against the latter of whom they were so greatly exasperated, as to send a complaint of him to that Elector, to desire to know if his envoy had acted by his orders. As to what related to the Danish ambassador, they took no further notice of it, because they were persuaded, that his sole view was to break off the treaty, and that this would not be disowned in Denmark. They assured me, however, that there needed nothing more than that to overthrow all they had hitherto done. That the States General had never imagined, that they were to renounce all their alliances; and that, though they had no design to enter into a war, they would not agree to tie their hands, and dishonour themselves in that manner. That they had reasons for not succouring the Spaniards; but that they had none for abandoning their other allies; and that there was no reason for alleging, that they refused his Majesty's offers, though his Majesty's allies should accept them, which they did not. They more particularly told me, that the States of Holland were separated for fifteen days, and therefore the difficulties that should arise would be regulated by the deputies of the States General, over whom the Prince of Orange had great authority, or sent back within fifteen days to the assembly of Holland; that they assured me this would cause such an alteration, and give such great dissatisfaction, that people would lose the confidence they before had placed in his Majesty, and that the Prince of Orange
and

and his creatures, by taking advantage of this disorder, might prevent this affair from ever being concluded. They desired me to consider, that the province of Holland was not unanimous; that those of Gelderland and Zeeland were in the opposition; and that those of Utrecht and Overijssel had declared contrary to the sentiments of their deputies to the States General; and that these deputies, whom I knew to be disaffected might, by misrepresentations, produce a change in their provinces.

The deputies of the States General came to me on the 28th, at four o'clock in the afternoon, and staid with me till ten at night. We again talked of the contributions, and they pressed me strongly to consent, that if any differences arose on this subject, they should be referred to the King of England: but as I made a difficulty of it, this affair remained undecided. We passed at length to that of the allies, and in spite of the remonstrances of the deputies of Amsterdam, and the little justice I found in the pretensions of his Majesty's allies, I persisted, during this whole sitting, which lasted six hours, in my resolution not to act contrary to my orders: and I made use of all the reasons which his Majesty had suggested: but I found that they were more disposed to put a stop to every thing than grant an indefinite clause for abandoning their allies. At length they told me, that the utmost I could wish for was, that they should consent to my couching this article in the strongest and most favourable terms that were to be found in my memorials, and that then they would consent to it. I found this proposal so reasonable that I consented to it. I then sent to the ambassador of Denmark, and the envoys of Brandenburg and Cologn, to ask them, if they thought it proper that I should prepare that article in a manner agreeable to what I myself had proposed, by his Majesty's order, or whether I ought to
break

break with them, if the States General would not grant more. They were not disposed to say that I ought to break with them: the envoy of Brandenburg could make no reply to it: that of Cologne wrote that he had no orders on this point; but that he himself was of my opinion, and he did not doubt but that his master would approve it; but the Danish ambassador being unable to make any reply to such a proposal, wrote that he should be very glad if I would defer the conclusion of this affair for ten days, or till he could be informed of the intentions of the King his master; that he knew nothing more of it, except that Mr. Meyerkrons had wrote to inform him, that I had orders to obtain an article that would put the King of Denmark in a state of security, not only in regard to the Empire, but also to the affairs of Holstein. He even insisted on having this delay, at which I could not help being surprized, since by this means he discovered himself too plainly; besides he could not but be sensible that the States General would not enter into the wars of the north; and that whatever happened, as the French King preserved the liberty of assisting his allies, the King his master would still be a gainer. It was but too evident that this ambassador wished that the peace might not be concluded, and that he had orders to oppose it, but in such a manner as that I might not perceive it; or at least to take such measures, as that the King of Denmark might remain in a perfect tranquillity with respect to the affairs of Holstein.

The deputies of the States General returned, on the 29th in the morning, to examine the article I had prepared, in relation to the allies, and to compare the others, that they might be immediately wrote out fair, and the treaty signed.

I communicated this article to them, and after many disputes, they consented that it should not
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only be couched in the manner his Majesty had demanded by my memorials, but much more advantageously, and nearly as the ambassador of Denmark had desired, since the period which mentioned the allies was much more distinct than it was in my memorial of the 17th of February. The memorial was conceived in these terms :

“ Provided that the States General engage not
 “ only to hinder the troops they have at present in
 “ Flanders from being employed otherwise than for
 “ the defence of the places possessed by the Catholic
 “ King in the Netherlands, but also not to give
 “ any other assistance to the crown of Spain, in
 “ any other country whatsoever, nor to act directly
 “ or indirectly against his Majesty or his allies :
 “ his Majesty will also oblige himself,” &c. and the
 article was couched in this manner :

“ And if the said sovereign Lord the Catholic
 “ King does not accept the said truce on the con-
 “ ditions stipulated ; and if, in the space of six
 “ weeks, reckoning from the day of the present
 “ convention, his Catholic Majesty should not pro-
 “ vide an act of ratification in good and due form ;
 “ the said Lords the States General oblige them-
 “ selves in this case to recall, immediately after the
 “ said time of six weeks, all their troops in the
 “ Spanish Netherlands, and not to give, while the
 “ present war shall last, any assistance to the crown
 “ of Spain, either directly or indirectly, and so long
 “ as the differences which at present subsist are not
 “ terminated ; and they also engage not to perform
 “ any act of hostility against the troops, countries,
 “ and subjects of his Majesty, or his allies. And
 “ his most Christian Majesty in like manner obliges
 “ himself,” &c.

The States General demanded with such importunity, that the differences that should arise in relation

tion to the contributions, should be referred to the King of England, that I could not help consenting to it; and I hoped that his Majesty would not dislike it, since he had been willing that this should be done in regard to the disputes that might arise relating to the possession. They would not admit these terms; *the contributions demanded of the countries that have there submitted to pay them*; and I would not insert, *the contributions demanded of the countries that have there rendered themselves subject to pay them*; therefore it was only put, *the raising of contributions shall be continued, &c.* This, they said, every one would interpret according as he understood it, and I imagined that his Majesty would lose nothing by its being expressed in such an indefinite manner. Besides I thought that this article was regulated as advantageously as possible; for if Spain did not accept the truce, the raising of contributions ought not to cease; and if Spain consented to the truce, the contributions ought to be paid till the day when the ratification should be exchanged, and the right of raising contributions had never been carried farther.

The magistrates of Amsterdam had desired, that I would consent to allow three weeks for the exchange of the ratifications; for though, if they did not lose a moment's time, they might be able within fifteen days to send the treaty into the provinces, to call general assemblies there, and to send the ratification to the Hague; yet as the States of Holland were separated for near fifteen days, and were to deliberate, in their towns, on affairs that ought to have been regulated in December, and on which they had not yet employed their thoughts; this precipitation would have thrown them into great confusion; I therefore allowed three weeks for the exchange of the ratifications.

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The States General also desired me to join my solicitations to those they had ordered their ambassador to make to the King, to the end that his Majesty might be pleased to withdraw his troops from the Spanish Netherlands, as soon as the ratifications of the States General should be exchanged; but I would not charge myself with it.

Though the States General and I had secretaries in my hall, who copied the articles, as soon as we agreed to them, we could not finish in the morning, and therefore put off our signing the treaty till six in the evening.

I was informed, at three in the afternoon, by a person sent by the magistrates of Amsterdam, that what I had said the day before, in favour of his Majesty's allies, had like to have broke off the negotiation; and that had I insisted upon it, they would have been obliged to communicate it to the provinces, which would have had such an effect, that affairs would never have been in the state they then were in. They advised me, at the same time, to yield with respect to some difficulties that were of no consequence, for the Prince of Orange's creatures had declared, that if I did not acquiesce, they would not sign the treaty.

They desired me, at the same time, to be on my guard against the Danish ambassador, who had underhand done all in his power to prevent the conclusion of this treaty, and who had held such discourse as was most proper to put a stop to it.

The deputies of the States General came to me at six o'clock in the evening; they at first made difficulties of what I had before been informed of: but as these were not things that were essential, I complied as readily as any honest men could wish, and at length we signed the treaty of a truce, by which,

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The States General, after having acknowledged in the preamble, that the King gave a second time peace to Christendom, engaged to make use of their utmost endeavours to bring the King of Spain to accept the truce of twenty years, during which the French King should keep all the places he possessed at the peace of Nimeguen, and which he enjoyed on the first of August 1681; and besides all this, he should also possess the city and provostship of Luxemburg, Beaumont, Beauvines, and Chimay, with their dependencies.

In case the King of Spain should approve the truce within six weeks, the King should draw his troops from the places under the dominion of Spain, and restore to his Catholic Majesty all he possessed by force of arms; and amongst others, Courtray and Dixmude, after he had levelled the walls and razed the fortifications.

If the King of Spain did not furnish within six weeks an act of ratification of the present treaty in good and due form, the States General obliged themselves to draw immediately, after the six weeks should be expired, all their troops out of the Spanish Netherlands, and not to give, while that war should last, any assistance, directly or indirectly, to the crown of Spain; and they also engaged not to commit any act of hostility against the troops, countries and subjects of his Majesty or his allies; and his most Christian Majesty obliged himself not to attack any place in the Netherlands, nor to make war in the open country, if the Spaniards would abstain from it, and not to receive any of those places in exchange for conquests he might make elsewhere in the dominion of Spain, reserving to himself the liberty of carrying his arms into any of the territories belonging to the Catholic King, except the Netherlands.

Thus the King rendered himself master of Luxemburg, and made an advantageous truce, while the Prince of Orange, who was at the head of a large army, and at the same time made all his creatures in the United Provinces exert their endeavours to save Luxemburg, was unable either to preserve that city, or to prevent the truce.

As my letters were all ready, I dispatched a courier the moment the treaty was signed, and sent it to his Majesty. I wrote by the same way to the marshal de Schomberg, to inform him, that I had just signed the treaty with the States General, and that two days before they had expressly forbid the Prince to perform any act of hostility against the King's troops.

The States General also, as soon as possible, sent it by a courier to Spain, and communicated the treaty to the ministers of their allies. Those of the Emperor and the King of Spain would not appear. Two days after they sent to all the courts of the Princes their allies, a writing, containing an ample justification of their conduct, and in which they exhorted those Princes to accept the conditions offered by his Majesty.

The signing of this treaty caused all the ministers of the allies of the States General, who were at the Hague, to separate, in order to form a league against France, under the pretence of a general accommodation. That of Sweden set out first, those of Hanover, Lorrain, Holstein, and the circle of Franconia followed presently after; and it was not doubted, but that this treaty would re-establish the peace of all Europe; for the Emperor's resident had told in confidence, a deputy of the States General, who was one of his friends, that the Emperor would accept the truce on the conditions offered by France.

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The King returned me an answer, dated the 26th, on the draught presented by the States General to their allies, which I had sent to him, and gave me large instructions in relation to it, which I did not receive till the day after the treaty was signed. I had only the satisfaction of seeing that he was willing that I should not insist on those articles which I had drawn up in a more advantageous manner than he had demanded. He also consented, that if I could not cause the clause in relation to the allies to be inserted, as he had proposed it, I might avoid mentioning in the treaty, either his allies or those of the States; especially, as his allies being members of the Empire, he could stipulate for nothing with respect to them, but their being included in the truce on the foot of their possessing what they enjoyed in the year 1681, which the King of Denmark did not wish for.

On the 30th of June I wrote to the King, that I had couched the article relating to the allies in so advantageous a manner, that I believed the States General would not perceive it before the ratification; that the envoy of Brandenburg was well satisfied with it; but that nothing could be more unreasonable than the desires of the Danish ambassador, who at the very time when he would not engage that the King his master should put an end to the disputes he had in the Empire, on the foot proposed by his Majesty, would have the States General obliged not to succour their allies against him. However, he was satisfied with the manner in which this article was drawn up.

That if his Majesty's allies had given me some trouble, I had received much more from the States General. That those of the Prince of Orange's party had strove to seize every opportunity of putting a stop to this affair: that the provinces were

not all of the same sentiments; and that those who wished for a peace, and had been convinced by my reasons, durst not mention them in public; while the Prince of Orange's friends, on the contrary, made a merit of openly supporting those who raised difficulties, good or bad; and that as soon as the least scruple was raised, a report was spread that France had resolved to deceive them. That I could assure his Majesty, that those who were acquainted with the interior concerns of the country, and the intrigues of the Prince of Orange and the Pensionary Fagel, could at first scarcely imagine it possible to bring this affair to a conclusion.

Scarce had I finished this letter, when two deputies, who had been concerned in carrying on the treaty of the truce, came to tell me, on the part of the States General, that they were surprized at its not being put into the treaty, that his Majesty's allies should not attack the Netherlands, since the States General had resolved that this clause should be inserted; that they had made a report to the States General of the reasons I had alledged for not admitting it; but that as I offered to cure them of their apprehensions, by inserting, that his Majesty should not attack the Netherlands, either by himself, or his allies, they desired me to consent to the article being altered in the manner I had proposed. I replied, that as the treaty was sent away, it was impossible to make any alteration in it; but they shewed such extreme uneasiness at the reports that had been spread of his Majesty's giving troops to the Elector of Cologne, with which that Elector was to attack the Spanish Netherlands; and made use of such pressing entreaties to prevail on me to put into a separate article, that when his Majesty engaged not to attack the Spanish Netherlands, this was to be understood, that neither would he cause them

them to be attacked by his allies, that I gave my consent, which I did so much the more willingly, as the King was far from having any design to attack the Spanish Netherlands, under the name of the Elector of Cologne; and as the Pensionary Fagel sought for all possible means of preventing its being ratified, I was persuaded, that if I had refused them this satisfaction, some would have imagined, that this was not done without some important reason.

I at the same time sent the King the resolution of the province of Zealand, relating to the truce, which discovered the continuation of the obstacles formed by the Prince of Orange's creatures. This province complained of not being allowed leisure to deliberate; and made it appear, at the same time, that the States had done well in not waiting for its answer, since it resolved to impose certain conditions on the accommodation, which would have been sufficient to have hindered its being brought to a conclusion.

The States General were, however, under such extraordinary fear, lest the Prince of Orange should engage them in the war, that they even went beyond what they had promised in the treaty, and caused their troops to march so suddenly out of the Spanish Netherlands, that on the fourth of July there were none left. I am persuaded, that they also imagined, that by this step, they should hasten the Spaniards signing the truce, by their depriving them of all hope of assistance.

The Prince of Orange, for his part, was so surprized, and so enraged at the treaty's being so suddenly signed, when he had flattered himself that much time would have been consumed in the discussion of articles; that the same day, that is on the fourth of July, he set out on his return to

Onslardick, a country house he possessed, about three leagues from the Hague, from whence he departed on the sixth, in order to go to Diren, which is a house he had built for hunting in the Welaw, near Doesburg.

Some days after, I received very good intelligence, that the Pensionary Fagel and the rest of the Prince of Orange's creatures endeavoured to criticize, as much as they were able, on the substance of this treaty; that they greatly blamed the deputies of the States General for suffering to be put into the preamble, that his Majesty a second time gave peace to all Christendom, saying, this was what ought never to have been signed by the States General; but the clause relating to the allies made the most noise, and even the magistrates of Amsterdam began to take umbrage at it, from their receiving letters from Berlin, which raised a belief, that the King of Denmark and some other Prince had agreed to attack Sweden; and that the Prince of Orange's friends resolved to make this article serve to prevent the ratification of the treaty: they represented that this clause; "And they also engage not to commit, nor to suffer to be committed, any act of hostility against the troops, countries, and subjects of his most Christian Majesty, or against his allies," being perfectly distinct, it might be inferred, that the States would be plainly and expressly engaged not to act against his Majesty's allies, on any account whatsoever; and as this was never their intention, they resolved to ask me for an explication: but I caused this affair to be represented to the magistrates of Amsterdam, and to some other members of the state, in such a light, that they were not stopped by this difficulty.

I informed his Majesty, that though the States General had the Saturday before resolved to speak
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to me about the interest of the Prince of Orange, nobody had yet come in their name on the sixth of July. As they would not make this deputation in a body, they had commissioned one of the nobles of Holland, but he not being disposed to take upon himself alone such a commission, this had retarded its being put into execution.

I entreated the King to mention what I was to do, supposing the King of Spain sent his ratification to the Hague; and if I ought not to refuse it, if in the body of the ratification, or in the seal, he assumed the title of Duke of Burgundy: on which his Majesty told me, in his answer, that I should take particular care not to receive it, if the King of Spain took the title of Duke of Burgundy, either in the ratification, in the power, or even round the seal that should be affixed to it; but that though the arms of Burgundy should be in the seal, as that might be considered as a quarter of alliance, I should not refuse it; and that it was necessary that the treaty should be inserted, in the ratification of Spain, word for word, as it was in his.

The King informed me, by a letter, dated the sixth of July, that he was very well satisfied with the treaty I had signed, and that there was nothing either in the expression or the substance, which he did not greatly approve, and he sent me the ratification of it.

He also told me, that he had agreed to what I had put in a separate article, relating to the encampment of his troops in the Spanish Netherlands, till the ratification came from Spain; and he consented that every thing I had written on this subject should be executed; and that he had moreover granted, that his troops should not lodge in Spanish Gelderland, nor beyond Newpoort.

That he had at the same time given orders to marshal de Schomberg, to learn from the marquis de Grana, if in conformity to what was stipulated by treaty, he would abstain from all acts of hostility, or whether he would continue them; and that he was to conform to the resolution the marquis de Grana should take on this subject.

On the 13th of July, I let the States General know, that I had received the ratification of the treaty; and I took this opportunity to communicate to them the orders his Majesty had given to the marshal de Schomberg, not to perform any act of hostility in the Spanish Netherlands, if the marquis de Grana would consent to desist from them.

They came the same day to thank me for this information, and told me, that this made them evidently see the sincerity of his Majesty's intentions to re-establish, as soon as possible, the tranquillity of the Netherlands, and the peace of all Europe. They also communicated to me the resolution they had taken the day after the treaty was signed, and which they had already executed, of recalling their troops out of the Spanish Netherlands, and intreated me to make use of my good offices to prevail on the King to recal his, as soon as his Majesty's and their ratifications should be exchanged. They pressed me on this subject with great warmth: but I let them see that they ought to be satisfied, since his Majesty had consented to regulate the incampment of his troops, according to their wishes, and much more advantageously than I had promised; and had ordered the marshal de Schomberg to regulate his behaviour, in regard to acts of hostility, as the marquis de Grana would have him.

They desired me to make a separate article, in order to explain the ninth, in which we should declare, that his Majesty could not attack the Spanish
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Netherlands, either by himself or his allies. I shewed them the inutility of such an explication: but as they were very much bent upon it, and as I found they had constantly that chimerical fear of the Elector of Cologn's troops, which was greatly increased since their knowing that he resolved to render himself master of the citadel of Liege, I made no difficulty of preparing an article, as I had before agreed with the two deputies, who came to me the day after the signing of the treaty. This separate article was as follows:

“ The said embassador of his most Christian Majesty and the said deputies of the States General, in order to give a greater light to the ninth article of the convention, signed by them at the Hague, on the 29th of June last past; as also to take away, and even prevent the least subject of scruple and distrust, contrary to the fidelity with which they have treated, both on the one side and the other, have thought proper to declare, that when it is said in the said ninth article, that his most Christian Majesty obliges himself not to attack or take possession of any place in the Netherlands, &c. this is to be understood to mean, that his Majesty shall not attack, either by his own troops, or by those of his allies, and shall not take possession of any other place in the Spanish Netherlands, while the present war shall last; and when it is said that the States General shall not assist, either directly or indirectly the crown of Spain, &c. this is to be understood to mean, that they shall not give any assistance to the Spaniards, either by sea or by land, in any manner or in any place whatsoever, while the present war shall continue. In assurance of which, we the embassador of his most Christian Majesty afore said, and the above mentioned deputies of

“ the States General have signed the present declaration, which shall have the same power and efficacy, as if it had been inserted in the above convention. Done at the Hague the of July, 1684.”

It will appear, perhaps, that I, on my side, took a precaution, that was not necessary, since the article relating to Spain was sufficiently understood, as it was couched in the same terms in which it was expressed in all my memorials: but since the States General were desirous of my giving it this interpretation, I took hold of this opportunity, to insert expressions, which shewed, in a more authentic manner, their entirely forsaking the crown of Spain.

In the mean while I resolved to settle with the States General the manner in which we should proceed, to prevent the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty being retarded by this separate article; and they consented to exchange the ratification sent me by his Majesty, for theirs, as soon as they should have received them from the provinces, independently of those of the separate article; and I took upon myself the task of beseeching the King to give me a particular ratification of this article, which we were to exchange when I received it.

They at length told me, that as his Majesty was desirous of securing the peace of their barrier, they hoped, that the promise he had made them in the 10th article, of not taking an exchange in the Netherlands, would be extended to all the time the truce should last; and that this would not be confined, as I had expressed it, to the duration of the present war. To this I replied, that the treaty contained only two points, what was to be done if Spain accepted it, and what was to be done if Spain did not accept it; and that we had stipulated nothing, either on the one side or the other, but what

had a relation to one of these two cases. That, however, if they would engage not to give any assistance to Spain, during the twenty years truce, I would mention it to his Majesty; and I hoped, that on this condition, he would give them satisfaction. This answer put them to silence, and they only replied, that they would mention what I had said to their superiors. They informed me, that the ratifications of the provinces of Friesland and Groningen were already arrived.

I wrote to the King, on the 14th of July, that the States of Holland had that morning ratified the treaty, and that they had also ratified the separate article, which I had agreed upon the day before, with the deputies of the States General, though I myself had not yet signed it.

That I believed I had prevented their sending three deputies, who were to have gone to France, England and Berlin, on the concerns of the Prince of Orange. That the well affected had shewn their friends that these were sufficiently provided for by the article, which declared, that the treaties of Nimeguen, between his Majesty and the States General, should remain in full force and vigour, and that they had a right, in virtue of this article, to solicit his Majesty to restore the Prince of Orange to the principality of Orange, agreeably to what was stipulated in the treaty of Nimeguen.

I also informed his Majesty, that the Prince of Orange and his creatures still warmly endeavoured to prevent the exchange of the ratifications; and that I greatly suspected, that Mr. Dickfeld had only made a pretence of the journey he was obliged to make to Utrecht, in order to have a conference with the Prince of Orange, at Diren, to consult with him whether there was no means of preventing the entire completion of this affair.

That

That Dickfeld and the rest of the Prince of Orange's creatures were not endeavouring to re-establish that Prince in his principality; but that they had no other end in view, besides that of preventing the States General, at any rate, from ratifying the treaty.

On the 17th, I was informed, that they no longer sincerely thought of sending a person to England or Berlin, on the interests of the Prince of Orange; but that they might possibly send one to France; they had already spoke of it to some persons of Amsterdam, but there was not one of the well affected who would take upon himself this employment, unless there was joined with it a commission to endeavour to obtain a treaty of commerce, and the re-establishment of the ancient alliances between France and the States General.

I informed the King, that I was not mistaken with respect to the design of Mr. Dickfeld's journey to Utrecht, and that he had left nothing undone to hinder that province from giving its ratification: that he had feasted all the magistrates of the city one after another; when he asked them, if they knew that their fortune depended on the Prince of Orange, and if they believed that he would forgive their having personally declared against him on this occasion, if they did not at least refuse to ratify the treaty; but that his menaces had no effect on the minds of those who had the government of the city: but the case was not the same with respect to the clergy, who compose one of the three voices of the province of Utrecht, and who were under such apprehensions, lest the Prince of Orange, from the power he had usurped, should deprive them of their livings, that they resolved not to ratify it. That the nobles, who were wholly devoted to the Prince of Orange, had done so too; and

and that therefore there were two voices against one. That people were extremely surprized at Mr. Dickfeld's proceedings, and could not comprehend, how a province could dare to refuse to ratify a treaty to which it had given its consent, and which had been signed by its deputy: but that there was no doubt but that the province of Holland would immediately send thither, to shew the consequence of such a refusal, and the fatal effects that might proceed from it.

The Prince of Orange also made use of all his endeavours to prevent its being ratified by the province of Overijssel; and the more to intimidate the people, he placed a part of the troops of the States General in the neighbourhood of that province, and he himself was not far from it, being constantly employed in hunting at Dieren.

His Majesty, on the 13th of July, wrote to inform me, that though the marquis de Grana had not yet accepted the suspension of arms, that had been offered him; nevertheless, as by the eighth article of the treaty I had signed, his Majesty was obliged to put a stop, from that time, to all acts of hostility in the Netherlands, against the towns and places belonging to the crown of Spain, even in the open country, in case the Spaniards abstained from them, he ordered those who commanded in his forts and in his army, to prevent their being any acts of hostility committed, till these were begun by the troops of Spain; that he had even ordered all his infantry to retire into the places subject to him, and his artillery to be brought back and put into his arsenals; so that there would be none but the cavalry and dragoons left in the open country, till the exchange of the ratifications with Spain.

On the 18th of July, I answered the King, that I had informed the magistrates of Amsterdam of the orders

orders he had given his infantry to retire out of the countries belonging to Spain; that they expressed an extreme joy at hearing this news, and went immediately to communicate it to the States General, and that I was thoroughly persuaded, that it would produce a very good effect.

The States General sent on the 20th of July, to inform me, that their ratifications were ready; and having demanded an audience, they brought them to me at four o'clock, and we made the exchange.

They desired me at length to sign the separate article relating to the allies, of which I had already sent a copy to his Majesty; which I did.

Mr. Dickfeld did not return to the Hague; he could not better show his mischievous intentions, after having hindered the province of Utrecht from ratifying the treaty, than by not coming to give an account of this refusal, from the apprehension he was under, lest the States of Holland should obtain contrary orders, before the time stipulated was expired: but the ratification of Overijssel being that day arrived, notwithstanding the endeavours of the Prince of Orange, and the cabals of his creatures, the States General having the majority of the provinces, and pre-supposing that the others would ratify it, would not let slip the time prescribed.

The well-affected found that they had done a great deal in preventing the Prince of Orange from having either the honour or the advantage of having any thing stipulated, in his favour, in the treaty. 'Tis certain, that they behaved with great fidelity and firmness on this occasion: but 'tis still more certain, that after having compromised matters in this manner, they would afterwards be obliged to support them, which if they had done, the King would have disposed of the States General at his pleasure.

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On the 21st of July, I sent the King the ratifications of the States General, and informed him, that the Prince of Orange was extremely uneasy at their being exchanged: that he had always flattered himself with the hopes of being able to prevent it: that his creatures had taken a very artful step, in order to traverse this affair; and had made use of such measures, that the provinces of Gelderland and Zealand had consented to ratify the treaty; but on condition only, that the exchange should not be made till after they had procured the Prince of Orange an entire satisfaction. This was also done by the province of Overyssel; but besides this it had given orders to its deputies, that if the provinces of Holland, Friesland and Groningen persisted in absolutely resolving to exchange the ratifications, without delay, under any pretence whatsoever, they were then to deliver theirs, which were full and explicit. These deputies executed the orders of their superiors, and continued firm till the 20th of July, when seeing the provinces of Holland, Friesland and Groningen resolved to ratify it, independantly of the other provinces, they delivered their ratifications, and the resolution was immediately taken in the States General, of making the exchange.

The King informed me, by a letter, dated on the 24th of July, that he approved of every thing contained in the separate article, on which I had agreed with the States General, and that he had accordingly sent the ratification of it. His Majesty joined another to it, as well for the treaty as for the separate article, to make an exchange with the minister of Spain, in case the Catholic King sent his.

His Majesty let me know, that the ambassador of the States General had pressed him very much to cause his cavalry to retire out of the Spanish Netherlands;

lands; but that he was not disposed to do it before the crown of Spain had ratified the treaty. That the Spaniards ought to thank the States General for recalling their troops, when they were no longer necessary for the defence of the places subject to the catholic King; but that this could not oblige his Majesty to behave in the same manner before the ratification of Spain was arrived.

On the second of August I informed the States General, that the King had sent me the ratification of the separate article, and the ratifications of the treaty to be exchanged with those of Spain. They were very glad to hear it, and having demanded an audience, they brought me, at six o'clock in the evening, a memorial which the Emperor's resident had presented that day, with the resolution they had taken in consequence of it.

This resident, after having exaggerated in very pompous terms, the Emperor's zeal for promoting the peace of all the Kings, Princes, and States his allies, and in general of all Europe, and having represented in a long discourse, that there was no better method of obviating the dangers with which all christendom was threatened by the Turks, than to come to an accommodation with the most christian King, declared, that his imperial Majesty accepted the truce offered by France, as well for himself as for all the Empire, for his allies, and those comprehended in the peace of Westphalia and Nimeguen, and in particular for the circle of Burgundy; as also for his catholic Majesty, and all his kingdoms and states, with inclusion of the allies of Spain, and in particular of the republic of Genoa; and that, in virtue of a power he had obtained from the King of Spain. That therefore, nothing more was to be done in order to pacify all Europe, than to authorize

thorize the French minister at Ratisbon to conclude a general truce between the Empire, Spain, France, and all their allies; and that his most christian Majesty should recal his troops, and put an end to all acts of hostility, in order that they might endeavour after a peace.

The resolution of the States General was, that since Spain had effectively accepted the truce offered by the King of France, they waited till his Majesty should give the necessary orders at Ratisbon, to the end that this affair might be concluded according to the acceptance made by the King of Spain with inclusion of his allies, and mentioning the republic of Genoa; and that he should immediately recal his troops out of the Spanish Netherlands, and other of the provinces of his most catholic Majesty; and that I should be desired to apply to his Majesty on this subject.

I replied, that I would not have received such an acceptance, if it had been offered me two months sooner; but in the state affairs were then in, it was entirely unreasonable. That the Austrians would act with insincerity, should they propose a universal truce, when that of Spain was already signed. That there were no means more sure or more short of establishing the general peace, than that of Spain's ratifying the truce concluded at the Hague, and that those affairs should be decided at Ratisbon which related to the Empire. That I was surprized at the demands contained in their resolution, that the King should recal his troops out of the dominions of Spain, and that the interests of the republic of Genoa ought to be comprehended in the truce with that crown; that this was entirely contrary to the treaty they had just signed, and directly opposite to the sentiments they had always expressed; that

that they ought not to mingle in the treaty concluded in favour of Spain, (and if I might be allowed to say so, in favour of the States General) for the safety of the Netherlands, the interests of all the other allies of Spain, or the quarrels of the republic of Genoa; and that I could not conceive in what light Europe would consider the conduct of the States General in bringing me this resolution after the treaty they had signed. They could not deny that it was not agreeable to their treaty; and said, that they had not properly explained their intention, which was to adhere to the treaty signed at the Hague, and therefore they desired me to return their resolution, in order that they might put it in other terms.

I learnt, that what had induced the States General to take this step, was a private letter from their ambassador at Madrid, which had informed them, that Spain would neither agree to a peace or a truce without comprehending in it the republic of Genoa. The Pensionary Fagel had made use of this incident in order to endeavour still to put a stop to the affair. He had not dared, however, to mention it to the States General, and had only addressed himself to some deputies, who were most devoted to the Prince of Orange, and who after having, amongst themselves, examined the memorial presented by the Emperor's resident, had resolved to interfere in the affairs of Genoa, which were of great importance to the trade of the Levant. 'Tis true, the other deputies who accompanied them, and even they themselves, were greatly surprized when I perused their resolution in their presence, because they themselves had not read it; for Fagel, their secretary, had only informed them of its contents; and for this reason they immediately took it back to make him alter it; the

the Pensionary Fagel was in a violent rage with his brother the secretary for having suffered this, and the deputies of the States General were still debating on the manner in which they should interpose in behalf of the Genoese.

This information obliged me to do two things, one of which was to send to some of the deputies of the States General, to make them reflect on the treachery of the Pensionary Fagel, who had drawn up such a resolution, which if I had taken without examination, would have been sent into France and England, and have drawn the States General into engagements contrary to their treaty. That they themselves ought not to wish to have the King consent, that the affairs of Genoa should be comprehended in the treaty with Spain; since after their refusing it at the Hague, the Pensionary Fagel would from thence form a pretence, for accusing those who had concluded on not mentioning any thing relating to the interest of Genoa in the treaty, with being remiss in their duty; and would not fail to say, that as his Majesty was willing now to admit this article, he would have granted this, and many others, if they had behaved with firmness and resolution, and that by this means he would make them entirely lose their credit with the people.

The other step was, to desire the States General to come to me. We had a long conference, in which they at length declared, that they intended faithfully to execute the treaty signed at the Hague; that so far from approving the memorial presented by the Emperor's envoy, they confessed, that they were something to blame for accepting it; that nevertheless, they could not dispense with their communicating it to me, and desiring me to make use of my good offices, to the end that every thing might be

be brought to an accommodation; but that they desired no more than *officium boni viri*; and that they would not pretend to say, that this ought to retard the ratification of Spain within the time mentioned in the treaty signed at the Hague. This was all the success obtained by this new and last attempt of the Pensionary Fagel. After which we exchanged the ratifications of the separate article, which was done on the 14th of August 1684.

F I N I S.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

